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ADDENDA
ERRATA
Page 592. Wood v. Hughes. The proper citation of the case is 9 N.Y.2d
144,- N.E.2d-, 212 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1961).
Subsequent Dispositions of Cases Noted
Page 159. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co. An order granted on re-
mand was vacated at 365 U.S. 125 (1961) (per curiam).
Page 163. In the Matter of Cohen was affirmed sub norm. Cohen v. Hur-
ley, 81 Sup. Ct. 954 (1961).
Page 187. Remington Arms Co. v. G.E.M., Inc. is reported officially at
257 Mlinn. 562 (1960).
Page 404. Brundage v. United States. The official citation denying cer-
tiorari is at 364 U.S. 831 (1960).
Page 578. Swart v. South Burlington School Dist. Certiorari was denied,
29 U.S.L. Week 3345 (U.S. May 15, 1961).
Page 582. McPhaul v. United States. Rehearing was denied at 364 U.S.
925 (1960).
Page 586. Pugack v. Dollinger. The official citation of the case is 365
U.S. 458 (1961) (per curiam).
Page 619. Consolidated Edison Co. v. United States was affirmed by the
Supreme Court. See 29 U.S.L. Week 4431 (U.S. May 22, 1961).
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This issue of the Fordham Law Review, representing the first sym-
posium issue in the Review's history, offers a collection of articles and
student comments on a broad variety of land use planning subjects. We
have selected a field in which there is perhaps less settled law than in
other areas of legal concentration. Our choice, however, has been future-
directed, motivated by a desire to familiarize our readers with some of
the social, economic and legal problems in a relatively new area of legal
endeavor.
In addition to our authors, reviewers and foreword writer, we must
express our special gratitude to Miss Miriam Strong, Mr. Robert Alpern,
and Ir. Alfred Shapiro of the Department of City Planning of the New
York City Planning Commission; 'Mr. Joseph P. 'McMurray, Director of
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board; Professor Robert C. Wood of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Ir. Sidney Z. Searles and
Mr. Norman Williams, Jr., members of the New York Bar. We also
express our sincere thanks to those state and local officials of the various
jurisdictions of the United States who generously furnished us with writ-
ten materials, which proved to be of invaluable assistance in the prepara-
tion of the student section of this issue.
The Editors

PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS BEFORE TRIAL IN
FEDERAL CRMIXNAL PROCEDURE
LESTER B. ORFIELD*
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure gave the Suprcme
Court Advisory Committee mnore drafting problcms than any other rule.
Professor Orfield, a member of the Advisory Comfnittec, traces the ricd's
development through its drafting stages, analyzes the case law Which prc-
ceded it, and studies the courts' treatment of the rule since its cnactment.
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, entitled "Plead-
ings and Mlotions Before Trial; Defenses and Objections," provides:
(a) Pleadings and MNotions. Pleadings in criminal proceedings shall be the indict-
ment and the information, and the pleas of not guilty, guilty and volo contcndcre.
All other pleas, and demurrers, and motions to quash are abolished, and defenses
and objections raised before trial which heretofore could have been raised by one
or more of them shall be raised only by motion to dismiss or to grant appropriate
relief, as provided in these rules.
(b) The Motion Raising Defenses and Objections.
(1) Defenses and Objections 'Which May Be Raised. Any defense or objection
which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be
raised before trial by motion.
(2) Defenses and Objections Which Must Be Raised. Defenses and objections
based on defects in the institution of the prosecution or in the indictment or in-
formation other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge
an offense may be raised only by motion before trial. The motion shall include all
such defenses and objections then available to the defendant. Failure to present
any such defense or objection as herein provided constitutes a waiver thereof, but
the court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver. Lack of jurisdiction
or the failure of the indictment or information to charge an offense shall be noticed
by the court at any time during the pendency of the proceeding.
(3) Time of Making Motion. The motion shall be made before the plea is
entered, but the court may permit it to be made within a reasonable time thereafter.
(4) Hearing on Motion. A motion before trial raising defenses or objections
shall be determined before trial unless the court orders that it be deferred for de-
termination at the trial of the general issue. An issue of fact shall be tried by
a jury if a jury trial is required under the Constitution or an act of Congress. All
other issues of fact shall be determined by the court with or without a jury or on
affidavits or in such other manner as the court may direct.
(5) Effect of Determination. If a motion is determined adverzely to the
defendant he shall be permitted to plead if he had not previouly pleaded. A plea
previously entered shall stand. If the court grants a motion based on a defect in
the institution of the prosecution or in the indictment or information, it may also
order that the defendant be held in custody or that his bail be continued for a
specified time pending the filing of a new indictment or information. Nothing in
this rule shall be deemed to affect the provisions of any act of Congress relating
to periods of limitations.
- Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
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I. HISTORY OF DRAFTING RULE 12
The first draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, dated
September 8, 1941, provided in rule 7(a) that no "other pleadings shall
be allowed" beyond indictment, presentment, information, complaint,
and pleas of not guilty, nolo contendere, and guilty. Rule 7(b) cor-
responded to Federal Civil Rule 7(b) on "Motions and Other Papers."
Rule 7(c) provided: "Demurrers, pleas in abatement, pleas to the juris-
diction, special pleas in bar, and exceptions for insufficiency of a plead-
ing shall not be used." Rule 7(b)(2) provided that if the defendant
does not enter a plea of nolo contendere or of guilty, he shall enter a
plea of not guilty or a motion to dismiss the accusation. If he wishes
to deny the charge and assert an affirmative defense, he shall file a
motion to dismiss the written accusation, as provided in rule 7 (c). Under
rule 7(c) the defendant shall file a motion to dismiss
if he wishes to establish affirmatively (1) that the written accusation is inadequate
because specified statutory requirements were not obeyed in its preparation or filing;
because it does not charge the defendant with the commission of an offense; because
it misjoins defendants or defenses; because it misnames the defendant; or because
it is otherwise defective or not sufficient to give notice to the defendant and to the
court of the offense which the written accusation is designed to accuse the de-
fendant of having committed; or (2) that there is a legal bar to the prosecution be-
cause of lack of jurisdiction in the court, the operation of the statute of limitations,
justification, entrapment, former jeopardy, former conviction, former acquittal, im-
munity or pardon; or (3) that there is a bar in fact to a conviction because of
impossibility, as in case of alibi, or (4) that the defendant did not have the
alleged criminal intent at the time he did the act, because of coercion, self-defense,
infancy, intoxication, or insanity. Any other matter constituting an avoidance, or
affirmative defense shall likewise be asserted by the defendant by a motion to dismiss
the written accusation. The motion to dismiss because of an affirmative defense
shall state the facts and shall cite the records, if any, on which the defense is based.
The defendant may from time to time, file with the court a motion for an order
requiring the government to provide a bill of particulars stating further facts neces-
sary to enable the defendant to prepare his motion to dismiss.
Under rule 7(d) the Government can file a reply motion. The United
States attorney can join in the motion to dismiss or reply in opposition
thereto, or move for an order requiring the defendant to provide a bill
of particulars stating facts necessary for the investigation and disposi-
tion of the motion to dismiss. The court must dismiss the accusation
if the United States attorney joins in the motion or if his written reply
is insufficient. "If a hearing is held, a jury may be had on any issue of
fact upon the request of the Government or of the defendant or upon
the court's own motion." Upon the conclusion of the hearing, the court
shall enter an order either dismissing or overruling the motion to dis-
miss. If the court overrules the motion, its order shall provide that the
facts established be taken as proved upon trial or other judicial consid-
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eration of the issue. No order of the court can interfere with the assertion
of the defense of lack of jurisdiction.
A letter from the Committee for the District of Colorado suggested
that demurrers, motions to quash, pleas in abatement, pleas in bar, and
other special pleas be abolished, and a motion to dismiss substituted;
that this motion be in writing, stating precisely the grounds for it and
the relief or order sought. The motion should be filed at or before the
time of arraignment or within the time allowed by the court. All motions
to dismiss not based on grounds appearing on the face of the indictment
should set forth the facts relied on in concise form and should be verified.
The Committee for the Southern District of Florida suggested that
all objections be made by motion to quash, and that this motion be
permitted to be made orally and recorded in shorthand by the court
reporter; that the motion be heard any time after return of the indict-
ment; and that the rule state the effect of sustaining the motion to quash.
The Committee for the District of Kansas would permit the court to
quash an indictment or information on three grounds: (1) the grand
jury has no authority over the offense; (2) the facts do not constitute
an offense; (3) the indictment or information contains allegations
amounting to justification or other bar. An indictment or information
should not be dismissed except on motion stating reasons and by court
order. Where the defendant has counsel and time the motion should be made
before arraignment and ten days before trial, unless the court orders
otherwise or unavoidable circumstances prevent. When the defendant
is without counsel, the court must afford him an opportunity to file these
pleas after counsel has been appointed and consulted.
The Committee for the Western District of Oklahoma recommended
that within ten days after a plea of not guilty the defendant may file
any special plea in writing without withdrawing the plea of not guilty
and serve a copy on the United States attorney; that all objections be
consolidated; that if the plea is not timely filed, all objections except
failure to charge a crime are waived.
Judge David A. Pine of the District of Columbia would require all
dilatory motions to be filed at one time. Alexander Campbell, United
States Attorney for Indiana, Northern District, suggested that pleadings
be filed within thirty days after return of the indictment or service of
a capias and would permit the court to extend time to plead on a proper
showing. Frederick E. Faville of the Committee for the Northern Dis-
trict of Iowa would hold a pre-trial conference to serve as the Govern-
ment's bill of particulars and the defendant's disclosure of his actual
defense. Tobias E. Diamond, United States Attorney for Iowa, sug-
gested that all objections should be required in one pleading. The Com-
mittee for the District of New Jersey would have dilatory pleas and
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motions made within thirty days after arraignment, but the defendant
need not argue the motion promptly unless the United States attorney
brings on the argument.
Rule 30(a) of the second draft, dated January 12, 1942, provided
that the only pleas or pleadings shall be an indictment, an information,
a complaint, not guilty, nolo contendere, and guilty. Presentments were
not mentioned. Rule 30(c) provided: "Demurrers, pleas in abatement,
pleas to the jurisdiction, motions to quash, and special pleas shall not
be used." Instead, a motion would be used, eliminating the problem
of selecting a plea. Rule 51(c) (4) provided: "If the defendant pleads
not guilty he shall at the same time file any motions asking the court
for orders either disposing of the written accusation or bringing the case
on to a trial." Rule 51(c)(1) allowed the defendant on arraignment
to ask the court for time to secure counsel or otherwise prepare his de-
fense. Rule 51(d) substituted motions for the former modes of objec-
tion to the accusation. Rule 51(e) provided that the motion be in writ-
ing, signed by the defendant or his attorney, and verified if it alleges
matters within the personal knowledge of the defendant or his attorney.
The court would hear no grounds of objection other than those stated.
These may be one or more of the following, but no legal ground is barred
because it is not enumerated:
that the written accusation was not prepared, filed or prosecuted according to law;
that it does not charge the defendant with the commission of an offense; that it
misnames the defendant; that it misjoins defendants or defenses; that it contains
allegations which are surplusage or duplications or repugnant; that it does not cite
the statute or rule on which it is based; or that the prosecution is barred by law,
because of facts concerning the defendant, as lack of jurisdiction, former jeopardy,
former conviction, former acquittal, pardon, or immunity, or because of facts con-
cerning the alleged offense, as lack of jurisdiction, statute of limitation, justification
or entrapment.
The Government could make a counter motion. If it "raises an issue
of fact," the motion may be heard before a jury upon request of the
defendant or Government, or upon the court's own motion.
Rule 51(b) of the third draft, dated March 4, 1942, made no pro-
vision for the defendant obtaining time at his arraignment to secure
counsel or otherwise prepare his defense. Rule 51(b) (4) provided:
"If the defendant pleads not guilty he shall within a reasonable time
fixed by the court file any motions for orders with respect to the written
accusation." The rule no longer listed in detail the various defenses and
objections, but left this to a footnote to rule 51(d)(1). Rule 51(d)(2)
provided: "When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the
court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective par-
ties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly
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on oral testimony or depositions." Rule 51(d)(3) did not provide, as
the former drafts, a sweeping right to jury trial.
If the motion raises an issue of fact upon which the defendant in the opinion of the
court would heretofore have had the right to jury trial if the issue had been raised
by a special plea, a jury may be had without request by the defendant, but the
defendant may waive jury trial with the consent of the government and of the court.
Rule 51(d)(4) was new. It provided:
If the motion alleges a defect consisting of the omission from the written accusa-
tion of a necessary allegation which either is uncontroverted or rwould in the
opinion of the court be proved by the government if it were contained in the writ-
ten accusation, the court, if it dismisses the written accusation, may order that the
defendant shall not be released if he is in custody, or that his bail Ehall not be
discharged if he has given bail, until the expiration of a period of time spzcifed by
the court. If a new written accusation is filed vthin the specified period, the de-
fendant shall remain in custody or his bail shall be deemed to continue in effect,
otherwise he shall be released or his bail discharged at the expiration of the
specified period.
The fourth draft, dated May 19, 1942, was more concise and ran
closer to the final form. Rule 15(b) provided: "Any matter capable
of determination before the trial of the general issue may be raised in
advance of trial by motion. Defects in the institution of the prosecution
and objections to the indictment or information other than that it fails
to charge an offense or to show jurisdiction in the court shall be raised
only by motion and before trial." Under rule 15(c) (1) the motion "may
be made before or after the plea but within such reasonable time as the
court shall fix, and shall be made together unless, for good cause shown,
the court shall otherwise permit." The motion was to be made "in writ-
ing or orally as the court may permit, and may be supported by affidavit."
Rule 15 (c) (3) provided:
When a motion in advance of trial raises an issue of fact, the defendant is entitled
to trial by jury if the issue could be properly raised at the trial under a plea of not
guilty. All other issues of fact raised on motions in advance of trial may be tried
as the court shall direct by affidavit or otherwise and with or without a jury. When
an issue has been tried and determined in advance of trial, the determination shall
control the subsequent course of the proceeding.
Rule 15(a) of the fifth draft, dated June 1942, made no important
changes. Rule 15 (c) (2) provided that motions "may be made before or
after the plea or accompanying the plea but within such reasonable time
before trial as the court shall fix, and shall be made and heard together
unless, for good cause shown, the court shall otherwise permit." A draft,
known as the Preliminary Draft, of May 1942, was submitted to the
Supreme Court for comment. The Court pointed out that rule 15(b)
abolished demurrers and certain pleas, while a statute allowed a direct
appeal to the Supreme Court, speaking in terms of demurrers and pleas
19601
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
in bar.' The statute provided that "the right of appeal shall continue in
those cases in which appeals are now authorized by law." Therefore,
it seemed necessary, in the court's opinion, to redraft rule 15(b) so as
to relate it to the statute. It could be that the abolition of demurrers
and pleas in bar was unnecessary. With respect to rule 15(c) (3), relat-
ing to the determination of the motion, the Court asked: "Has the
question been considered whether this rule raises questions of double
jeopardy unless the trial of the preliminary question is before the same
jury which sits in the main trial and is in effect a part of the main trial?"
Rule 12 of the sixth draft, dated Winter 1942-1943, made a number
of changes. Rule 12 was split into two subsections, with the same titles
as the final version. Rule 12(a) was in effect the same as the final ver-
sion. Rule 12(b)(1) provided: "The motion shall be made at arraign-
ment or at such other time as the court or these rules may determine.
The motion shall present together all defenses and objections then avail-
able to the defendant. It may be made before, with, or after a plea."
Rule 12(b)(2) provided:
The court may order an immediate hearing of the motion, upon request of the de-
fendant, of the Government or upon its own initiative, whenever in the opinion of the
court a decision in advance of the trial of the general issue may substantially
dispose of the whole proceeding or any part of it. Affidavits may be submitted by
each party. The right to trial by jury shall be preserved to each party. The court
may determine the motion or it may order that the defense or objections raised
by the motion may be submitted for determination at the trial of the general issue.
Rule 15(b) (3) provided for waiver for failure to make a motion "ex-
cept that the lack of jurisdiction or the failure of the indictment or
information to charge an offense shall always be noted by the court
whenever or however brought to its attention." Rule 12 (b) (5) provided
for the statute on direct appeals in criminal cases to continue in effect
and the words "demurrer," "motion to quash," "plea in abatement,"
"plea in bar," or "special plea in bar" to be interpreted to mean "motion
raising a defense or objection" as provided in this rule.
The First Preliminary Draft (seventh committee draft), dated May
1943, changed the number of the rule to 13. It contained the same
subsection headings and division of subsection headings as the final
version. Rule 13(b) (3) provided: "The motion shall be made before or
after the plea but within such reasonable time before trial as the court
shall fix." The first sentence of rule 13(b)(4) provided: "The court may
order a hearing of the motion whenever it is of the opinion that a deci-
sion in advance of the trial of the general issue may substantially dispose
of the whole proceeding or of any part of it."
1. Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246.
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The following comments were made to the Advisory Committee on
the First Preliminary Draft. Former Attorney General Homer Cum-
mings stated, concerning rule 13(a):
This should result in a reduction of opportunities for dilatory tactics, and, at the
same time, relieve the defense of embarrassment. Many competent practitioners have
been baffled and mystified by the distinctions between pleas in abatement, pleas in
bar, demurrers, and motions to quash, and have, at times, found difficulty in de-
termining which of these should be invoked. I recall a case in which I was recently
concerned in which learned counsel debated among themselves for nearly a veek
which course to pursue and which pleading came first. We ended by filing them all
plus a few extra motions for full measure. The Court was patient and heard
arguments on them all.2
James G. Martin of Norfolk, Virginia, stated: ".As 'not guilty' is a
plea in bar, I think it would be a little better to say 'and special pleas
in bar are abolished,' or 'and pleas in bar (except the plea of not guilty)
are abolished.' "" The federal judges of 'Michigan pointed out that no
provision was made as to a motion for a bill of particulars, the most
common dilatory motion.' There should, they said, be a time limit
for such motion. It should be made before plea and within five days
after arraignment.
The Judicial Conference of the Ninth Circuit adopted a resolution
to purge rule 13(b)(1),(4) and (5) and to substitute the provisions of
the California Penal Code in paragraphs 1016, 1019, and 1020, which
provide what pleas may be interposed." Thomas V. Arrowsmith, Assist-
ant United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey, thought that
the rule still left open the way to delay trial by successive pleas to the
jurisdiction and motions for bill of particulars.' Harry L. Underwood,
Assistant Director of the Bureau of Inquiry of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, favored a statement of the points relied on in the motion,
particularly motions to dismiss for failure to charge an offense. Rule 15
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had such a requirement.7
Robert S. Rubin, Special Counsel for the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, stated with respect to the provision that lack of jurisdiction
shall be noted whenever it comes to the court's attention: "Does this
include the objection of improper venue, which previously had to be
raised before trial or else waived? I favor the waiver of such an ob-
2. 1 Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, Comments, Recommen-
dations, and Suggestions Received Concerning the Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure 93 (1943) [hereinafter cited as Comments].
3. Id. at 94.
4. 2 Comments 390.
5. 2 Comments 391.
6. Id. at 392.
7. Id. at 392.
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jection, if not raised prior to trial."8 United States District Judge W.
Calvin Chesnut of Maryland thought that the rule did not state clearly
which motions to dismiss were within the discretion of the court and
not appealable, such as motions to quash, and which were appealable
on adverse rulings.' John T. Metcalf, United States Attorney for the
Eastern District of Kentucky, thought the question of lack of jurisdic-
tion or failure to charge an offense should be raised not later than the
time set to move for a new trial.
With respect to rule 13(b) (3), Seth Thomas of the Court of Appeals
of the Eighth Circuit suggested that no motions be made before arraign-
ment.10 If the defendant is going to plead guilty, he will not make a
motion. If he pleads not guilty, the trial judge controls the time of mak-
ing the motion. Judge J. W. Waring of the Eastern District of South
Carolina would have the rule provide simply: "The motion shall be
made before a plea." Motions should be disposed of before pleas. Once
the plea is filed, the case should be ready for trial." Joseph T. Votava,
United States Attorney for the District of Nebraska, would amend the
rule to require leave of court for a motion after plea. To bar motions
completely after plea might be harsh on defendants, particularly those
arraigned shortly after return of the indictment. Under the existing prac-
tice, courts protected the defendant by permitting him to withdraw his
plea. The committee rule, on the contrary, permits motions up to trial.
This is unfair to the Government since it prevents investigation of the
law or writing of briefs. 2 Stuart H. Steinbrink of New York favored
a motion made within a fixed time after arraignment, for example, ten
days, with a proviso that the court may extend the time for cause."
With respect to rule 13(b) (4), Judge Merrill E. Otis of the Western
District of Missouri asked: "Would it not be better if it is a motion
which raises an issue of fact as to which the defendant is entitled to a
jury trial, to reserve that question to the trial of the case on the merits?"14
An example of such a motion is one setting up a prior conviction. There
should not be two jury trials in such a case. Joseph T. Votava thought
that the rule would
lead to a practice of double trials. Under this provision, attorneys for defendants
will learn to file motions, raising some issue of fact, and then demanding trial on
8. Id. at 393.
9. 1 Comments 95.
10. Id. at 96.
11. Id. at 96.
12. Id. at 97.
13. 2 Comments 394.
14. 1 Comments 98.
15. Id. at 98.
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the motion, with all of the expense involved, and vill do this solely as a fishing
expedition to find out just what the Government's evidence is.1r
Judge Xenophon Hicks of the Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit
thought one trial by jury sufficient, and a preliminary trial unnecessary.10
Robert S. Rubin found the following sentence ambiguous: "The
court may determine the motion or may order that the defenses or ob-
jections raised by the motion may be submitted for determination at the
trial of the general issue." It was not clear whether court or jury was
to decide the issue raised by the motion.17 This sentence was deleted
from the succeeding drafts of the rule. Stuart H. Steinbrink questioned
the advisability of permitting the court to reserve the defenses raised
by motion until trial."' This encouraged the trial judge to avoid re-
sponsibility for terminating a prosecution or for deciding difficult legal
issues. If a defendant's motion has merit, he is entitled to prompt deter-
mination and dismissal, and should not incur the expense and delay of
a trial. The Government is likewise saved such e.xpense and, in addition,
the defendant may make only one motion. The rule should provide that
the motion be determined before trial.19
Judge A. F. St. Sure of the Northern District of California would
delete subsections (1), (4) and (5) of rule 13(b). The rule encourages
and permits a determination of issues of fact by a jury all of which,
save insanity, are now determined on trial of the general issue. Some
issues of fact which might arise in a criminal case are: entrapment, alibi,
confession by duress, self defense and the statute of limitations where
the issue is whether the defendant is a fugitive. Some of these would
present mixed questions of fact and law which the judge would feel
constrained to submit to a jury. An unpredictable number of "issues
of fact" might arise which would have to be tried by a jury before trial
of the general issue.20 James E. Ruffin of the Criminal Division of the
Department of justice thought that the "rule should specify exactly
what issues the defendant is entitled to have tried under the general
issue, and what issues of fact he is entitled to have tried before the
trial of the general issue."'' s
With respect to rule 13(b) (5), Judge T. C. Trimble of the Eastern
District of Arkansas thought there should be a provision for suspending
the operation of the statute of limitations if the motion were granted,
pending the filing of a new accusation. 2 Robert S. Rubin thought that
16. 2 Comments 395.
17. Id. at .397.
IS. Id. at 397.
19. Id. at 397.
20. Id. at 397-98.
21. 2 Comments 393.
22. 1 Comments 99.
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the note to this subdivision should make it clear that the rule does not
supersede the statutes providing for tolling of the statute of limitations
pending the return of a new indictment.23 James E. Ruffin would state
the amount of time which a defendant can be held in custody or on ball
pending the filing of a new accusation.24
The Second Preliminary Draft (eighth committee draft), dated Febru-
ary 1944, changed the number of this rule to 12. Rule 12(b)(3) pro-
vided: "The motion shall be made before the plea is entered, or there-
after and within such reasonable time before the trial as the court may
fix." The other provisions of rule 12 obtained their final form. The
provision on the Criminal Appeal Statute was omitted.
The following comments were made to the Advisory Committee on
the Second Preliminary Draft. The Special Committee of the Los Angeles
Bar Association thought that an indictment should be excluded from
the definition of "pleadings," as in rule 12(a)(16). Judge Learned
Hand had pointed out that an indictment is not a pleading but the charge
of the grand jury.25 Others, including Blackstone, define it as an accusa-
tion, but never as a pleading. Concerning rule 12 (b) (2), the Committee
of the State Bar of California suggested that any motion involving a
question of fact, which terminated the case if granted, should be triable
by a jury without limitation.26 On the recommendation of Judge Learned
Hand, the Judicial Conference for the Second Circuit adopted a motion
to strike out the last sentence of rule 12(b) providing that lack of juris-
diction or failure to charge an offense shall be noticed by the court at
any time.2 7
The doctrine of waiver should prevent, except at the beginning, the
raising of the jurisdictional question. This was the rule with personal
jurisdiction, even in the constitutional or international sense. The de-
fendant could have a fair trial in another district of a state or even in
another state. All the federal courts are equally competent. If the de-
fendant chooses to have the case tried by the wrong federal court, con-
sciously or unconsciously, he has no meritorious ground for objection.
If he were acquitted after a trial in the wrong court, the Government
should not be able to prosecute in the right court. If the defendant con-
sciously avoids raising the question, he is in no position to complain. A
question of policy alone is involved. The rules permit the defendant
to waive more important questions. The rule is wrong in not permitting
a waiver for failure to charge an offense. It is in conflict with federal
23. 2 .Comments 399.
24. Id. at 399.
25. Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420, 425 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 590 (1928).
See 24 Ill. L. Rev. 319, 322 (1929).
26. 4 Comments 30.
27. 3 Comments 44.
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rule 55(a) on harmless error..2 1 Ralph F. Lesemann of the Bar Com-
mittee for the Seventh Circuit suggested that the defense of pardon,
former acquittal, former conviction, former jeopardy, and the statute
of limitations be made by motion before trial, and that such defenses
be included in the motion. It is important to the defendant that the
rules specify when and how such defenses be raised, and that the Govern-
ment be apprised before it goes to the expense of preparing for trial."
The Tennessee federal judges thought that the proposed rule 12 (b) (3)
was confusing and might require a standing order since a court could
not anticipate the making of a motion or fix a reasonable time until noti-
fied that a motion was to be made. The rule should read as follows:
"The motion shall be made before the plea is entered, or thereafter,
within the discretion of the court, and within a reasonable time."' '
The Report of the Advisory Committee (ninth committee draft),
dated June 1944, merely finalized rule 12(b) (3), providing for the time
to make a motion. The Supreme Court adopted the rule without any
change.
II. FEDERAL PROCEDULRE PRIOR TO RULE 12
A. What Law Govcrnzs
There have always been cases involving pleadings and motions before
trial. The early ones made reference to the common law, to English
cases, and to such English writers as Blackstone and Chitty. In 1858
Circuit justice Clifford, in passing on the wording of an indictment for
murder, pointed out that Congress had provided no forms for indict-
ments and that the "common law prevailing in the jurisprudence of the
states"'- must be what Congress intended regarding the accusation and
trial of offenders. The matter "must be referred to the laws of the
states and the usages and customs of the courts at the time when the
judicial system of the United States was organized."32
In passing on the sufficiency of an information, a district court in 1870
stated that "state laws do not control in criminal proceedings in the
United States courts ... in the mode or form of charging the offense....
On the contrary, the proceedings throughout are according to the course
of the common law, except so far as has been otherwise provided by
the laws of congress or by constitutional provision."33 Hence, the names
2S. Id. at 45.
29. Id. at 46.
30. Id. at 47.
31. United States v. Williams, 2S Fed. Cas. 636, 641 (No. 16707) (C.C.D. MNfe. 1053 ).
32. Ibid. The court cited United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1051), which,
however, had laid down rules for evidence and trial. In the instant case, the court appliad
the state law of Maine and Masachusetts, of which Maine had been a part.
33. United States v. Shepard, 27 Fed. Cas. 1056, 105 (No. 16273) (E.D. BEch. 170).
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of witnesses for the prosecution need not be indorsed on the indictment
or information even though a statute of the state required it. In 1871
Circuit Judge Dillon stated: "In the federal courts the sufficiency of
pleas in abatement, in the absence of legislation by congress touching
the question or authorized rules of court, must be tested by the princi-
ples of the common law."134 In 1875 Circuit Judge Woods concluded that
in the absence of a statute "questions of criminal jurisprudence ... must
be governed by the common law .... I'll
But in 1880 a judge stated that "in all matters respecting the accusa-
tion and trial of offenders, not otherwise provided for, we are referred
to the laws and usages of the state when the judicial system was organ-
ized." 6 In the same year another court followed the common law. 7 In
1882, state law governed the effect of standing mute with respect to
misdemeanors.38 In 1886 Circuit Justice Gray stated that "the statutes
and the practice of the states do not control the rules of pleading in
criminal cases in the courts of the United States. . . ."I' At arraignment
or trial, the common law applies to objections of present insanity.4" As
late as 1908, a district court referred to statutes of the state in which
the court sat as controlling in attacking the validity of the indictment
due to defects in the grand jury proceedings.4' Yet a plea in abatement
was held to lie although the state statutes were silent. Thus prior fed-
eral precedents were followed. The same year a court of appeals in
determining whether the names of grand jury witnesses must be indorsed
on the indictment stated: "Criminal cases in the federal courts are gov-
erned and controlled by federal statutes and federal decisions, and state
statutes and state decisions are inapplicable."42
In 1916 it was found that state law did not apply in sustaining a
demurrer to an indictment.43 In 1920 the Supreme Court held that state
law did not apply to a motion to quash an indictment, found after a
prior grand jury had failed to find one.44 In 1931 the Supreme Court,
34. United States v. Williams, 28 Fed. Cas. 666, 669 (No. 16716) (C.C.D. Minn. 1871).
35. United States v. Hammond, 26 Fed. Cas. 99, 100 (No. 15294) (C.C.D. La. 1875).
36. United States v. Coppersmith, 4 Fed. 198, 204-05 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1880). Tho
court cited United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851).
37. United States v. Nye, 4 Fed. 888, 890 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1880). The case involved
joinder of several distinct misdemeanors in the same indictment.
38. In re Smith, 13 Fed. 25, 27 (C.C.D. Mass. 1882). The court cited United States v.
Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851).
39. United States v. Richardson, 28 Fed. 61, 66 (C.C.D. Me. 1886).
40. Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937, 940 (6th Cir. 1899).
41. United States v. Wells, 163 Fed. 313, 323 (D. Idaho 1908).
42. Jones v. United States, 162 Fed. 417, 419 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 212 U.S. 576
(1908).
43. United States v. Bopp, 232 Fed. 177, 178 (N.D. Cal. 1916).
44. United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 414 (1920).
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holding that the privilege against self incrimination is properly raised
under a plea of not guilty and not a special plea, stated: "Federal crim-
inal procedure is governed not by state practice but by federal statutes
and decisions of the federal courts."" In 1941 a district court held that
the defense of insanity must be offered under a plea of not guilty. The
procedure was not determined by state practice but "according to the
practice of common law... ., In the same year a court of appeals held
that state law applied to motions to quash. If the state law allowed such
a motion for error extrinsic to the record, the federal court sitting in the
state should also allow it 7 Yet the court considered "the settled prin-
ciples of criminal law"45 to be determinative of joinder of offenses.
Whether a plea in abatement lies because of the dissolution of a corpor-
ate defendant was determined by the common law, not the state, prior
to 1776.90 In 1946, two months before the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure went into effect, one court of appeals concluded: "It is no
longer necessary in the federal courts to follow the old common law
rules of criminal pleading.... .,30
B. Oral Pleading
In 1836 Chief Judge Cranch stated: "In criminal cases, the pleadings
subsequent to the indictment are generally considered as ore tenus."31
However, the court's judgment is the same as if they were in writing
and spread upon the record.-
C. Time of Pleading
Mr. Justice Field has stated the time when pleading occurs:
When the indictment is found, or the information is filed, a vwarrant is isSued for
the arrest of the accused to be brought before the court, unless he is at the time in
custody, in which case an order for that purpose is made, to the end, in either case,
that he may be arraigned and plead to the indictment or information. When. he is
brought before the court, objections to the validity or form of the indictment or
information, if made, are considered, or issue is joined upon the accusation.a
45. United States v. Mlurdock, 284 U.S. 141, 150 (1931).
46. United States v. Fore, 3S F. Supp. 140, 141 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
47. United States v. Perlstein, 120 F.2d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 1941), ccrt. denied, 316 US.
678 (1942).
48. Id. at 2S0, quoting Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 4CD (1394).
49. United States v. Leche, 44 F. Supp. 765, 766 (E.D. La. 1942).
50. Norris v. United States, 152 F.2d S03, 810 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 8505
(1946).
51. United States v. White, 28 Fed. Cas. 550, 557 (No. 16675) (C.C.D.C. 1M6). Sea
also United States v. Alertine, 64 F. Supp. 792 (D.N.J. 1946); Unitcd State: v. Clayton-
Kennedy, 2 F. Supp. 233 (D. Ald.), appeal dismissed per curiam, 67 F.2d 923 (4th Cir.
1933).
52. United States v. White, 28 Fed. Cas. 562, 566 (No. 16676) (C.C.D.C. 1 36).
53. In re Bonner, 151 US. 242, 257-58 (1894).
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According to one writer on federal procedure, the pleadings of the
defendant in federal criminal cases came in the following order: (1) plea
to the jurisdiction, (2) plea in abatement, (3) motion to quash, (4) de-
murrer, and (5) pleas in bar. 4 At the arraignment, which occurred later,
the defendant pleaded not guilty, nolo contendere, or guilty. He might
then ask to withdraw his plea and make the objections enumerated
above. This article will consider the pleadings in their chronological
order.
1. Plea to the Jurisdiction
A court has stated: "In criminal prosecutions, although a defendant
may plead to the jurisdiction of the court, there are but few instances
in which he is obliged to have recourse to such a plea. He may take ad-
vantage of the matter under the general issue." 5 In one case the Supreme
Court saw no objection to raising the issue by motion for new trial."0
In an early case, the court, in submitting the issue of guilt to the jury,
stated that a verdict of not guilty would eliminate the issue of jurisdic-
tion, but a verdict of guilty would be subject to the opinion of the court
on jurisdiction. 7 A plea to the jurisdiction must precede a plea of not
guilty. 8 Following the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction the defendant
may plead over.59
2. Plea in Abatement
In 1871 Circuit Judge Dillon stated that pleas in abatement "are
dilatory, and not being favored, the law requires that they shall contain
all essential averments, pleaded with strict exactness."'0 The proper
54. 15 Hughes, Federal Practice, Jurisdiction and Procedure 642, 832, 911 (1932). See
also Robinson, Cases on Criminal Law and Procedure 1221 (1941).
It is said in I Chitty, Criminal Law 434 (2d ed. 1826), that at common law the order
of pleading was as follows: (1) pleas to the jurisdiction, (2) demurrers, (3) dilatory pleas,
including pleas in abatement, (3) pleas in bar, such as former convictions, former acquittal,
former attainder and pardon, and (5) pleas to the matter of the indictment, i.e., not guilty
and special pleas. But this order was not rigidly adhered to. 2 Bishop, New Criminal
Procedure §§ 746-47 (4th ed. 1895). While Chitty states that double pleading was not
allowed, Bishop cites Hawkins to the contrary. 2 Bishop, op. cit. supra, §§ 748-52.
55. United States v. Six Fermenting Tubs, 27 Fed. Cas. 1089, 1091 (No. 16296) (D. Wis.
1868). The court discussed pleading of the statute of limitations. It was taken advantage
of on a plea of not guilty in United States v. McGill, 26 Fed. Cas. 1088, 1090 (No. 15676)
(C.C.D. Pa. 1806). See also Wright v. United States, 158 U.S. 232, 238 (1895).
56. United States v. Thomas, 151 U.S. 577, 581 (1894) (jurisdiction over Indians).
57. United States v. Wiltberger, 28 Fed. Cas. 727, 731 (No. 16738) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1819).
The issue was as to jurisdiction over a crime committed in a foreign state. The Supreme
Court later held there was no jurisdiction. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
76 (1820). See also United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336 (1818).
58. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 606 (1927).
59. United States v. Lawrence, 26 Fed. Cas. 879, 884 (No. 15573) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1876);
United States v. Caldwell, 25 Fed. Cas. 237, 238 (No. 14707) (C.C.S.DN.Y. 1871).
60. United States v. Williams, 28 Fed. Cas. 666, 668 (No. 16716) (C.C.D. Minn. 1871).
[Vol. 29
1960] FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
conclusion of a plea in abatement is a prayer that the indictment be
quashed."' When a plea in abatement prays for a judgment which the
court cannot give upon such a plea, it is defective. Pleas of misnomer
are verified while a plea in abatement usually is not. In cases of mis-
demeanor and felony, two or more pleas in abatement, not repugnant to
one another, may be pleaded. The Government usually attacks the
plea by a demurrer."3 The Supreme Court has stated that in "all cases
of contested fact" a plea in abatement is the "proper remedy," rather
than a motion to quash.64 Under the statute on imperfections of form
in the indictment, the defendant must show prejudice from the defect
even though he need not aver it."" The trial court has wide discretion
in ruling on a plea, particularly on a late one, and the appellate court
is not likely to reverse."6
A plea of abatement for misnomer should be made before a motion
to quash, or there is a waiver."7 If the plea of misnomer is followed
by a demurrer, a waiver also occurs. One great advantage to pleas in
abatement is that they may be used to present issues not on the record., 3
"All the authorities agree that a plea in abatement is not open to amend-
ment. . . 2 If a plea attacks the evidence before the grand jury, it
should be verified.7" The plea should aver the facts relied on, and
Accord, Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36, 44 (1397); Olmztead v. United State:, 19
F.2d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 1927), aff'd, 277 U.S. 43S (1923) ; United States v. Antonli Fire-
works Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 875 (W.D.N.Y. 1943), afi'd, 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.), cLt denied,
329 U.S. 742 (1946); United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 43 F.Zd 135, 133 (MD. Pa. 1930);
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 177 Fed. 774, 70 (W.D. Ky. 1910); United
States v. Reeves, 27 Fed. Cas. 750, 751 (No. 16139) (C.C.D. La. 1878); United States v.
Hammond, 26 Fed. Cas. 99, 101 (No. 15294) (C.C.D. La. 1875).
61. United States v. Hammond, 26 Fed. Cas. 99, 101 (No. 15294) (C.C.D. La. 1375).
62. United States v. Richardson, 28 Fed. 61, 67 (C.C.D. Me. 1OS).
63. Jones v. United States, 179 Fed. 584 (9th Cir. 1910) ; United States v. Howel,
65 Fed. 402 (N.D. Cal. 1895); United States v. Ewan, 40 Fed. 451 (CC.%N.D. Fla. 1$9).
In United States v. Rintelen, 235 Fed. 787 (S.D.qN.Y. 1916), the Government moved to
strike out; it also so moved in United States v. Jones, 16 F. Supp. 135, 137 (SoDN .Y.
1936), where the court held that such a motion would lie, demurrer not bing the only
mode of attack.
64. Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36, 44 (1897). See United States v. Heath, 260
F.2d 623, 630 (9th Cir. 1958).
65. United States v. Cobban, 127 Fed. 713, 715 (C.C.D. Mlont. 1904). See An Act to
Further the Administration of Justice § S, 17 Stat. 193 (1872).
66. Wilder v. United States, 143 Fed. 433, 439 (4th Cir. 0), cerL denied, 204 US.
674 (1907).
67. Lee v. United States, 156 Fed. 94S, 950 (9th Cir. 1907).
68. May v. United States, 236 Fed. 495, 497 (Sth Cir. 1916); United Stato v. Silver-
thorne, 265 Fed. 859, 862 (W.D.N.Y. 1920); United States v. Wells, 163 Fed. 313, 323
(D. Idaho 1908).
69. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 177 Fed. 774, 780 (W.D. Ky. 1910). But
see United States v. Burk, 41 F. Supp. 916, 919 (D. Del. 1941).
70. Olmstead v. United States, 19 F.2d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 1927); United States v.
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not conclusions of law or evidence of such facts.7 The plea should not
be based merely on information and belief.7
The history of the scope of these pleas has been so described: "Pleas
in abatement were first used in cases of a misnomer, thereafter to attack
the regularity of drawing and convening grand jurors, and still later to
determine whether an indictment has been found on incompetent evi-
dence. ' 73 Thus, the plea could be used for objections to the indictment
not apparent on the face of the indictment. Its scope was not limited
to the conduct of the grand jury, or to the sufficiency and competence of
evidence before it. It lies for any defect apparent on the face of the
indictment and for matters extrinsic to the record.74 In 1926 Mr. Justice
Holmes pointed out: "It is true that there is less strictness now in deal-
ing with a plea in abatement than there was a hundred years ago. The
question is less what it is called than what it is. But while the quality
of an act depends upon its circumstances, the quality of the plea de-
pends upon its contents."" Its effect is not the same as a plea in bar
and does not become a plea in bar because of such extrinsic circumstances
as the running of the statute of limitations. "The plea looks only to
abating the indictment not to barring the action ."7  In its last decision on
pleas in abatement prior to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the Supreme Court thus described its function in connection with grand
jury procedure:
Although frequently described as a dilatory plea which should be strictly construed,
* . . such a plea is an appropriate means of raising objections to an indictment which
may involve serious and prejudicial infringements of procedural rights, such as an
objection to the qualifications of grand jurors . . . to the method of selection of the
grand jury . . . or to its composition.. .. 7T
National Wholesale Druggists' Ass'n, 61 F. Supp. 590, 593 (D.N.J. 1945); United States v.
Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 875 (W.D.N.Y. 1943); United States v. Bopp,
232 Fed. 177, 178 (N.D. Cal. 1916); United States v. Nevin, 199 Fed. 831, 836 (D. Colo.
1912).
71. Olmstead v. United States, 19 F.2d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 1927); United States v.
Silverthorne, 265 Fed. 859, 861 (W.D.N.Y. 1920).
72. United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 43 F.2d 135, 140 (M.D. Pa. 1930).
73. United States v. Rintelen, 235 Fed. 787, 788 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). "At common law
the only challenge to an indictment because of the improper constitution of the grand jury
was by plea in abatement. . . ." United States ex rel. McCann v. Thompson, 144 F.2d
604, 607 (2d Cir. 1944). See United States v. Heath, 260 F.2d 623, 630 (9th Cir. 1958).
74. United States v. Apex Distrib. Co., 270 F.2d 747, 753 (9th Cir. 1959) ; United States
v. Heath, 260 F.2d 623, 630 (9th Cir. 1958); United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 43
F.2d 135, 137 (M.D. Pa. 1930); United States v. Goldman, 28 F.2d 424, 426 (D. Conn.
1928); United States v. Silverthorne, 265 Fed. 859, 862 (W.D.N.Y. 1920).
75. United States v. Storrs, 272 U.S. 652, 654 (1926).
76. Ibid.
77. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 29 n.3 (1943), 56 Harv. L. Rev. 828,
41 Mich. L. Rev. 1205.
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Where a plea in abatement is sustained because of misconduct of the
United States attorney before the grand jury, the defendant may be held
in bail pending such further proceedings as the Government may want to
take.73 On overruling of a plea in abatement, the defendant may plead
over.7 9 The Court has found that the defendant is not concluded on the
merits despite the English practice. s0
In many cases the Supreme Court5 ' and various circuit courts 2 re-
viewed on the merits decisions overruling or refusing to entertain pleas
in abatement. A few courts held that a general statute against review of
such pleas prevented appellate review of a decision overruling a plea
in abatement to an indictment, but at the same time holding that the
pleas were properly overruled. 3 In 1943 the Supreme Court held that
this latter interpretation was erroneous and that appeal, not mandamus,
was available.5
3. MAlotion to Quash
A motion to quash an indictment is a proper mode of attacking defects
of form or substance15 But it is within the court's discretion to quash
an indictment especially for a defect of form.'- The motion must be
founded on defects which would make erroneous a judgment against the
defendant on that indictment. 7 In many cases the court refused to
quash an indictment even for defects which would cause an arrest of
judgment. A defect pleadable only in abatement and which is curable
by pleading over is not ground for a motion to quash. The Supreme Court
has stated: "When made in behalf of defendants, it is usually refused,
73. United States v. Wells, 163 Fed. 313, 329 (D. Idaho 103).
79. United States v. Williams, 23 Fed. Cas. 666, 670 (No. 16716) (C.C.D. IMnn. 1G71);
United States v. Smith, 27 Fed. Cas. 11S6, 1191 (No. 16341a) (C.C.D.N.Y. 1K05).
.0. United States v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65, 67-63 (1,33).
S1. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 27 (1943); Hyde v. United State:,
225 U.S. 347, 372-74 (1912); Holt v. United States, 21S U.S. 245, 247-43 (1910); Crowley
-. United States, 194 U.S. 461, 463-74 (1904); Agnew v. Unitcd States, 165 U.S. 36, 43-45
(1897); Brain v. United States, 163 U.S. 532, 566-6S (1S97).
82. Mrulloney v. United States, 79 F.2d 566, 572-SO (Ist Cir. 1935); Dunn v. United
States, 23S Fed. 503 (5th Cir. 1917); Hilliman v. United States, 192 Fed. 264, 269 (Oth
Cir. 1911), cert. denied, 225 U.S. 699 (1912); Lowdon v. United Statec, 149 Fed. 673 (5th
Cir. 1906), cert. denied, 210 U.S. 434 (1903).
33. Biemer v. United States, 54 F.2d 1045 (7th Cir.), cert. denicd, 2116 U.S. 566 (1932);
Luxenberg v. United States, 45 F.2d 497, 493 (4th Cir. 1930), ccrt. denied, 283 U.S. 020
(1931); Blounday v. United States, 225 Fed. 965, 967 (Sth Cir.), cerL denied, 239 U.S.
645 (1915).
84. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 27 (1943).
S5. United States v. O'Sullivan, 27 Fed. Cas. 367, 363, 373 (No. 15974) (S.Dm.Y. 1351).
36. United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460 (1327); Takeguma v. Unitcd
States, 156 F.2d 437, 441 (9th Cir. 1946).
87. United States v. Brown, 24 Fed. Cas. 1273 (No. 14671) (D. Ore. 1871); 'United
States v. Pond, 27 Fed. Cas. 590, 591 (No. 16067) (C.C.D. Alas3. 1355).
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unless in the clearest cases, and the grounds of it are left to be availed
of, if available, upon demurrer or motion in arrest of judgment.""8 Sub-
sequently, a district court concluded that motions to quash are not
favored and are not usually allowed "where the motion is founded upon
some matter which could be presented by demurrer, motion in arrest
of judgment, or which could be made available by way of defense on
trial before a jury.""9 An indictment must be grossly in error to be
quashed. If it is subject to both quashing and arrest of judgment, "it
may as well be quashed before trial as to have judgment arrested on
it after."'90 In general, the sufficiency of an indictment should be tested
by demurrer, since the granting of a motion to quash is discretionary. 1
One district court stated broadly: "An indictment may be quashed for
any reason which would render ineffective a trial had upon the accusa-
tion as formulated .... An indictment is quashed upon the theory that
the facts charged therein are insufficient to put the accused upon his
defense." 92 Occasionally, formal written motions to quash have not been
filed.93 The court may quash an indictment on its own motion, without
the defendant's, when the indictment fails to state an offense."' On a
prosecution for treason, where the defendant moves to quash, his counsel
may be required to file a formal statement of the grounds on which the
motion is based."
Proof of facts outside the record should be offered in the first instance
by one or more affidavits accompanying the motion. If the prosecution
does not admit the facts, or seriously controverts them, the court should
take testimony on the issue." A motion to quash should be verified
88. United States v. Rosenburgh, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 580, 583 (1868). See also Radford
v. United States, 129 Fed. 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1904). There should be no quashing where the
points of law raised by the defendant are doubtful. United States v. Stowell, 27 Fed. Cas.
1350 (No. 16409) (C.C.D. Mass. 1854).
89. United States v. Kilpatrick, 16 Fed. 765, 773 (W.D.N.C. 1883).
90. United States v. Wardell, 49 Fed. 914, 915 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1892).
91. Sconyers v. United States, 54 F.2d 68, 69 (5th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S.
554 (1932) ; Gay v. United States, 12 F.2d 433, 434 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S.
705 (1926).
92. United States v. Frankfeld, 38 F. Supp. 1018, 1019 (D.D.C. 1941).
93. United States v. Mertine, 64 F. Supp. 792 (D.N.J. 1946). Counsel agreed that the
matter should be submitted as if a formal motion to quash had been filed.
94. District of Columbia v. Homing, 47 App. D.C. 413, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1918).
95. In re Davis, 7 Fed. Cas. 63, 89 (No. 3621a) (C.C.D. Va. 1867-71).
96. Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 448 (1900); United States v. Journal Co., 197 Fed.
415 (E.D. Va. 1912).
97. United States v. Perlstein, 120 F.2d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 1941) ; United States v.
Reilly, 30 F.2d 866 (Efl. Pa. 1929) ; United States v, Coolidge, 25 Fed. Cas. 622, 623 (No.
14858) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815). See also United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 512-13
(1943).
98. United States v. Brown, 24 Fed. Cas. 1273, 1274 (No. 14671) (D. Ore. 1871). Accord,
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either by facts of record, by admissions of the Government, or by
affidavits. 7
In 1871 a court stated that a motion to quash will not lie "where the
objection does not appear or arise upon the face of the indictment, or
perhaps the records of the court."03 In 1897 the Supreme Court stated
that "in all cases of contested fact" a plea in abatement is the "proper
remedy."' Yet contrary opinions have been announced from time to
time.' 0 In 1910 the Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit said that
the improper selection of a grand jury by barring Negroes permitted
motions to quash "as substitutes for pleas in abatement."'' As to im-
proper presence of a person in the grand jury room, "a motion to quash
seems to be made use of in many instances instead of a plea in abate-
ment, although the plea in abatement is the proper remedy in all cases
of contested fact. 11 2 A district court stated that grounds for quashing
"may be either matters intrinsic to the pleading as defects apparent on its
face or matters extrinsic to the instrument, as irregularities or other facts
occurring prior to the return of the bill."' 3 The Court of Appeals of the
Third Circuit upheld this wide scope because it was the practice in the
state of trial.' In 1943 the District Court for Massachusetts held that
a motion to quash is the equivalent of a demurrer and cannot be sup-
ported by evidence, since it merely tests the indictment on its face.Ye;
Even though an indictment is quashed, the defendant is not discharged
where he is given a recognizance to appear in court readily to answer an
indictment and not to depart without leave of court.' Where an indict-
ment is quashed for defect in the size of the grand jury, the defendant
may be held to await the action of a proper grand jury.0 7 On overruling
of a motion to quash, the defendant may plead over.'
Anderson v. United States, 273 Fed. 20, 23 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 647 (1921);
Cooper v. United States, 247 Fed. 45, 47 (4th Cir. 1917) ; United States v. Lzhigh Valley
R.R., 43 F.2d 135, 137 (M.D. Pa. 1930) ; United States v. Silvwrthorne, 265 Fed. 353, 853
(Wr.D.N1.. 1920) ; United States v. Terry, 39 Fed. 355 (N.D. Cal. L9).
99. Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36, 44 (1S97).
100. See Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900); Mamaux v. United Statc, 264
Fed. 816 (6th Cir. 1920); Mclnerney v. United States, 147 Fed. 133, 124 (Ist Cir. 19S5);
Breese v. United States, 143 Fed. 250, 252 (4th Cir. 1905).
101. Hillegass v. United States, 1S3 Fed. 199, 201 (3d Cir. 1910), cert. denied, 219 ULS.
SS5 (1911).
102. May v. United States, 236 Fed. 495, 497 (Sth Cir. 1916).
103. United States v. Frankfeld, 33 F. Supp. 1013, 1019 (D.D.C. 1941).
104. United States v. Perlstein, 120 F.2d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 1941).
105. United States v. Slobodkin, 43 F. Supp. 913, 915 (D. Alass. 1943).
106. United States v. White, 2S Fed. Cas. 570, 572 (No. 16678) (C.C.D.C. 1337). The
indictment was quashed because the statute of limitations had run before the filing of the
indictment.
107. United States v. Haskell, 169 Fed. 449, 454 (E.D. Oka. 1 09).
log. United States v. Smith, 27 Fed. Cas. 11S6, 1191 (No. 16341a) (C.C.DN.Y. I1M).
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A division of opinion over a motion to quash between judges of a
circuit court would not be considered by the Supreme Court, 109 since the
matter is discretionary. The rule would be different as to a demurrer.
Later, when the courts of appeals had been set up, it was held that that
court would not review." 0 It was sometimes said that the ruling on a
motion to quash was not "ordinarily" reviewable,"' or reviewable only
for abuse of discretion." 2 On the other hand, the appellate courts did
not hesitate to review decisions on pleas in abatement." 3
4. Demurrer
In 1827 Mr. Justice Story stated:
Undoubtedly, according to the regular course of practice, objections to the form and
sufficiency of an indictment ought to be discussed, upon a motion to quash the
indictment, which may be granted or refused in the discretion of the court, or upon
demurrer to the indictment, or upon a motion in arrest of judgment, which are
matters of right. The defendant has no right to insist that such objections should
be discussed or decided, during the trial of the facts by the jury. It would be very
inconvenient and embarrassing, to allow a discussion of such topics, during the
progress of the cause before the jury, and introduce much confusion into the ad-
ministration of public justice. But, we think, it is not wholly incompetent for the
court to entertain such questions, during the trial, in the exercise of a sound discre-
tion. It should, however, be rarely done, and only under circumstances of an
extraordinary nature 14
It was asserted in 1829 that "demurrers, in criminal cases, are very
rare, inasmuch as upon a motion to quash, or in arrest of judgment, the
defendant may avail himself of all the matters which he could upon de-
murrer."" 5  A "demurrer to an indictment admits every matter of fact
which is well pleaded .... ,,116 "A demurrer can only be used to object to
109. United States v. Hamilton, 109 U.S. 63 (1883); United States v. Rosenburgh, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 580, 583 (1868).
110. Conway v. United States, 142 F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1944); Sconyers v. United
States, 54 F.2d 68, 69 (5th Cir. 1931) ; Gay v. United States, 12 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1926) ;
Colbeck v. United States, 10 F.2d 401, 402 (7th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 662
(1926); Goodfriend v. United States, 294 Fed. 148, 150 (9th Cir. 1923); McGregor v.
United States, 134 Fed. 187, 192 (4th Cir. 1904).
111. Roper v. United States, 54 F.2d 845, 846 (10th Cir. 1931); Nanfito v. United
States, 20 F.2d 376, 378 (8th Cir. 1927); Livezey v. United States, 279 Fed. 496, 498
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 721 (1922); Anderson v. United States, 273 Fed. 20, 30
(8th Cir. 1921); Hilegass v. United States, 183 Fed. 199, 201 (3d Cir. 1910); Dillard v.
United States, 141 Fed. 303, 304 (9th Cir. 1905).
112. Hill v. United States, 15 F.2d 14 (8th Cir. 1926); Stewart v. United States, 300
Fed. 769, 777 (8th Cir. 1924); Steigman v. United States, 220 Fed. 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1915);
Carlisle v. United States, 194 Fed. 827, 829 (4th Cir. 1912).
113. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 27 n.3 (1943).
114. United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 478-79 (1827).
115. United States v. Watkins, 28 Fed. Cas. 419, 474 (No. 16649) (C.C.D.C. 1829).
116. United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 168, 178 (1872). See also Knoell v.
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an indictment as insufficient in law, because defective in substance or
form."'1 7 While special demurrers are not recognized, pleadings so de-
nominated are treated as a general demurrer." s A contention made on
demurrer fails to raise an issue when not supported by facts in the
record,119 and questions of fact cannot be raised on demurrer2 A
demurrer attacking an indictment for a fact not alleged in the indict-
ment is bad as a speaking demurrer.'-" Sometimes oral demurrers have
been filed ."' Questions which can be raised at the trial should not be
raised by demurrer.- 3 No demurrer to the indictment because of a vari-
ance between indictment and proof will stand."i
As early as 1836 it was held that the scope of a demurrer may be
broader than that of a motion in arrest of judgment. Upon demurrer, the
court decides upon the whole record as it then appears. Upon motion
in arrest of judgment after a verdict, the court decides on the whole
record as it then appears. The prima facie cause for demurrer may
have been removed by the subsequent pleadings.2 3 Another court at a
later date took a more conservative view: "In this country demurrers
in criminal proceedings are not usual in practice, as all errors which
can be thus presented can be availed of on motion in arrest of judg-
ment."' Under the 1872 statute on imperfections of form in the in-
dictment, the defendant should make his attack early and not wait
until time for motion in arrest.2 7 The Supreme Court stated in 1S98:
United States, 239 Fed. 16, 19 (3d Cir. 1917); United States v. Wimberly, 34 F. Supp.
904, 911 (W.D. La. 1940) ; United States v. Boutin, 251 Fed. 313, 314 (N.D.N.Y. 1913).
117. United States v. Kilpatrick, 16 Fed. 765, 773 (W.D.N.C. 1M33).
11S. United States v. French, 57 Fed. 32, 391 (C.C.D. Mass. 1293). Iatcr, the
Supreme Court used the term "special demurrer." Ledbetter v. United Statco, 170 US.
605, 614 (1S93). See Smith v. United States, 33 F.2d 631, 637 (3th Cir. 1936); United
States v. Plumer, 27 Fed. Cas. 561, 572 (No. 16056) (C.C.D. Mass. 1359).
119. United States v. Cudahy Packing Co., 243 Fed. 441, 450 (D. Conn. 1917).
120. Pierce v. United States, 252 US. 239, 244 (1920). But facts not stated in the
indictment are a-aiiable on demurrer if they are matters judicially noticcd. Jon= v.
United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1390); United States v. Blorrison, 109 Fed. .91 (S.D. Iowa
1901).
121. United States v. Empire Hat & Cap Mlfg. Co., 47 F. Supp. 395 (EfD. Pa. 1942);
United States v. Tot, 36 F. Supp. 273 (D.N.J. 1941), afi'd, 131 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1942).
122. United States v. Clayton-Kennedy, 2 F. Supp. 233 (D. Md. 1933).
123. United States v. Werner, 247 Fed. 703 (E.D. Pa. 1915), aft'd, 251 U.S. 46G (1920).
124. Sconyers v. United States, 54 F.2d 63, 69 (5th Cir. 1931).
125. United States %% White, 2S Fed. Cas. 562 (No. 16676) (C.C.D.C. 136). In Sutton
v. United States, 157 F.2d 661, 663 (5th Cir. 1946), it is stated that in 179, a "defect in
an indictment that was ground for a general demurrer was sufficient to arrest judgment."
126. United States v. Kilpatrick, 16 Fed. 765, 773-74 (V.D.N.C. 133). Sca a o
Hillegass v. United States, 133 Fed. 199, 202 (3d Cir. 1910); United StatQ v. Plumer
27 Fed. Cas. 561, 572 (No. 16056) (C.C.D. Mlass. 1859).
127. United States v. San Francisco Bridge Co., 33 Fed. 591, 393 (N.D. Cal. 1593);
United States v. Noelke, 1 Fed. 426, 431 (C.C.SD.N.Y. 1s0).
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"We do not wish to be understood ... as holding that this indictment
might not have been open to special demurrer for insufficiency as to
the allegations of time and place, but upon motion in arrest of judg-
ment we think it is sufficient."' 2 A court of appeals stated: "We have
heretofore expressed our disapproval of the practice of postponing a
challenge to the sufficiency of the indictment until after an expensive
trial has been had. . . . The better practice is to raise such questions
by demurrer in advance of the trial."'20
A court has the right to give the defendant leave to withdraw his
demurrer and plead not guilty after overruling the demurrer and before
entering judgment upon it."' In a misdemeanor case, a judgment against
the defendant upon demurrer is peremptory, but not if the ruling is
against the United States, which may seek a new indictment. Upon per-
mitting a defendant to withdraw his demurrer, the court may require
him to waive his right to move in arrest of judgment for any matter
apparent under the indictment. 13  In an early case where a demurrer
to an indictment for a misdemeanor was overruled, judgment absolute
was rendered against the defendant, no suggestion having been made
to the court that the defendant had any defense to the indictment. 1 2
In 1859 Circuit Justice Clifford concluded that "the settled practice of
the court is, that if the demurrer is overruled, the judgment of the court,
if the charge is of the grade of felony, shall be respondeat ouster, as at
common law. 1" 3 Thus the defendant may plead over, as statute ulti-
mately provided." 4
There seems to have been no similar problem as to other types of
pleading. In an early case the court overruled the defendant's plea in
abatement and his motion to quash. The defendant then pleaded not
guilty." 5 Likewise, a plea to the jurisdiction having been overruled,
128. Ledbetter v. United States, 170 U.S. 606, 614 (1898).
129. Morris v. United States, 168 Fed. 682, 683 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 214 U.S. 527
(1909). See also Crain v. United States, 148 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1945) ; Clement v. United
States, 149 Fed. 305 (8th Cir. 1906). See also Sutton v. United States, 157 F.2d 661, 667
(5th Cir. 1946) (Hutcheson, J., dissenting).
130. United States v. Watkins, 28 Fed. Cas. 419, 470, 474 (No. 16649) (C.C.D.C. 1829).
The court said that there was no federal precedent on the point. Circuit Judge Thruston
dissented, 28 Fed. Cas. at 475. See also Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 165 (1895) ;
Hillegass v. United States, 183 Fed. 199, 201 (3d Cir. 1910); United States v. French,
57 Fed. 382, 391 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893).
131. United States v. Watkins, 28 Fed. Cas. 419, 475 (No. 16649) (C.C.D.C. 1829).
132. United States v. Quinn, 27 Fed. Cas. 673, 680 (No. 16110) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1870).
133. United States v. Plumer, 27 Fed. Cas. 561, 572 (No. 16056) (C.C.D. Mass. 1859).
See also Hillegass v. United States, 183 Fed. 199, 201 (3d Cir. 1910).
134. See Mulloney v. United States, 79 F.2d 566, 573 (Ist Cir. 1935).
135. United States v. Smith, 27 Fed. Cas. 1186, 1191 (No. 16341a) (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806).
See also United States v. Williams, 28 Fed. Cas. 666, 670 (No. 16716) (C.C.D. Minn. 1871).
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the defendant was allowed to plead anew."O The Supreme Court in-
dicated that a defendant is not concluded on the merits after a plea in
abatement is overruled in the federal courts, despite the English prac-
tice.137 After a double jeopardy plea is overruled, the case will continue
on a plea of not guilty. 3 ' Where a plea of immunity was overruled, the
defendant on application was granted the privilege of pleading over.
The court pointed out that at common law sentence followed immediately
in misdemeanor cases, but in felony cases the defendant usually was
allowed to plead not guilty after judgment over.' 9 In one case after the
overruling of four pleas in bar, the defendant was allowed to plead over.
The court said that denial of the right to plead over "might be depriving
defendant of the most important right of trial by jury.""' The court did
not say that the defendant had an absolute right to plead over, but rather
that the court in its discretion would allow him to plead over.
The sustaining of a demurrer to an indictment is not a bar to the return
of a new indictment.' In general, an order quashing an indictment,
dismissing it, or sustaining a demurrer to it, is not jeopardy. The grand
jury may indict again after the indictment has been quashed.4 2
For about a century there was no statutory provision for appellate
review of criminal convictions.' 3 It followed that a defendant could
not have appellate review of the overruling of his demurrer.'" A division
of opinion between the judges of a circuit court might be considered
by the Supreme Court. 45
5. Plea in Bar
In 1959 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts thus described
pleas in bar: "The proper purpose of a plea in bar is to set up a ground
136. United States v. Lawrence, 26 Fed. Cas. 879, 384 (No. 15573) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1376);
United States v. Caldwell, 25 Fed. Cas. 237, 233 (NTo. 14707) (C.CS.D.N.Y. 1371).
137. United States v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65, 67-63 (1333). See also Hillegazs v. United
States, 183 Fed. 199, 202 (3d Cir. 1910); United States v. Richardson, 23 Fed. 61, 74
(C.C.D. Me. MOS6).
133. Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271, 273 (194); Rankin v. State, 73 U.S.
(11 Wall.) 3S0, 3S1 (1370).
139. HeiLe v. United States, 217 U-S. 423, 430 (1910).
140. United States v. Rockefeller, 226 Fed. 32S, 329, 332 (S.DN.Y. 1915).
141. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 35, 87 (1916); Henry v. United States,
15 F.2d 624, 626 (9th Cir. 1926), cerL denied, 274 U.S. 737 (1927); Simpzon v. United
States, 229 Fed. 940, 943 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 241 U.S. 663 (1916); Unitcd States v.
Owen, 21 F.2d 63, 370 (N.D. M11. 1927); United States v. Bopp, 232 Fed. 177 (,Nfl. Cal.
1916); United States v. Rogoff, 163 Fed. 311, 312 (C.CS.D.N.Y. 1903); United States
v. Watkins, 23 Fed. Cas. 419, 475 (No. 16649) (C.C.D.C. 1329).
142. Nordlinger v. United States, 24 App. D.C. 405, 409 (D.C. Cir. 104).
143. Orfield, Federal Criminal Appeals, 45 Yale L.J. 1223, 1224-26 (1936).
144. United States v. Watlins, 23 Fed. Cas. 419, 475 (No. 1649) (C.C.D.C. 1829).
145. United States v. Rosenburgh, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 520, 53 (1263).
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not open under a plea of not guilty, which is an absolute defence, not only
at the time of filing but for all time. Examples of appropriate pleas in
bar are former acquittal, former conviction, and pardon." 40 The court
added: "To these may be added the statute of limitations."' 4 7
Following overruling of a plea of double jeopardy, the defendant may
plead over. 4 ' The same is true where a plea of immunity is overruled. 4 '
In one case after the overruling of four pleas in bar the defendant was
allowed to plead over. 5 ° The overruling of a defendant's plea in bar,
such as immunity, does not give the defendant an immediate right to
appeal.'' There is as yet no final judgment. The same would be true as
to the overruling of a plea of former conviction or acquittal.5 2
D. Objection to the Evidence
In general, objections to the indictment or information may not be
raised at the trial by objecting to evidence. Objection is limited to "cir-
cumstances of an extraordinary nature"' 3 and should seldom be made.
Almost all federal cases now hold that no objection to introducing evi-
dence can be made, even though the indictment is manifestly defective
as failing to state an offense. 154
E. Functions of the Various Pleadings
Mr. Justice Gray pointed out that the term "pleadings" means "the
allegations made . . . for the purpose of definitely presenting the issue
146. Commonwealth v. Geagan, 159 N.E.2d 870, 878 (Mass. 1959), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 895 (1960), citing United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 151 (1931), and United
States v. Brodson, 234 F.2d 97, 99 (7th Cir. 1956). See United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S.
431, 453 (1960) (Stewart, J., dissenting); United States v. Heath, 260 F.2d 623, 629 (9th
Cir. 1958).
147. Commonwealth v. Geagan, supra note 146, at 878, citing United States v. Gold-
man, 277 U.S. 229 (1928), United States v. Franklin, 188 F.2d 182, 186 (7th Cir. 1951), and
Capone v. Aderhold, 65 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir. 1933).
148. Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271, 273 (1894); Rankin v. State, 78 U.S.
(11 Wall.) 380, 381 (1870).
149. Heike v. United States, 217 U.S. 423, 427 (1910).
150. United States v. Rockefeller, 226 Fed. 328, 329, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
151. Heike v. United States, 217 U.S. 423, 431 (1910).
152. Id. at 432. See Rankin v. State, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 380, 381 (1870).
153. United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 479 (1827). The court upheld
such objection in the case before it. The case was followed in United States v. McBride,
18 App. D.C. 371, 382 (D.C. Cir. 1889), where the defendant renewed objections made
before trial by special pleas and which had been overruled.
154. Ramirez v. United States, 23 F.2d 788, 789 (9th Cir. 1928) ; Stubbs v. United
States, 1 F.2d 837, 839 (9th Cir. 1924); Wild v. United States, 291 Fed. 334, 335 (8th
Cir. 1923) ; Grant v. United States, 252 Fed. 692, 693 (8th Cir. 1918) ; McKnight v. United
States, 252 Fed. 687, 688 (Sth Cir. 1918), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 493 (1920) ; Estes v. United
States, 227 Fed. 818, 819 (8th Cir. 1915); McSpadden v. United States, 224 Fed. 935, 936
(8th Cir. 1915).
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to be tried and determined between them."11; While rule 12(a) treats
an indictment as a pleading, Circuit Judge Learned Hand has stated:
"But an indictment is not a pleading of the United States, but the charge
of a grand jury .... "I" Yet another court of appeals has stated: "An
indictment is a pleading... and the demurrer is likewise a pleading. n6 7
Prior to the federal rules, the defendant raised defenses and objec-
tions by substantially the same procedural methods as those described
by Blackstone:"s "The plea of the prisoner ... is either, 1. A plea to
the jurisdiction; 2. A demurrer; 3. A plea in abatement; 4. A special
plea in bar, or 5. The general issue ... or plea of not guilty." District
Judge Hough stated in 1912:
It is therefore necessary to inquire what pleas are possible either to the indict-
ment or information, there being no such thing knovm as an answ.er in criminal law
in the sense in 'which that 'word is used on the civil side. All possible pleas on the
criminal side of this court must be either in abatement, in bar, or the general issue.
A motion to quash is not a pleading, and therefore is not included, and jurisdic-
tional pleas, which are sometimes given as a separate class, are really either in
abatement or bar according to 'whether the objection is to a particular court or
courts in general. 15 9
Differences of opinion, uncertainties, and confusion arose with respect
to the functions of the various procedural forms by which defenses and
objections were raised. In many cases the defendant filed a motion to
quash and a plea in abatement, each presenting the same or similar ob-
jections.160 In one case, the court stated: "The language of the pleas in
abatement is identical with that of the motions to quash. Both pro-
cedures have been adopted by counsel, in order to avoid a possible
denial of their claims upon purely technical grounds."10' In another
case, one defendant filed a motion to quash the indictment and on the
same date, on substantially the same grounds, other defendants filed
a plea in abatement in the nature of a motion to quash.11- Motions to
quash were at times filed with demurrers, each raising the same ob-
155. Tucker v. United States, 151 U.S. 164, 16S (1894).
156. Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420, 425 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 5Q, (192S).
157. Bratton v. United States, 73 F.2d 79 5, 799 (10th Cir. 1934).
158. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries §§ 332, 33S (1769).
159. United States v. 3. L. Hopkins & Co., 223 Fed. 173, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1912).
160. Bram v. United States, 163 U.S. 532, (1S97); Shreve v. United Statcz 77 F.2d 2,
S (9th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 654 (1936); United States v. Charasy, 50 F. Supp.
5&1, 582 (D. Mass. 1942); United States v. Pappagoda, 2S9 Fed. 214 (D. Conn. 1923);
United States v. Rintelen, 235 Fed. 787, 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); United States v. Swift, Ic6
Fed. 1002, 1co3 (NJ). Ill. 1911); United States v. Edgerton, C0 Fed. 374 (D. Mont. 1197).
161. United States v. Goldman, 23 F.2d 424, 426 (D. Conn. 192S). Sce also United
States v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 43 F.2d 135, 137 (M.D. Pa. 1930).
162. United States v. Johnson, 123 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1941)x rev'd, 319 U.S. 503 (1943).
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jections to the indictment. 6 ' A demurrer and a plea in abatement were
sometimes filed in the same case, each presenting the same objection
or defense.' 6 4 A plea in bar and a plea to the jurisdiction have been
filed in the same case, each presenting the same objection or defense. 10'
In one case the same defense "was presented in four forms entitled re-
spectively, demurrer, motion to quash, plea in abatement, and plea in
bar."M
66
As of 1928, the Supreme Court gave little weight to formal procedural
distinctions. It stated:
Whether the judgment sustaining the motion of the defendants in error and
dismissing the information on the ground that the prosecution was barred by the
statute of limitations, was a judgment sustaining a special plea in bar within the
meaning of the Act, is to be determined not by form but by substance. . . . The
material question in such cases is the effect of the ruling sought to be reviewed. It is
immaterial that the plea was erroneously designated as a plea in abatement instead
of a plea in bar ... or that the ruling took the form of granting a motion to quash
which was in substance a plea in bar. . . . Here the motion to dismiss raised the
bar of the statute of limitations upon the facts appearing on the face of the in-
formation, and was equivalent to a special plea in bar setting up such facts. And
the effect of sustaining the motion was the same as if such a special plea had been
interposed and sustained. 167
The court of appeals also indicated a willingness to consider subject
matter over form: "[S]trictly speaking, a motion to quash is within the
discretion of the trial court, and is not subject to review. . . . However,
treating the motion because of the point it raises as a demurrer, we do
not think it was error to overrule it." 68
F. The Grand Jury
1. Illegal Selection or Organization of the Grand Jury
Specific defenses and objections raised in the federal courts by the
various common law methods of attack will be considered next. The
first major topic, defect in the institution of the prosecution, considers,
163. Morris v. United States, 12 F.2d 727, 728 (9th Cir. 1926) ; Knauer v. United States,
237 Fed. 8, 10 (8th Cir. 1916) ; Dillard v. United States, 141 Fed. 303, 304 (9th Cir. 1905) ;
United States v. Charney, 50 F. Supp. 581, 582 (D. Mass. 1942); United States v.
Jacopetti, 17 F.2d 771 (N.D. Cal. 1927); United States v. Dembowski, 252 Fed. 894, 895
(E.D. Mich. 1918).
164. United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217 (1934); Simpkins v. United States, 78
F.2d 594, 595 (4th Cir. 1935).
165. MacKnight v. United States, 263 Fed. 832, 834 (1st Cir. 1920).
166. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 86 (1916).
167. United States v. Goldman, 277 U.S. 229, 236 (1928). See also United States v.
Hark, 320 U.S. 531, 536 (1944).
168. Sconyers v. United States, 54 F.2d 68, 69 (5th Cir. 1931). See also Roper v.
United States, 54 F.2d 845, 847 (10th Cir. 1931).
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first, objections to the grand jury per se. Under this subdivision illegal
selection or organization of the grand jury is discussed.
The listing which follows is not simply of historical value. Counsel
in federal criminal prosecutions under the Federal Criminal Rules can
use this as a check list for defenses and objections; the difference is that
now in all cases he will make a motion to dismiss.
Illegal selection or organization of the grand jury may be attacked by
a plea in abatement.' Thus, a plea would lie where the size of the
grand jury is too small 17° and perhaps where qualified persons are ex-
cluded. 1 7 It does not lie on the ground that forty-eight persons were
summoned as grand jurors and only twenty-two persons fit to be sworn
attended.Y The plea should have averred prejudice to the defendant.
It does not lie when the grand jury was drawn from one county rather
than from the whole district, since there was no allegation of prejudice
and the plea was made late. 73 It would lie if jurors were selected with
regard to party affiliations. 174
Illegal selection or organization of the grand jury may be a ground for
motion to quash.'7 3  Illegal conduct of the officers employed in desig-
nating, summoning, and returning the grand jury is a ground of pre-
judice to the defendan' and exclusion of qualified persons might be.'-
Intentional exclusion of wage earners is a ground. 78 Exclusion of women
169. Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900); Agnev v. United State:, 165 U.S. 36,
40 (1397); United States v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65, 67 (193); Morris v. United States, 128
F.2d 912, 914 (5th Cir. 1942); Younge v. United States, 242 Fed. 78, 792 (4th Cir.), cerL
denied, 245 U.S. 656 (1917); Moffatt v. United States, 232 Fed. 522, 527 (0th Cir. 1916);
Lowdon v. United States, 149 Fed. 673, 674 (5th Cir. 1905); United States v. Nevin, 199
Fed. 831, 833 (D. Colo. 1912); United States v. Eagan, 30 Fed. C03 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1S7);
United States v. Richardson, 2S Fed. 61 (C.C.D. Me. 16).
170. Reynolds v. United States, 93 U.S. 145, 153 (1878).
171. United States v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65, 70 (1S33).
172. United States v. Tuska, 2S Fed. Cas. 234 (No. 16550) (C.D.N.Y. 1876). The
court relied in part on An Act to Further the Administration of Justice § 8, on 17 Stat 193
(1872), as to technical defects in indictments.
173. Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36, 44 (1S97).
174. United States v. Chaires, 40 Fed. 820, 823 (C.C.N.D. Fla. 18s9).
175. Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900); Agnew v. United State:, 165 US. 36,
44 (1897); United States v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65, 67 (13S3); Mamaux v. United States, 264
Fed. 816, 819 (6th Cir. 1920); Hillegass v. United States, 103 Fed. 199, 201 (3d Cir.
1910); United States v. Lewis, 192 Fed. 633, 63S (E.D. Mo. 1911); United States v.
Haskell, 169 Fed. 449, 452 (ED. Okla. 1909).
176. United States v. Tallman, 23 Fed. Cas. 9, 10 (No. 16429) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. I72);
United States v. Reed, 27 Fed. Cas. 727, 732 (No. 16134) (C.C.N.D. 1352).
177. United States v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65, 70 (183).
17S. Maaaux v. United States, 264 Fed. 816, 818 (6th Cir. 1920).
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in states where women may serve on grand juries may be a ground,170
as may be the exclusion of Negroes. 18
2. Lack of Legal Qualifications of the Grand Jury
The next objection to the grand jury per se is lack of legal qualifica-
tions of its members, which may be attacked by a plea in abatement.' 8 '
Such a plea lies where a federal statute excludes insurrectionists from
serving on a grand jury. 8 2 The plea would not lie where a prosecutor was
a member of the grand jury,' 8' or where a grand juror had served within
two years. 84 It does lie where a member of the grand jury had served
on a petty jury which rendered a verdict of guilty against the defendant
for the same offense on a former trial, the verdict having been set aside. 88
It does not lie where the names of some of the grand jurors were not on
the assessment rolls of their respective counties when there was no aver-
ment that the defendant was prejudiced thereby, 80 or where the ques-
tion is the residence and property of grand jury members. 87
A plea in abatement does not lie where one of the grand jurors who
found the indictment had expressed a prior opinion that the defendant
was guilty. 8 It does not lie where some of the grand jurors were not
legally registered electors, 8 or where the foreman of the grand jury
was a vice-president of a national bank.10 A plea in abatement lies
where the statutory life of the grand jury has expired.' 0 '
Lack of legal qualifications of the grand jury members may also be
179. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 190 (1946); Wuichet v. United States,
8 F.2d 561, 562 (6th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 651 (1926) ; United States v. Roemig,
52 F. Supp. 857, 859 (N.D. Iowa 1943) (male defendant can object); United States v.
Gilbert, 31 F. Supp. 195, 202 (S.D. Ohio 1939) (male defendant cannot object).
180. Nanfito v. United States, 20 F.2d 376, 378 (8th Cir. 1927).
181. Crowley v. United States, 194 U.S. 461, 462 (1904); United States v. Gale, 109
U.S. 65, 67 (1883); United States v. Griffith, 2 F.2d 925, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1924).
182. United States v. Hammond, 26 Fed. Cas. 99, 100 (No. 15294) (C.C.D. La. 1875).
183. United States v. Williams, 28 Fed. Cas. 666, 669 (No. 16716) (C.C.D. Minn. 1871).
184. United States v. Reeves, 27 Fed. Cas. 750 (No. 16139) (C.C.D. La. 1878). The
proper remedy is a challenge. See also United States v. Clark, 46 Fed. 633, 640 (D. Alaska
1891).
185. United States v. Jones, 31 Fed. 725, 727 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1887).
186. United States v. Benson, 31 Fed. 896, 898 (C.C.D. Cal. 1887). The court relied
in part on An Act to Further the Administration of Justice § 8, 17 Stat. 198 (1872), as
to technical defects in indictments.
187. United States v. Tuska, 28 Fed. Cas. 234, 235 (No. 16550) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1876).
The court cited An Act to Further the Administration of Justice § 8, 17 Stat. 198 (1872),
on technical defects in indictment.
188. United States v. White, 28 Fed. Cas. 572 (No. 16679) (C.C.D.C. 1838). The
defendant should have objected by challenge for favor.
189. United States v. Ewan, 40 Fed. 451 (C.C.N.D. Fla. 1889).
190. Johnson v. United States, 11 F.2d 606 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 675 (1926).
191. United States v. McKay, 45 F. Supp. 1007, 1013 (E.D. Mich. 1942).
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attacked by a motion to quash.1 2 The motion does not lie where a grand
juror expressed sympathy with strikers later indicted, then said that
they ought to be shot for destroying private property.19 3 Grand jurors
need not be as unprejudiced as petty jurors. A motion to quash does not
lie where the foreman of the grand jury was a practicing attorney.191
In 1934 Congress passed a statuteles providing that no plea or motion
to quash an indictment upon the ground that one or more of the grand
jurors was disqualified shall be sustained if it appears that twelve or
more jurors, after deducting the member so disqualified, concurred in
the finding of the indictment. " " The statute'57 also required the de-
fendant before arraignment, or during the next ten days, to plead in
abatement or move to quash the indictment because of irregularity indrawing or impaneling the grand jury, or disqualification of a grand
juror. This statute was strictly applied. If the defendant wished more
time, he could ask for a postponement of arraignment.0 3 The statute
did not apply where the statutory life of the grand jury had expired. 103
3. Objections to the Proceedings of the Grand Jury
The third objection to the grand jury per se is error in its proceedings.
Objections have been taken by plea in abatement.t 0  An early case held
that it did not lie on the ground that illegal testimony was introduced
before the grand jury. -"' It lies when a defendant is subpoenaed to
192. Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 430, 4,2 (191S); United State3 v. Gale,
109 U.S. 65, 67 (183) ; Shaw v. United States, 1 30 Fed. 343, 349 (6th Cir. 1910) ; United
States v. Clune, 62 Fed. 793 (S.D. Cal. 1S94), aff'd, 159 U.S. SSO (1S95).
193. United States v. Clune, supra note 192.
194. Shaw v. United States, 10 Fed. 34S, 349 (6th Cir. 1910).
195. An Act Regulating Procedure in Criminal Cases in the Courts of the United States,
43 Stat. 643 (1934). See 13 U.S.C. § 3233 (1953).
196. The statute was applied in United States ex rd. McCann v. Thompzon, 144 F.2d
604, 606 (2d Cir. 1944); Shreve %. United States, 77 F.2d 2, 3 (9th Cir. 1935); 'United
States v. Burk, 41 F. Supp. 916, 917 (D. Del. 1941).
197. See note 195 supra.
193. The statute was applied in ledley v. United States, 155 F2d 357, 059 (DC. Cir.),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 873 (1946); United States e-x rel. McCann v. Thompzon, 144 F.2d
(04, 607 (2d Cir. 1944).
199. United States v. McKay, 45 F. Supp. 1007, 1014 (E.). Mich. 1942).
200. United States v. Storrs, 272 U.S. 652 (1926); Evaporated Mlilk V-s'a v. froce,
130 F.2d 343, ,44 (9th Cir. 1942); United States v. Parker, 103 F.2d S57, .10 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 307 U.S. 642 (1939); May v. United States, 236 Fed. 495 (,th Cir. 1916);
United States v. National 'Whole-sale Druggists' Ass'n, 61 F. Supp. SSO (DJj. 1945);
United States v. Atlantic Comm'n Co., 45 F. Supp. 137, irD, 193 (EIXN.C. 1942);
United States v. Goldman, 2S F.2d 424 (D. Conn. 1923); United States v. Rinteln, 235
Fed. 7S7, 7SS (S.D.N.Y. 1916); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 177 Fed. 774,
775 (W.D. Ky. 1910); United States v. Wells, 163 Fed. 313, 314 (D. Idaho 15o3); United
States v. Twining, 132 Fed. 129, 130 (D.N.J. 1904).
201. United States v. Smith, 27 Fed. Cas. 11S6 (No. 16341a) (C.C.D.Y. K305). The
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attend a grand jury hearing and give material testimony, not knowing
that his own conduct is under investigation." 2 It lies to attack the con-
duct of the United States attorney in the grand jury proceeding.20° It
lies to raise an issue of fact of what evidence was presented to the grand
jury20 4 and to raise the issue that the evidence before the grand jury
was obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure. 0 The courts,
however, have been reluctant to grant the defendant discovery of the
grand jury minutes so that he might properly prepare his plea in abate-
ment or in bar.200
Objections to the proceedings of the grand jury have also been taken
by a motion to quash.20 7 The motion lies when the grand jury receives
unsworn testimony.08 It does not lie where illegal testimony is intro-
duced before the grand jury.20 An indictment was quashed when an
expert witness remained in the grand jury room while another witness
was being examined.210 A motion to quash must be supported by affi-
davit when it attacks a proceeding before the grand jury.21' There must
be something in writing, just as there must be a record upon which the
court can exercise its discretion.
Government demurred to the plea. The case contains an excellent historical discussion of
pleas in abatement in England. See also United States v. Terry, 39 Fed. 355 (N.D. Cal.
1889).
202. United States v. Edgerton, 80 Fed. 374 (D. Mont. 1897).
203. United States v. Wells, 163 Fed. 313, 314 (D. Idaho 1908).
204. United States v. Swift, 186 Fed. 1002, 1019 (NJ). Ill. 1911).
205. Marr v. United States, 8 F.2d 231, 234 (8th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S.
644 (1926); United States v. Silverthorne, 265 Fed. 859, 862 (W.D.N.Y. 1920).
206. United States v. Molasky, 118 F.2d 128, 132 (7th Cir. 1941); United States v.
National Wholesale Druggists' Ass'n, 61 F. Supp. 590, 593 (D.N.J. 1945); United States
v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 876 (W.D.N.Y. 1943); Orfield, The Federal
Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343, 402-13 (1958).
207. United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 410 (1920); United States v. Heinze,
177 Fed. 770, 771 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910); McGregor v. United States, 134 Fed. 187, 192 (4th
Cir. 1904); United States v. Gouled, 253 Fed. 242, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1918); United States v.
Edgerton, 80 Fed. 374 (D. Mont. 1897); United States v. Terry, 39 Fed. 355, 356 (N.D.
Cal. 1889); United States v. Kilpatrick, 16 Fed. 765 (W.D.N.C. 1883).
208. United States v. Reed, 27 Fed. Cas. 727, 734 (No. 16134) (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1852);
United States v. Coolidge, 25 Fed. Cas. 622, 623 (No. 14858) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
209. United States v. Swift, 186 Fed. 1002, 1018 (N.D. Ill. 1911); United States v.
Haskell, 169 Fed. 449, 451 (E.D. Okla. 1909); McGregor v. United States, 134 Fed. 187,
192 (4th Cir. 1904); United States v. Cobban, 127 Fed. 713, 718 (C.C.D. Mont. 1904);
United States v. Reed, 27 Fed. Cas. 727, 738 (No. 16134) (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1852); United
States v. Smith, 27 Fed. Cas. 1186, 1191 (No. 16341a) (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806); United States
v. Brown, 24 Fed. Cas. 1273, 1274 (No. 14671) (D. Ore. 1871). But see United States v.
Farrington, 5 Fed. 343 (N.D.N.Y. 1881); McKinney v. United States, 199 Fed. 25, 29
(8th Cir. 1912) (dissenting opinion).
210. United States v. Edgerton, 80 Fed. 374, 375 (D. Mont. 1897). See also United
States v. Rosenthal, 121 Fed. 862, 870, 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1903).
211. United States v. Coolidge, 25 Fed. Cas. 622, 623 (No. 14858) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
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G. Defects hz the Indictment or Information
The next group of cases deals with defects in the indictment or in-
formation, other than failure to allege an offense.
1. Duplicity
The first topic to be considered is duplicity, which may be attacked
by a motion to quash; 212 but the grounds of the motion must be
stated.2 13 Duplicity may be objected to by a general demurrer,2 1 al-
though some cases deny this because of the statute on imperfection of
form.215 "Duplicity consists in joining in the same count two or more
distinct and separate offenses."2 10 Duplicity also may be attacked by a
motion to elect.2 17 However, one case regarded this as imalid because
it amounted to an amendment of the indictment21S
212. Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625, 635 (lS96); Center v. United State2, 95
F.2d 127, 130 (4th Cir. 193S); Egan v. United States, 2S7 Fed. 95S, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1922);
Knauer v. United States, 237 Fed. S, 11, 13 (Sth Cir. 1916); Lemon v. United StatQ, 164
Fed. 953, 953 ($th Cr. 1903); United States v. NunnLmachcr, 27 Fed. Cas. 202 (No.
15903) (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1376) ; United States v. Peterson, 27 Fed. Cas. 515, 519 (No. 1037)
(C.C.D. Mass. 1846); United States v. Sharp, 27 Fed. Cas. 1046 (No. 16265) (C.C.D. Pa.
1815); United States v. Schmidt, 15 F. Supp. S04, "05 (M.D. Pa. 1936); United Staten
i. Dembowski, 252 Fed. 894, S96 (ED. Mlich. 191S).
213. Connors v. United States, 153 U.S. 403, 411 (1395).
214. Connors v. United States, 153 U.S. 403, 411 (1395); United States v. Johnzon, 123
F.2d 111, 121 (7th Cir. 1941); Sconyers v. United States, 54 F.2d 63, 69 (5th Cir. 1931);
Creel v. United States, 21 F.2d 690 (Sth Cir. 1927); Lau v. Unitcd States, 13 F.2d 975,
976 (8th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 739 (1927); Evans v. United States, 11 F.2d
37, 3S (4th Cir. 1926) ; Lewellen v. United States, 223 Fed. 13, 20 (,th Cir. 1915) ; Ammer-
man v. United States, 216 Fed. 326 (Sth Cir. 1914); John Gund Brewing Co. v. 'United
States, 204 Fed. 17, 21 (8th Cir. 1913); United States v. Peterson, 27 Fed. Can. 515, 519
(No. 16037) (C.C.D. Mass. 1846); United States v. Watlins, 23 Fed. Cas. 419, 430 (No.
16649) (C.C.D.C. 1329); United States v. Buerk, 33 F. Supp. 40% 410 (E.D. Win. 1941);
United States v. Borden Co., 2SF. Supp. 177, 183 (N.D. IlM. 1939); United Statu v. Olmnte-d,
5 F.2d 712, 713 (W.D. Wash. 1925) ; United States v. Drawdy, 28 Fed. 567, 570 (SD. Fla.
1923); United States v. Cleveland, 231 Fed. 249, 250 (S.D. la. 1922); United States v.
Dembowski, 252 Fed. 894, 897 (ED. Mlich. 1918); United States v. Cadwallader, 59 Fed.
677, 673 (W.D. Mis. 1893).
215. Pooler v. United States, 127 Fed. 509, 515 (1st Cir. 104); United States v.
Charney, 50 F. Supp. 581, 353 (D. Mlass. 1942); United States v. Luther, 2C0 Fed. 579,
534 (ED. Okla. 1919); United States v. Louisville & N.R.R., 165 Fed. 936, 941 (W.D. Ky.
1908).
216. Optner v. United States, 13 F.2d 11, 12 (6th Cir. 1926).
217. UWiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 643 (1396); Crain v. United States, 162
U.S. 625, 635 (1396); In re Lane, 135 U.S. 443, 448 (1390); Bailey v. United States,
273 Fed. 849, 851 (6th Cir. 1922); United States v. Peterson, 27 Fed. Cas. 5W, 519 (No.
16037) (C.C.D. Mass. 1346); United States v. Charney, 50 F. Supp. 531, 91 (D. Ma, .
1942); United States v. Louisville & N.R.R., 165 Fed. 936, 941 (W.D. Ky. 103).
218. United States v. Dembowski, 252 Fed. 894, 893 (ED. Mlich. 1913).
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2. Several Counts Charging the Same Offense
A motion to quash does not lie because several counts of the indict-
ment charge the same offense. The most the defendant can claim is that
the Government be required to elect on which counts it will prosecute.210
3. Misjoinder of Offenses
A plea in abatement,220 a motion to quash,21 a demurrer,222 a motion
to elect," 3 and a motion for severance of counts 224 will all lie where
there is a misjoinder of offenses.
4. Misjoinder of Defendants
A motion to quash2 5 and a demurrer"0 lie for misjoinder of de-
fendants. Further, a motion for separate trial or a motion for severance
lies where there is a misjoinder of defendants.2 27
5. Repugnancy
A motion to quash lies for repugnancy.2 28 A demurrer has been used
219. Wetzel v. United States, 233 Fed. 984, 985 (9th Cir. 1916), cert. denied, 242 U.S.
648 (1917) ; United States v. Harman, 38 Fed. 827, 829 (D. Kan. 1889).
220. United States v. Howell, 65 Fed. 402, 403 (NI). Cal. 1895).
221. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 400 (1894); Ginsberg v. United States, 96
F.2d 433, 435 (5th Cir. 1938) ; Powers v. United States, 293 Fed. 964, 965 (9th Cir. 1923) ;
Corbin v. United States, 264 Fed. 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1920); United States v. Nye, 4 Fed.
888, 892 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1880) ; United States v. O'Callahan, 27 Fed. Cas. 216 (No. 15910)
(C.C.N.D. Ohio 1855); United States v. General Elec. Co., 40 F. Supp. 627, 629, 632
(S.D.N.Y. 1941); Kidwell v. United States, 38 App. D.C. 566, 568 (D.C. Cir. 1912).
222. Kreuzer v. United States, 254 Fed. 34, 36 (8th Cir. 1918), cert. denied, 249 U.S.
603 (1919); Dillard v. United States, 141 Fed. 303, 304 (9th Cir. 1905); United States v.
Spintz, 18 Fed. 377 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1883); United States v. Nye, 4 Fed. 888, 892 (C.C.S.D.
Ohio 1880); United States v. Jacopetti, 17 F.2d 771 (N.D. Cal. 1927).
223. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 402 (1894); Nestlerode v. United States,
122 F.2d 56, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Perlstein v. United States, 120 F.2d 276, 280 (3d Cir.
1941); Optner v. United States, 13 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1926); Powers v. United States,
293 Fed. 964, 965 (9th Cir. 1923) ; McGregor v. United States, 134 Fed. 187, 194 (4th Cir.
1904); United States v. General Elec. Co., 40 F. Supp. 627, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
224. Nestlerode v. United States, 122 F.2d 56, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
225. Ginsberg v. United States, 96 F.2d 433, 435 (5th Cir. 1938); Culjak v. United
States, 53 F.2d 554, 555 (9th Cir. 1931); Filiatreau v. United States, 14 F.2d 659, 661
(6th Cir. 1926).
226. Ainsworth v. United States, 1 App. D.C. 518, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1893). The court
pointed out that no cases directly in point were cited by either side.
227. Morris v. United States, 128 F.2d 912, 917 (5th Cir. 1942); Ginsberg v. United
States, 96 F.2d 433, 436 (5th Cir. 1938); Dowling v. United States, 49 F.2d 1014, 1015
(5th Cir. 1931) ; Lennon v. United States, 20 F.2d 490, 492 (8th Cir. 1927) ; United States
v. Atlantic Comm'n Co., 45 F. Supp. 187, 190 (E.D.N.C. 1942).
228. Silkworth v. United States, 10 F.2d 711, 714 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 664
(1926); Lehman v. United States, 127 Fed. 41, 47 (2d Cir. 1903); Sims v. United States,
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to attack repugnancy19 Under the statute on imperfection of form the
error is cured by verdict where no objection is taken.---
6. Surplusage
Surplusage has been attacked by motion to quash. -31 But it is not
fatal error in view of the statute on imperfection of form. Similarly, a
directed verdict sought at the end of the Government's case has been
denied.z 2 Surplusage has been attacked by demurrer.1 3 It is not fatal
error, however, in view of the statute on imperfection of form of in-
dictments.
7. Presentment Not Followed by Indictment
A motion to quash a presentment after the entry of a nolie proscqui
will be overruled since the courts take no notice of presentments on
which the United States attorney does not institute proceedings.
8. Conclusion of Indictment
The omission to charge that the offense was "contrary to the form of
the statutes in such case made and provided, against the peace and
dignity of the United States" is immaterial and is not open to attack
by demurrer or other pleading.
9. Signature of Grand Jury Foreman
A plea in abatement has been used to make the contention that there
was an omission of a formal indorsement of an indictment as "a true
bill," signed by the foreman of the grand jury..I A demurrer has been
used to make the contention that the foreman indorsing the indictment
as a true bill should describe himself as "foreman of the grand jury"
rather than simply as "foreman. M3r
121 Fed. 515, 51S (9th Cir. 1903); United States v. Nunncmacher, 27 Fed. C,,. 202
(No. 15903) (C.C.EI). Wis. 1376).
229. Lehman v. United States, 127 Fed. 41, 47 (2d Cir. lI3); Sims v. Unitcd Statc,
121 Fed. 515, 513 (9th Cir. 1903); United States v. French, 57 Fed. 3M2, 3r,4 (C.CJ).
Mass. 1S93).
230. Lehman v. United States, 127 Fed. 41, 47 (2d Cir. 1S3).
231. United States v. Mloody, 164 Fed. 269, 270, 275 (W.D. Mich. K03); United
States v. Bornemann, 35 Fed. S24 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 13SS).
232. Cummings -v United States, 131 F2d 107 (5th Cir. 1942).
233. United States v. Drawdy, 2S3 Fed. 567, 570 (S.D. Fla. 1923); United Statca v.
Clark, 46 Fed. 633, 63S (D. Alaska 1891).
234. United States v. Hill, 26 Fed. Cas. 315, 316 (No. 15364) (C.C.D. Va. IES)).
235. Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 163 (1S95).
236. Id. at 163. It was held not to lie in view of the statute on imperfections of form,
An Act to Further the Administration of Justice § 3, 17 Stat. 193 (1372).
237. Edwards v. United States, 312 U.S. 473, 482 (1941), revwrzing 113 Fad 2S6 (10th
Cir. 1940).
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10. Indictment Based on Affirmation
In one case the defendant moved to quash and pleaded in abatement
where the indictment, reciting that it was presented on oath and affirma-
tion, did not recite that the juror affirmed because of conscientious
scruples.23 The defendant did not succeed because of the statute on
imperfection of form.
11. Pendency of Another Indictment
The pendency of another indictment for the same offense cannot be
pleaded in bar or abatement, though it may be a good ground for a
motion to quash.2 39 However, a defendant who has been twice indicted
for the same offense, but who was never arraigned under the first indict-
ment and has never pleaded to it, has no right to have it quashed before
going to trial under the second indictment. 40 After a trial on the second
indictment, the defendant could then plead the former acquittal or con-
viction in bar if later arraigned under the first. The Government has a
right to elect under which indictment it will proceed. Where a de-
fendant has pleaded to the first indictment, and a second indictment is
thereafter found, the court will ordinarily quash the first indictment to
protect against double jeopardy. 4' An order to quash is necessary.
12. Information Not Showing Defendant Held to Answer
A demurrer does not lie where an information did not show that the
defendant was held to answer on a complaint before a commissioner, or
that the charge was found true by a grand jury.242 These are not neces-
sary elements of an information.
13. Information Not Signed by United States Attorney
A motion to quash will lie where the information was signed by one
other than the United States attorney. 43 A sworn assistant of the
United States attorney may sign the name of the United States attorney
under general authority conferred by the latter. A plea in abatement
will also lie.244
238. Bran v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 566 (1897).
239. United States v. Herbert, 26 Fed. Cas. 284, 286 (No. 15354) (C.C.D.D.C. 1836).
Motion to quash was denied in Thompson v. United States, 202 Fed. 401, 404 (9th Cir.
1913), the court finding no precedents for it.
240. United States v. Maloney, 26 Fed. Cas. 1149 (No. 15713a) (C.C.D.N.Y. 1853).
241. United States v. Strew], 99 F.2d 474, 477 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S.
638 (1939).
242. United States v. Moller, 26 Fed. Cas. 1289 (No. 15794) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879).
243. United States v. Nagle, 27 Fed. Cas. 68 (No. 15852) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879). See
also Caha v. United States, 152 U.S. 211, 221 (1894); United States v. Atlantic Comm'n
Co., 45 F. Supp. 187, 190 (E.D.N.C. 1942).
244. United States v. Atlantic Comm'n Co., 45 F. Supp. 187, 190 (E.D.N.C. 1942).
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14. Information Not Supported by Oath
A motion to quash was used to assert that an information was not
supported by oath or affirmation showing probable cause, and that a
warrant of arrest under this information was invalid.2 5
15. Prosecution by Information Improper
A motion to quash was used to assert the claim that a crime must be
prosecuted by indictment rather than by information.21 A demurrer has
also been used to assert this claim. 2 
17
16. Dissolution of Corporate Defendant
A plea in abatement was used to raise the objection that the corporate
defendant has been dissolved." ' It could also be used upon the death of
a natural defendant.
17. Misnomer
A plea in abatement would lie for misnomer, -24 9 and also for the want
of an addition or for a wrong addition, but the defendant must state
his true name in the plea.2 '-" A married woman could raise the plea of
coverture under a plea in abatement, a motion to quash, or a plea of
not guilty.2 ,2 The concept of addition of estate, mystery, or place would
cover that of coverture. Hence, the indictment should allege whether or
not a woman defendant is single, married, or widowed. A plea lies where
245. United States v. Shepard, 27 Fed. Cas. 1056 (No. 16273) (ED. Mkich. 1570).
246. United States v. Butler, 25 Fed. Cas. 226 (No. 14701) (C.C.D.S.C. 1876); United
States v. Shepard, 27 Fed. Cas. 1056, 105S (No. 16273) (E.D. Mich. 1370).
247. United States v. Field, 16 Fed. 778 (C.C.D. VL 1873).
248. United States v. Leche, 44 F. Supp. 765, 766 (ED. La. 1942).
249. Faust v. United States, 163 U.S. 452 (1896); United States v. Fawcett, 115 F.2d
764, 767 (3d Cir. 1940); Capriola v. United States, 61 F.2d 5, 11 (7th Cir.), ccrL denied,
287 U.S. 671 (1932); United States ex rel Alouquin v. Hecht, 22 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1927),
cert. denied, 276 U.S. 621 (1928); Filiatreau v. United States, 14 F.2d 659, 6-0 (6th Cir.
1926); MlacKnight v. United States, 263 Fed. 832, 834 (1st Cir. 1920); Lce v. United
States, 156 Fed. 948, 950 (9th Cir. 1907); United States v. Spintz, 13 Fed. 377 (C.CS.D.
Ga. 1883); United States v. De Quilfeldt, 5 Fed. 276, 2S0 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. IS31); United
States v. Pond, 27 Fed. Cas. 590, 591 (No. 16067) (C.C.D. Mass. 155); United States
v. Empire Hat and Cap AMfg. Co., 47 F. Supp. 395, 401 (ED. Pa. 1942); United States
v. Howard, 26 Fed. Cas. 3S6 (No. 15402) (D. Ore. 1871).
250. United States v. De Quilfeldt, 5 Fed. 276, 2S0 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1031) (coverture);
United States v. Pond, 27 Fed. Cas. 590, 591 (No. 16057) (CC.D. Ma3. 1S55).
251. United States v. Hammond, 26 Fed. Cas. 99, 101 (No. 15294) (C.C.D. La. 1375);
United States v. Howard, 26 Fed. Cas. 3S6 (No. 15402) (D. Ore. 1871).
252. United States v. De Quilfeldt, 5 Fed. 276, 281 (C.C.A.D. Tenn. 18I).
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the initials of the Christian name are used.1 3 However, a motion to
quash will not lie for misnomer,2 5 4 nor will a demurrerass
18. Lack of Name of Defendant
Demurrer lies where the name of the defendant does not appear in the
indictment .2"6  An indictment charging an offense by "John Doe, a
Chinese person, whose true name is to the grand jurors aforesaid un-
known" is bad. A motion to quash would also lie. If the defendant
had been indicted simply as John Doe, a plea in abatement would lie.
257
19. Failure to Allege an Offense
In 1876 the Supreme Court pointed out that whether an indictment
charges an offense "is a question which has to be met at almost every
stage of criminal proceedings; on motions to quash the indictment, on
demurrers, on motions to arrest judgment, etc. '25 8 But habeas corpus
would not lie. The Court stated that a motion to quash will lie if every
ingredient of the offense is not "accurately and clearly alleged in the
indictment.2 9
A decision of a court of appeals held that where an indictment failed
to state facts sufficient to constitute an offense, although there was no
demurrer, motion to quash, demand for a bill of particulars, motion for
new trial, or in arrest of judgment, the court could reverse the con-
viction.26 The cases were in conflict on the question of whether habeas
corpus would lie.26'
253. United States v. Upham, 43 Fed. 68 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1890).
254. Filiatreau v. United States, 14 F.2d 659, 661 (6th Cir. 1926); United States v.
Pond, 27 Fed. Cas. 590, 591 (No. 16067) (C.C.D. Mass. 1855). But see United States v.
De Quilfeldt, 5 Fed. 276, 280 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1881).
255. United States v. Howard, 26 Fed. Cas. 386 (No. 15402) (D. Ore. 1871).
256. United States v. Doe, 127 Fed. 982, 984 (N.D. Cal. 1904).
257. Id. at 983.
258. Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18, 20 (1876). At this date writ of error was not available.
The Supreme Court took a similar view as early as 1830. Ex parte Tobias Vatkin,
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 203 (1830).
259. United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 168, 174 (1872). See also Rosen v.
United States, 161 U.S. 29, 40 (1896); Sugar v. United States, 252 Fed. 74, 76 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 248 U.S. 578 (1918); United States v. Wardell, 49 Fed. 914 (C.C.E.D.N.Y.
1892); United States v. Schmidt, 15 F. Supp. 804, 805 (M.D. Pa. 1936). Contra, United
States v. Myatt, 264 Fed. 442, 452 (E.D.N.C. 1920).
260. Sonnenberg v. United States, 264 Fed. 327, 328 (9th Cir. 1920). Accord, Goldstein
v. United States, 73 F.2d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 1934); Grimsley v. United States, 50 F.2d
509, 511 (5th Cir. 1931); Connley v. United States, 46 F.2d 53, 54 (9th Cir. 1931); Remus
v. United States, 291 Fed. 513, 516 (6th Cir. 1923); Edwards v. United States, 266 Fed.
848, 850 (4th Cir. 1920). See Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America 96 (1939). See also
54 Harv. L. Rev. 1204, 1208 (1941).
261. See Orfield, Arrest of Judgment in Federal Criminal Procedure, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 8,
27 (1956); 47 Colum. L. Rev. 693, 694 (1947); 35 Colum. L. Rev. 404, 408-09 (1935).
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a. Required Mental Element
A motion to quash will lie where there is no allegation as to the
required mental element,202 as will a demurrer. -0 3
b. Required Act or Conduct
A motion to quash,2G4 as well as a demurrer,2- 5 will lie where there
is no allegation as to the required act or conduct of the defendant.
c. Some Other Essential Averment
A motion to quash will lie where there is no allegation as to some
other essential averment, 0 6 as will a demurrer.
207
d. Repeal or Expiration of Statute
The lack of a statute creating the crime alleged is a ground of attack.
First to be considered in this connection is repeal or expiration of the
statute.
A plea in abatement will lie on the ground of repeal of the statute. -c3
This applies where prosecutions begin or continue after repeal, although
probably not where final judgment is rendered before repeal. - 9
A motion to quash will lie because the statute making the act a crime
has been repealed -.27  This includes an indictment previously found, but
not yet tried, since no one can be punished for an act not a crime at
the time of punishment.
Demurrer also lies when the statute has been repealed. -7' It will lie
when the act defining the offense has been repealed, although the act
262. Cohn v. United States, 25S Fed. 355, 357 (2d Cir. 1919); United States v. Conant,
25 Fed. Cas. 591, 593 (No. 14S44) (C.C.D. Mlass. 1379).
263. Moffatt v. United States, 232 Fed. 522, 530 (8th Cir. 1916).
264. United States v. Myatt, 264 Fed. 442 (E.D.N.C. 1920); United States v. Bcttilini,
24 Fed. Cas. 1135 (No. 145S7) (C.C.N.D. Fla. 1371); United States v. Pond, 27 Fed. Cas.
590 (No. 16067) (C.CJ.. Mass. 1355).
265. Bratton v. United States, 73 F.2d 795, 793 (10th Cir. 1934).
266. United States v. Fay, S3 Fed. S39 (E.D. Mo. 1S97); United States -. Wardell, 49
Fed. 914 (C.C-E.D.N.Y. 1S92).
267. United States v. Johnson, 123 F.2d 111, 120 (7th Cir. 1941); United States v.
Louisville , NYR.R., 165 Fed. 936, 941 (W.D. Ky. 190S).
268. United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 222 (1934); Simphins v. United State:,
73 F.2d 594, 595 (4th Cir. 1935).
269. United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 226 (1934).
270. United States v. Finlay, 25 Fed. Cas. 1035 (No. 15099) (W.D. Pa. 1269). Sca
also United States v. Hark, 49 F. Supp. 95, 93 (D. Mlass. 1943). The Supreme Court,
however, treated the motion to quash as a plea in bar with resp ct to Government appcdas.
United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531, 536 (1944).
271. United States v. Chambers, 291 US. 217, 222 (1934); Simphns v. United States,
73 F.2d 594, 595 (4th Cir. 1935); Bailey v. United States, 5 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1925);
United States v. Luther, 260 Fed. 579 (EDl. Okla. 1919).
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imposing a penalty is still in force.272 It lies where the statute has
expired.2 73
Early cases held that repeal of a statute could be raised on a plea of
not guilty. 74 In one case, counsel for the defendant intended not to
move to quash and proposed discussing the issue of repeal as soon as the
jury was sworn and before evidence was introduced.275 The United
States attorney objected to the novelty of the proceeding and the court
ordered the trial to proceed in the usual course. Both the evidence and
the law have to be put to the jury, who then give a verdict. If the
verdict went against the defendant, he could move in arrest of judgment.
e. Constitutionality of the Statute
A motion to quash lies to attack the constitutionality of a statute.2 70
In one case a motion to quash and a plea in abatement were used to at-
tack constitutionality.2 7 A demurrer can also be used.178
f. No Statutory Provision Making the Facts Alleged an Offense
A motion to quash 79 and a demurrer2 10 lie if there is no statute making
the facts alleged a crime.
g. Certainty in Alleging the Offense
A demurrer will lie for lack of clearness, definiteness, and certainty
in alleging the offense..28  The Supreme Court has stated that "the
272. United States v. Van Vliet, 23 Fed. 35 (E.D. Mich. 1885).
273. Sims v. United States, 121 Fed. 515, 516 (9th Cir. 1903).
274. Anonymous, 1 Fed. Cas. 1032 (No. 475) (C.C.D. Pa. 1804); United States v.
Passmore, 27 Fed. Cas. 458 (No. 16005) (C.C.D. Pa. 1804).
275. United States v. Passmore, 27 Fed. Cas. 458, 459 n.3 (No. 16005) (C.C.D. Pa.
1804).
276. Sugar v. United States, 252 Fed. 74, 76 (6th Cir. 1918).
277. United States v. Atlantic Comm'n Co., 45 F. Supp. 187, 190 (E.D.N.C. 1942).
278. Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 165 (1895); United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375 (1886); United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850); United
States v. Quinn, 27 Fed. Cas. 673, 676 (No. 16110) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1870); United States
v. Cudahy Packing Co., 243 Fed. 441, 446 (D. Conn. 1917); United States v. Moody,
164 Fed. 269, 270 (W.D. Mich. 1908).
279. Caha v. United States, 152 U.S. 211, 213 (1894); Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18, 20
(1876); United States v. O'Sullivan, 27 Fed. Cas. 367, 373 (No. 15974) (S.D.N.Y. 1851).
280. Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18, 20 (1876) ; United States v. Sandefuhr, 145 Fed. 49, 52
(E.D. Ark. 1906); United States v. Brown, 24 Fed. Cas. 1273, 1275 (No. 14671) (D. Ore.
1871); United States v. Barney, 24 Fed. Cas. 1011 (No. 14524) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1866).
281. Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 40 (1896); Stokes v. United States, 157 U.S.
187, 188 (1895) ; Chew v. United States, 9 F.2d 348, 350 (8th Cir. 1925); Bailey v. United
States, 5 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1925); United States v. Borden Co., 28 F. Supp. 177, 188
(N.D. Ill. 1939); United States v. Drawdy, 288 Fed. 567, 572 (S.D. Fla. 1923); United
States v. Peuschel, 116 Fed. 642, 648 (S.D. Cal. 1902) ; United States v. Long, 68 Fed. 348,
349 (S.D. Cal. 1895); United States v. Brown, 24 Fed. Cas. 1273, 1275 (No. 14671) (D.
Ore. 1871).
FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
constitutional right of the defendant to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him entitles him to insist, at the outset,
by demurrer or by motion to quash ... that the indictment shall ap-
prise him of the crime charged with such reasonable certainty that he
can make his defense and protect himself after judgment against another
prosecution for the same offence... ."22
H. Lack of Jurisdiction
1. Lack of Jurisdiction of Court as a Court
District judge Hough concluded that "jurisdictional pleas, which are
sometimes given as a separate class, are really either in abatement
or bar according to whether the objection is to a particular court or to
courts in general." ' 3 In one case lack of jurisdiction of the court as a
court was attacked by a plea to the jurisdiction and a plea in bar!3s
It was alleged that the court had lost jurisdiction because the defendant
was not granted a speedy trial.
2. Lack of Jurisdiction of Territory
A plea to the jurisdiction has been used to attack a court's jurisdic-
tion of territory.2 5 It was held to lie where the offense of murder was
committed in another country. -30
A plea in abatement - 7 and a motion to quash"'3 have also been used
to attack the court's jurisdiction of territory. A demurrer was used
where the offense was wilful destruction of a vessel in United States
waters, but not on the high seas. - 9 A demurrer was filed and rejected
concerning federal jurisdiction over murder committed by Indians on an
Indian reservation in the state of California.C0 The same result was at-
282. Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 40 (1S96).
283. United States v. J. L. Hopkins & Co., 22S Fed. 173, 175 (SD .N.Y. 1912).
284. MacKnight v. United States, 263 Fed. 832, 834 (Ist Cir. 1920).
235. Wright v. United States, 15S U.S. 232, 233, 238 (1S95); United States v. Rodgers,
150 U.S. 249, 250 (1893); United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 571 (146);
Price v. United States, 63 F.2d 133, 134 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 632 (1934);
United States v. Ferris, 19 F.2d 925, 926 (NJ). Cal. 1927); United States v. Schouw iler,
19 F.2d 387, 3SS (S.D. Cal. 1927); United States v. WVilthergr, 23 Fed. Cas. 727 (No.
1673S) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1S19).
286. United States v. Wiltberger, 1S U.S. (5 Wrheat.) 76 (IS20); United States v.
Wriltberger, 23 Fed. Cas. 727, 731 (No. 16738) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1819).
2S7. United States v. Newth, 149 Fed. 302 (W.M. Wash. 1905).
28. Wright v. United States, 158 US. 232, 234 (1895); Reass v. United State-, 99
F.2d 752, 753 (4th Cir. 1938); United States v. Nev Bedford Bridge, 27 Fed. Cas. 91, 92
(No. 15S67) (C.C.D. mass. 1847); United States v. Johnson, 53 F. Supp. 596 (D. Del.
1944), aff'd, 323 U.S. 273 (1944).
289. United States v. Wilson, 28 Fed. Cas. 718 (No. 16731) (S.D.N.Y. 1356).
290. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (186).
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tained in a case involving a murder committed on a guano island
appertaining to the United States.291 A demurrer was filed and rejected
where the crime of perjury was perpetrated in Oklahoma territory, the
federal court of Kansas having jurisdiction.292 A demurrer was filed
and rejected where a fraud on the United States Government was com-
mitted on the high seas and in a foreign country by American citizens.98
Unlawful seizure of the defendant on the high seas can be raised by
demurrer.294 A demurrer was filed and denied regarding a murder on a
United States ship in foreign territorial waters. 215 A demurrer was over-
ruled to a forgery committed in a post office located in a state. 90
One court has stated: "The usual way of contesting the territorial
jurisdiction of the court to try a crime under the Sixth Amendment ...
is on a plea of not guilty, which puts in issue the whole case and enables
the defendant to make any special defense which goes to an original
absence of guilt as charged.297 Yet, a separate trial of the issue of
territorial jurisdiction may be convenient, just like a separate trial of
the issue of present insanity. A long and expensive trial of the main fact
may be avoided. The defendant will not improperly gain the defense
of double jeopardy. It might be added that the court's lack of terri-
torial jurisdiction over the offense can be attacked by habeas corpus.9 8
3. Lack of Venue of the Offense
An indictment should allege venue in the district and it is subject to
demurrer if it fails to do so.99 Venue "is a fact to be established, at
least by prima facie or presumptive proof by the prosecutor, and ...
291. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 204 (1890).
292. Caha v. United States, 152 U.S. 211, 213 (1894).
293. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97 (1922), reversing 287 Fed. 588 (S.D.N.Y.
1921), 71 U. Pa. L. Rev. 173 (1923).
294. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 601 (1927).
295. United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 145 (1933), 46 Harv. L. Rev. 1338, 2 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 106, 19 Va. L. Rev. 873. But see Mathues v. United States ex rel. Maro,
27 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1928), 27 Mich. L. Rev. 706 (1929).
296. United States v. Andem, 158 Fed. 996, 998-1000 (D.N.J. 1908).
297. Price v. United States, 68 F.2d 133, 134 (5th Cir. 1934) ; Conley v. United States,
23 F.2d 226, 227 (4th Cr. 1928); United States v. Britton, 24 Fed. Cas. 1239, 1241 (No.
14650) (C.C.D. Mass. 1822). See also United States v. Cornell, 25 Fed. Cas. 646, 647 (No.
14867) (C.C.D.R.I. 1819).
298. Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939); Case v. United States, 14 F.2d 510
(8th Cir. 1926).
299. Bratton v. United States, 73 F.2d 795, 798 (10th Cir. 1934); Skelley v. United
States, 37 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1930); Patterson v. United States, 222 Fed. 599, 626 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 635 (1915) ; United States v. Bink, 74 F. Supp. 603, 608 n.9
(D. Ore. 1947); United States v. Christopherson, 261 Fed. 225, 226 (E.D. Mo. 1919);
United States v. Jenks, 258 Fed. 763 (E.D. Pa. 1919); United States v. Marx, 122 Fed.
964 (E.D. Va. 1903).
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the onus probandi rests on the Government." 5 Venue can be proved
by circumstantial evidence."' On failure of proof the defendant is en-
titled to a directed verdict.32" Improper venue may be attacked by a
plea to the jurisdiction"30 It may also be attacked by a plea in abate-
ment.""- Improper venue of an offense has been raised by a motion
to quash where the grand jury was drawn exclusively from one division
of a district to investigate crimes committed therein, but indicted for an
offense committed in another division.- 5 Attack on venue is also made
by demurrer. 0
4. Lack of Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter
A demurrer has been used to attack the court's jurisdiction of the
subject matter.0 7 One defendant construed such lack of jurisdiction to
mean prosecution in a district other than the one of the offense - 93
Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower court spoke in such terms.
Occasional decisions have sharply differentiated the jurisdiction of a
federal court in one state from that in another, in effect speaking in
terms of jurisdiction of the subject matter.09
Mr. justice Field has stated in a habeas corpus case that a "court has
jurisdiction to render a particular judgment only when the offense
charged is within the class of offenses placed by the law under its juris-
diction. ... In order that a court may take jurisdiction of a criminal
case, the law must, in the first instance, authorize it to act upon a
particular class of offenses within which the one presented is em-
braced."10
300. United States v. Britton, 24 Fed. Cas. 1239, 1241 (No. 14650) (C.C.D. M a. 1322);
Price v. United States, 63 F.2d 133, 134 (5th Cir. 1934); Moran v. United State:,
264 Fed. 76S, 770 (6th Cir. 1920). Accord, Vernon v. Unitcd States, 146 Fed. 121, 126
(8th Cir. 1906).
301. Vernon v. United States, 146 Fed. 121, 126 (Sth Cir. 105).
302. Id. at 127.
303. Price v. United States, 65 F.2d 133, 134 (5th Cir. 1934).
304. United States v. Newth, 149 Fed. 302 (W.D. Wash. 1S06).
305. United States v. Tait, 6 F.2d 942 (S.D. Ala. 1925). See Orfield, Venue of Federal
Criminal Cases, 17 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 375, 332 n.10, 411 n230 (1956); United States v.
Beaugh, 2 F.2d 378 (Wi). La. 1924).
306. Reass v. United States, 99 F.2d 752, 753 (4th Cir. 1933); United States v. Bucr,
38 F. Supp. 409, 410 (ED. Wis. 1941).
307. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 605 (1927); Unitcd States v. Lombardo, 241
U.S. 73, 75 (1916); United States v. Anderson, 60 F. Supp. 649, 650 (W.D. Wah. 1945);
United States v. Jacopetti, 17 F.2d 771 (ND. Cal. 1927).
303. United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 75 (1916), afrminmg 223 Fed. 9Z9 932
(W.D. 'Wash. 1915).
309. Weinberg v. United States, 126 F.2d 1004, 10C5 (2d Cir. 1942); United States v.
Bink, 74 F. Supp. 603, 607 (D. Ore. 1947) ; In re Rosdcitscbr, 33 Fed. 657 (ED. Va. IC3).
310. In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 257 (1S94).
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5. Lack of Jurisdiction of Person of Defendant
A plea to the jurisdiction over the person of the defendant has been
filed where the defendant has been extradited and is being prosecuted
for a crime not listed in the extradition treaty. Early cases rejected the
plea on that ground,"' but the Supreme Court took a different view in
1886.312 Jurisdiction "of the person" was lacking. The plea has been
used in other cases to attack jurisdiction over the person of the de-
fendant, such as Indians.113 Ordinarily, one who desires to object to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person must appear before the court
only for that purpose. 14 He must raise only that question; if he does
more, he waives his objection. One who pleads to the indictment, or
makes motions to suppress evidence or to quash the indictment, has sub-
mitted to the jurisdiction of the court in the ordinary case. In rare cases,
the defendant may withdraw his general appearance. A demurrer has
also been used to attack jurisdiction over the person of the defendantY1'
I. The Raising of Defenses
1. Former Jeopardy
A former conviction should be pleaded in bar.310 If it is not pleaded,
the defendant cannot rely on this defense. A former conviction may not
be pleaded in bar unless it has been followed by judgment.1 7 A former
conviction on a void indictment, when the penalty has not been inflicted,
may not be pleaded. 18 A defendant so pleading must produce the entire
record and not merely a portion of it.319 A former acquittal may be
311. United States v. Lawrence, 26 Fed. Cas. 879, 881 (No. 15573) (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1876); United States v. Caldwell, 25 Fed. Cas. 237 (No. 14707) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1871).
312. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 433 (1886). See Orfield, Arrest of Judg-
ment in Federal Criminal Procedure, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 8, 18 (1956).
313. Wright v. United States, 158 U.S. 232, 233, 238 (1895). See also Ford v. United
States, 273 U.S. 593, 606 (1927), affirming 10 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1926); United States v.
Lloyd, 23 F.2d 858 (N.D. Cal. 1928); United States v. Schouweiler, 19 F.2d 387, 388
(S.D. Cal. 1927); United States v. Ferris, 19 F.2d 925, 926 (N.D. Cal. 1927).
314. United States v. Lloyd, 23 F.2d 858, 859 (N.D. Cal. 1928).
315. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 606 (1927), affirming 10 F.2d 339, 344 (9th
Cir. 1926).
316. United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 151 (1931) ; United States v. Lanza, 260
U.S. 377, 379 (1922) ; United States v. Mason, 213 U.S. 115, 120 (1909) ; United States v.
Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 665 (1896); Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271, 274 (1894);
Hans Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 176, 177, 186 (1889); United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S.
(7 Pet.) 150, 159 (1833) ; Goodrich v. United States, 146 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1944) ; Miller v.
United States, 41 App. D.C. 52, 60 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 231 U.S. 755 (1913).
317. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 130 (1904); United States v. Herbert,
26 Fed. Cas. 284, 286 (No. 15354) (C.C.D.C. 1836). An acquittal need not be followed
by judgment.
318. United States v. Jones, 31 Fed. 725, 728 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1887).
319. Id. at 727.
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pleaded in bar.2 0 It may be so pleaded even where the former court
had jurisdiction and proceeded on a defective indictment which was not
objected to before verdict22  If the court had no jurisdiction, it cannot
be pleaded in bar.322 Res judicata may be pleaded in bar, as a judgment
for the defendant on a special plea of the statute of limitations."2 3 While
there may be a waiver of a not guilty plea by proceeding to trial, the
defendant must be given an opportunity to plead former jeopardy.Pt
A conviction after denial of such opportunity would be invalid. Judge
Learned Hand has stated: "Upon the plea of double jeopardy the de-
fendant has the burden of proof, and must make out his case."325 A
defendant pleading former jeopardy may support his plea with oral
testimony to prove his former conviction, and may resort to the
record.
3 2 1
An early case suggests that former jeopardy might be raised under a
plea of not guilty. "I prefer to say that, in criminal cases, the plea of
not guilt3 puts in issue the whole case on both sides .... It is usual to
plead matters of record, such as a former conviction or acquittal; but I
doubt if even that is necessary." 32 7
2. Pardon
If a pardon is by public statute or presidential proclamation, the court
must take judicial notice of it.32s An individual pardon by the President,
however, must be pleaded in bar by motion, plea, or otherwise.03 It
320. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 665 (1S96) ; United States v. Weiz4 293 Fcd.
992, 993 (N.D. Ill. 1923).
321. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 666 (1995). See 20 Colum. L. Rev. 915 (1920).
322. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1395).
323. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 385, 37 (1916). Estoppcl may alba be
pleaded. United States v. Morse, 24 F.2d 1001 (S.D.N.1. 1926). See also United Statcs
v. Meyerson, 24 F.2d S55, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 192S).
324. Ruloxitch v. United States, 2S6 Fed. 315, 319 (3d Cir.), cart. dcnicd, 261 US.
622 (1923).
325. Kastel v. United States, 23 F.2d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1927).
326. Bartell v. United States, 227 U.S. 427, 433 (1913); Dunbar v. United Statc, 156
U.S. 135, 191 (195); Yoa Gora v. Territory of Hawaii, 152 F.2d 933, 935 (9th Cir.), ccrt.
denied, 323 U.S. S62 (1946) ; United States v. Remington, 64 F-2d 326, 33 (2d. Cir. 1933) ;
Capone v. United States, 56 F.2d 927, 933 (7th Cir.), ccrt. dcnicd, 26 U.S. 553 (1932);
Tubbs v. United States, 105 Fed. 59, 61 (Sth Cir. 19C0); United States v. Clailin, 25 Fcd.
Cas. 433, 434 (No. 14793) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875).
327. United States v. Brown, 24 Fed. Cas. 1263, 1264 ('No. 14665) (D. Ma . 1373).
32S. Armstrong v. United States, S0 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154, 156 (1371); In re Greathou:
10 Fed. Cas. 1057, 1059 (No. 5741) (C.C"N.D. Cal. 164).
329. United States v. 'Murdock, 2S4 U.S. 141, 151 (1931); Unitcd State3 v. Wit-an,
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 161 (1333); Miller v. United Statec, 41 App. D.C. 52, 61 (D.C. Cir.
1913); In re Greathouse, 10 Fed. Cas. 1057, 1061 (No. 5741) (C.C ).D. Cal. 1G4); Unitcd
States v. Schreck, 6 Alaska 412, 413 (1921).
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must be pleaded before a plea of guilty unless the date is subsequent to
the pleadings, since the defendant is estopped by his plea of not guilty.8 0
The defense may possibly be raised by motion.8 '
3. Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations may be raised by a plea in abatement 32
A motion to quash does not lie with the running of the statute of limita-
tions since this would deprive the Government of an opportunity to reply
that the defendant was a person fleeing from justice, or to show it
at the trial . 3 3 The defense should be raised by a special plea or by a
plea of not guilty.334 On the other hand, it has been said that the
general practice is to make a motion to quash.33 i A few decisions have
allowed the motion to quash. 3 In 1829 it was held that the defendant
may avail himself of the statute of limitations by demurrer, 37 but in
1872 the Supreme Court held that demurrer would not lie.338
The statute of limitations may be raised by a plea in bar.3 9 But it
330. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 162 (1833). For a case in which the
pardon came later and the defendant pleaded in arrest of judgment, see De Kay v. United
States, 280 Fed. 465, 471 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 738 (1922).
331. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 159, 162 (1833).
332. United States v. Hewecker, 79 Fed. 59, 60 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1896); United States v.
Brace, 143 Fed. 703, 704 (N.D. Cal. 1906). See, however, United States v. Barber, 219
U.S. 72, 77 (1911), suggesting a plea in bar.
333. United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 168, 179 (1872) ; United States v. White,
28 Fed. Cas. 550, 551 (No. 16675) (C.C.D.D.C. 1836).
334. United States v. White, 28 Fed. Cas. 550, 551 (No. 16675) (C.C.D.D.C. 1836).
Habeas corpus was denied where the defendant had not pleaded the defense. Johnson v.
United States, 13 Fed. Cas. 867 (No. 7418) (C.C.D. Mich. 1842).
335. United States v. Six Fermenting Tubs, 27 Fed. Cas. 1089, 1091 (No. 16296) (D.
Wis. 1868).
336. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 86 (1916).
337. United States v. Watkins, 28 Fed. Cas. 419, 470 (No. 16649) (C.C.D.D.C. 1929).
Accord, Pinkerton v. United States, 151 F.2d 499, 500 (5th Cir. 1945), aff'd, 328 U.S.
640 (1946); United States v. White, 28 Fed. Cas. 570 (No. 16678) (C.C.D.D.C. 1837);
United States v. Jacopetti, 17 F.2d 771 (N.D. Cal. 1927) ; United States v. Raley, 173 Fed.
159, 167 (D. Ore. 1909); United States v. Wells, 163 Fed. 313, 314 (D. Idaho 1908).
338. United States v. -Cook, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 168, 178 (1872). Accord, Hughes v.
United States, 114 F.2d 285, 288 (6th Cir. 1940); Capone v. Aderhold, 65 F.2d 130, 131
(5th Cir. 1933) ; Evans v. United States, 11 F.2d 37, 39 (4th Cir. 1926); Greene v. United
States, 154 Fed. 401, 411 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 207 U.S. 596 (1907); Unitcd States v.
Smith, 13 F.2d 923, 924 (W.D. La. 1926); United States v. Andem, 158 Fed. 996, 999
(D.N.J. 1908); United States v. Brace, 143 Fed. 703, 704 (N.D. Cal. 1906).
339. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 86 (1916) ; United States v. Barber, 219
U.S. 72, 78 (1911) ; United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 168, 179 (1872) ; Forthoffer
v. Swope, 103 F.2d 707, 709 (9th Cir. 1939); Brouse v. United States, 68 F.2d 294 (1st
Cir. 1933); Capone v. Aderhold, 65 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1933); United States v. Mayo,
26 Fed. Cas. 1230 (No. 15755) (C.C.D. Mass. 1813); United States v. Slacum, 27 Fed. Cas.
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was held with respect to continuing offenses that a special plea in bar
does not lie, and that the issue must be raised under a plea of not
guilty2 ° The statute of limitations may be raised by a motion to stay
all further proceedings on the information. 1 The statute of limitations
may also be raised by a motion to dismiss, treated as a special plea
in bar."
4. Present Insanity
A motion for a continuance may be used to raise the issue of the
defendant's present insanity.3' 3 One presently insane can neither plead
to an arraignment nor be tried." Counsel should object before arraign-
ment, but failure to object is not a waiver and objection to a trial is
permitted after arraignment. A petition for inquiry into the mental
condition of the defendant also lies.' 4
5. Immunity
The defense of immunity may be raised by a plea in abatement c~a or
by a motion to quash.147 In one case, an alleged violation of the privilege
against self incrimination before the grand jury was attacked by a
motion to quash and a plea in abatement.3 The defense of immunity
can also be made by a plea in bar3 19 There may be an amended plea in
1124 (No. 16311) (C.C.D.).C. 1803); United States v. J. L. Hup"ins & Co, 223 Fed. 173,
175 (S.D.N.Y. 1912); United States v. Brace, 149 Fed. 874, 376 (NJ). Cal. EI37).
340. United States v. Kissel, 213 U.S. 601, 610 (1910), rever-ing 173 Fed. 023, 829
(C.CS.DN.Y. 1909), 10 Colum. L. Rev. 159 (1910). Accord, United States v. Barbar,
219 U.S. 72, 73 (1911).
341. United States v. 'Mann, 26 Fed. Cas. 1153, 1154, 1157 (No. 15713) (C.C.D.N.H.
1S12).
342. United States v. Goldman, 277 US. 229, 236 (1923).
343. Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937, 940 (6th Cir. 199); United States v.
German, 115 Fed. 937, 92S (W.D. Ky. 1902). See also United States v. Boylen, 41 F. Supp.
724 (D. Ore. 1941).
344. Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937, 940 (6th Cir. 1.99).
345. United States v. Harriman, 4 F. Supp. 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
346. United States v. Thomas, 49 F. Supp. 547 (W.D. Ky. 1943); United States v.
Slobodkin, 4S F. Supp. 913, 1914 (D. lass. 1943); TJnitcd States v. Goodner, 35 F. Supp.
2S6, 237 (D. Colo. 1940); United States v. Shaw, 33 F. Supp. 531 (S.). Cal. 1949),
rev'd on other grounds, 131 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1942); United States v. Swift, 13 Fed.
1002, 1003 (N.D. Ill. 1911).
347. United States v. Goodner, 35 F. Supp. 2S6, 237 (D. Colo. 1940); Unitcd States v.
W-ard, 295 Fed. 576 (W). Wash. 1924); United States v. Swift, 186 Fed. 102, 103
(N.D. EL1 1911).
343. United States v. Wilson, 42 F. Supp. 721 (D. Del. 1942).
349. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943), affirming United States v. American
Meat Institute, 47 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. IlL 1942) ; Edwards v. United States, 312 US. 473,479
(1941), reversing 113 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1940); Sherwin v. United State, 263 US.
369, 370 (1925); Heike v. United States, 217 U.S. 423, 426 (1910); United States v.
Molasky, 113 F.2d 128, 133 (7th Cir. 1941); United States v. Chaplin, 54 F. Supp. 926
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bar.350 It is error to overrule a plea of immunity under the Securities
Act... without ordering production of a transcript of the testimony de-
livered by the defendant before the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission.3 52
6. Entrapment
Matters of defense or objection not capable of determination without
the trial of the general issue are raised under a plea of not guilty.
Thus, the defense of entrapment is raised by a plea of not guilty,3 13 not
by a motion to quash, 54 a plea in abatement, 3 5 or a plea in bar.3"
Under the majority view of the Supreme Court, evidence of entrapment
must be introduced by the plea of not guilty, and the fact of entrapment
is a matter for the jury to determine in finding the defendant guilty or
not guilty.3 5 7 Under the minority view of Justices Roberts, Brandeis,
and Stone, the issue of entrapment whenever raised is left to the court.
On a finding of entrapment the indictment must be quashed and the
case dismissed.
7. Statute of Limitations
On a plea of not guilty the defendant may raise the defense of the
statute of limitations.5 ' This is true where the issue is whether the
(S.D. Cal. 1944); United States v. Goldman, 28 F.2d 424 (D. Conn. 1928); United States
v. Moore, 15 F.2d 593 (D. Ore. 1926); United States v. Pardue, 294 Fed. 543 (S.D. Tex.
1923); United States v. Elton, 222 Fed. 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); United States v. Skinner,
218 Fed. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
350. United States v. Molasky, 118 F.2d 128, 133 (7th Cir. 1941).
351. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1958).
352. Edwards v. United States, 312 U.S. 473, 479-82 (1941).
353. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932); United States v. Pappagoda,
288 Fed. 214, 215 (D. Conn. 1923).
354. United States v. Pappagoda, 288 Fed. 214, 215 (D. Conn. 1923).
355. Claiborne v. United States, 77 F.2d 682, 691 (8th Cir. 1935).
356. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932).
357. See Note, 42 Yale L. J. 803 (1933). See also United States v. Cerone, 150 F.2d
382, 384 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 756 (1945).
358. Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 135 (1917); Forthoffer v.
Swope, 103 F.2d 707, 709 (9th Cir. 1939); Greene v. United States, 154 Fed. 401, 411
(5th Cir. 1907); United States v. Ballard, 24 Fed. Cas. 972 (No. 14507) (C.C.D. Mich.
1844); Parsons v. Hunter, 18 Fed. Cas. 1259, 1262 (No. 10778) (C.C.D.N.H. 1836) ; United
States v. Porter, 27 Fed. Cas. 595, 597 (No. 16072) (C.C.D.D.C. 1812); United States v.
J. L. Hopkins & Co., 228 Fed. 173, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1912); United States v. Andem, 158
Fed. 996, 999 (D.N.J. 1908); United States v. Brace, 143 Fed. 703, 704 (N.D. Cal. 1906);
United States v. Brown, 24 Fed. Cas. 1263 (No. 14665) (D. Mass. 1873); United States
v. Six Fermenting Tubs, 27 Fed. Cas. 1089, 1091 (No. 16296) (D. Wis. 1868). It is said
in People v. Kaplan, 143 Misc. 91, 256 N.Y. Supp. 874 (Gen. Sess. 1932), that the weight
of authority favors use of the not guilty plea to raise the issue of the statute of limitations.
See 10 Colum. L. Rev. 159 (1910); 8 Coum. L. Rev. 52 (1908); 33 Mich. L. Rev. 805
(1935); 7 Va. L. Rev. 656 (1921).
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defendant is a fugitive " 9 The Government need not file any written
special replication.;" The defendant is in no better position if he pleads
not guilty than if he pleads specially.20 ' The plea of not guilty also lies
for the denial of a continuing defense,31G2 and other extensions of the
time limitation.363
S. Insanity at Time of Offense
The defense of insanity at the time of an offense may be raised on a
plea of not guilty fu
9. Alibi
The defense of alibi may be raised on a plea of not guilty.'-"
10. Privilege Against Self Incrimination
The defendant should raise the privilege against self incrimination
under a plea of not guilty, not by a special plea in advance of trial.'-
Matters of defense determinable under the general issue should not be
raised by a special plea both as to questions of law and of fact.
J. Waiver
1. Waiver of Defenses
Former acquittal, former conviction, and former jeopardy must ordi-
narily be pleaded specially. There may be an express or implied waiver.
It may be implied from the failure to raise the objection or defense at
the first opportunity. It comes too late, however, when first raised by
motion in arrest of judgment,307 by motion for new trial,-CCS or on ap-
peal3 9 There is a waiver when the defendant pleads not guilty and is
359. United States v. Cook, S4 U.S. (17 rall.) 16S, 179 (1372); Greene v. Unitcd
States, 154 Fed. 401, 411 (5th Cir. 1907); United States v. Smith, 13 F2d 923, 924
(W.D. La. 1926); United States v. Brace, 143 Fed. 703, 704 (N.D. Cal. 1MQC).
360. United States v. White, 2S Fed. Cas. 562, 566 (No. 16676) (C.C.DD.C. IV36);
United States v. White, 2S Fed. Cas. 550, 551 (No. 16675) (C.C.D.D.C. 1336).
361. United States v. White, 23 Fed. Cas. 562, 563 (No. 16676) (C.C.D.D.C. 1036).
362. United States v. Brace, 149 Fed. S74, 876 (N.D. Cal. 107).
363. United States v. Clayton-Kennedy, 2 F. Supp. 233, 235 (D. Md. 1933).
364. Owens v. United States, 35 F.2d 270, 271 (D.C. Cir. 193j); W hitny v. Zubst,
62 F.2d 970, 972 (10th Cir. 1933); United States v. Fore, 3S F. Supp. 140, 141 (S.D.
Cal 1941).
365. Colbeck v. United States, 10 F.2d 401, 403 (7th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 270
U.S. 663 (1926).
366. United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 150 (1931).
367. Lexin v. United States, 5 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir.), ccrt. dened, 269 Us. 562
(1925). Contra, Reynolds v. United States, 2S0 Fed. 1, 4 (6th Cir. 1922).
363. Brady v. United States, 24 F.2d 399, 405 (Sth Cir. 1923).
369. Miller v. United States, 41 App. D.C. 52, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1913).
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tried and convicted without claim of the defense.3 70  There is also a
waiver when he pleads guilty.3 7'
The defense of the statute of limitations is not available on appeal if
not properly presented below.372 In some cases the courts have neverthe-
less reviewed the issue. 3  It cannot be raised by motion in arrest of
judgment, since the prosecution is entitled to an opportunity to intro-
duce evidence which would bring the defendant within any exception
contained in the statute. '7 4
Misjoinder of offenses could be raised before trial or during the
trial. Misjoinder of counts may be raised by motion to elect 375 or dis-
miss376 during the trial.
Under the law prior to the rules, the defendant could present various
defenses and objections in successive pleadings. In one case he filed in
order a plea in abatement, a demurrer, a plea to the jurisdiction, and a
plea of not guilty 77  All the pleadings except the plea of not guilty
occurred before arraignment. In another case the defendant first moved
to quash, then demurred, pleaded not guilty, and filed a special plea
to each count. He then moved to quash on another ground, followed by
a motion that the Government elect on which counts it would proceed. '"
Another defendant first demurred for failure to state an offense, then was
given leave to file a plea in abatement and a motion to quash for du-
plicity.37 9 Still another moved to quash, demurred, and then filed three
pleas in abatement.380 In another case the defendant pleaded not guilty,
withdrew his plea, and demurred. He then moved to quash, pleaded in
370. McGinley v. Hudspeth, 120 F.2d 523, 525 (10th Cir. 1941); Curtis v. United
States, 67 F.2d 943, 948 (10th Cir. 1933); Callahan v. United States, 35 F.2d 633, 634
(10th Cir. 1929); Brady v. United States, 24 F.2d 399, 405 (8th Cir. 1928); Blair v.
White, 24 F.2d 323, 324 (8th Cir. 1928).
371. Graham v. Squier, 132 F.2d 681, 683 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 777
(1943); Caballero v. Hudspeth, 114 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1940); Bracey v. Zerbst, 93
F.2d 8, 10 (loth Cir. 1937); United States v. Lawson, 57 F. Supp. 664, 667 (N.D. Tex.
1944); United States v. Harrison, 23 F. Supp. 249, 252 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 99 F.2d 1017
(2d Cir. 1938).
372. Forthoffer v. Swope, 103 F.2d 707, 709 (9th Cir. 1939); Evans v. United States,
11 F.2d 37, 39 (4th Cir. 1926) ; Pruett v. United States, 3 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1925).
373. Evans v. United States, 11 F.2d 37, 39 (4th -Cir. 1926); Pruett v. United States,
3 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1925).
374. Capone v. Aderhold, 65 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir. 1933).
375. Gardes v. United States, 87 Fed. 172, 175 (5th Cir. 1898).
376. United States v. Perlstein, 120 F.2d 276, 280-81 (3d Cir. 1941) ; Beaux Arts Dresses
v. United States, 9 F.2d 531, 532 (2d Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 644 (1926).
377. Crowley v. United States, 194 U.S. 461, 465 (1904).
378. McGregor v. United States, 134 Fed. 187, 190 (4th Cir. 1904).
379. United States v. Barber, 219 U.S. 72, 76 (1911).
380. Matters v. United States, 244 Fed. 736, 737 (8th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 255 U.S.
575 (1921).
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abatement, and filed a second motion to quash.351 In another case the
defendant moved to compel the Government to elect which offenses it
would prosecute, and then he demurred for failure to charge an offense.
Finally, he was tried.2
Objections to the grand jury which should have been raised before
trial by pleas in abatement or by motion to quash are waived if not so
raised.z3 As to the omission of the formal indorsement of an indictment
as a "true bill," signed by the foreman, the Supreme Court stated: "The
defect, however, is waived if objection is not made in the first instance
and before trial, for it does not go to the substance of the charge, but
only to the form in which it is presented." '  One court stated: "By fail-
ing to demur to the indictment the plaintiff in error waived all objec-
tions thereto, except the objection that some substantial element of the
crime was omitted therefrom.' ' ss5 Prosecution under a copy of the
indictment, if there is a defect, may be waived by going to trial without
objection zs6
The objection that the indictment is invalid for duplicity cannot be
raised after verdict and judgment.s ' It is waived unless presented before
trial,'" but even then it cannot be raised by a motion to dismiss. sO
Duplicity may not be presented for the first time by motion in arrest of
judgment,"0 or on appeal.391 It is reviewable on appeal only if it has
381. United States v. Perlman, 247 Fed. 158, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
332. Bailey v. United States, 273 Fed. 349, 350 (6th Cir. 1922).
33. United States v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65, 67 (10M3); Shaw v. United State:, 1 F.2d
199, 201 (Sth Cir. 1924); Burchett v. United States, 194 Fed. S21, 325 (4th Cir. 1912);
United States v. Hartwll, 26 Fed. Cas. 204, 205 (No. 15319) (C.C.D. Ma . 1370).
334. Frisbie v. United States, 157 US. 160, 164 (1S95).
3S5. Berry v. United States, 259 Fed. 203, 205 (9th Cir. 1919).
386. United States v. McKee, 26 Fed. Cas. 1112, 1115 (No. 15637) (C.C.E.D. 11Mo.
1376).
387. Babcock v. United States, 34 Fed. S73, 376 (C.C.D. Colo. 1323). Se Durlnd v.
United States, 161 U.S. 305, 315 (1896).
38S. Beauchamp v. United States, 154 F.2d 413, 415 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 723 (1946); United States v. Fawcett, 115 F.2d 764, 767 (3d Cir. 1940); Vl.l v.
United States, 257 Fed. 605, 609 (9th Cir. 1919); Lemon v. United States, 164 Fed. 953,
953 (8th Cir. 1903).
339. Barnard v. United States, 16 F.2d 451, 453 (9th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 274 U.S.
736 (1927).
390. United States v. Fawcett, 115 F2d 764, 767 (3d Cir. 1940); Spirou v. United States,
24 F.2d 796, 797 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 596 (1923); Barnard v. United States,
16 F.2d 451, 453 (9th Cir. 1926) ; Chew v. United States, 9 F.2d 343, 353 (Sth Cir. 1925);
Morgan v. United States, 143 Fed. IS9, 190 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 203 U.. 595 (1 90);
Pooler v. United States, 127 Fed. 509, 514 (1st Cir. I04); United States v. Bayaud, 16
Fed. 376, 336 (C.C.S.DMN.Y. 1S33); United States v. Fero, 13 Fed. Q01 (E.D. Wis. 1333).
391. Connors v. United States, 153 U.S. 403, 411 (1395); Spirou v. United Statcz, 24
F.2d 796, 797 (2d Cir. 192); Wells v. United States, 257 Fed. 605C, 609 (9th Cir. 1919).
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been presented before trial. 92  An objection to nmisnomer cannot be
raised after trial by a motion for a new trial. 93
What about waiver of venue within the district as between divisions
of the district? Where the grand jury is drawn exclusively from one
division of a district to investigate offenses committed within such
division, but hands down an indictment for an offense committed in an-
other division of the district, the defendant waives his right to object if
he proceeds to trial on a plea of not guilty. D4 There is a waiver where
the defendant files a plea of guilty, having failed previously to file,
among others, a plea in abatement. 9 5 The question of venue cannot be
raised after conviction. 391 With respect to the statutory requirement that
capital offenses be tried in the county of the offense, the court held that
venue was waivable through delay.3"7 Venue within the district is merely
a personal privilege. 8
What about waiver of venue as between districts? Prior to 1931, no
federal decision involved waiver of venue as between districts.99
Waiver of trial by jury was upheld in 1930.40 Referring to such waiver,
one court concluded:
If, as is thus decided, a person charged with crime may forego a jury trial by
agreeing to waive a jury, it would, we think, be difficult to sustain the view that he
may not also in the same manner waive the provision in the same article with rela-
tion to the place of trial. Logically it seems to us to follow that both are in the
same category. Whatever sanctity growing out of established custom obtains with
relation to the trial of a defendant in the vicinage of the crime obtains with equal
force with relation to the right to trial by jury .... 401
The court pointed out that the defendants might have pleaded to the
jurisdiction.40 2 When the case went to the Supreme Court, the Court did
not disagree with these conclusions, finding that the indictment suffi-
392. Creel v. United States, 21 F.2d 690, 691 (8th Cir. 1927).
393. Filiatreau v. United States, 14 F.2d 659, 660 (6th Cir. 1926); United States v.
De Quilfeldt, 5 Fed. 276, 280 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1881).
394. Rosencrans v. United States, 165 U.S. 257, 263 (1897); McNealy v. Johnston, 100
F.2d 280, 282 (9th Cir. 1938); Silverberg v. United States, 4 F.2d 908, 909 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706 (1925). See Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 237 (1924)
Biggerstaff v. United States, 260 Fed. 926 (8th Cir. 1919).
395. Marvel v. Zerbst, 83 F.2d 974, 977 (10th Cir. 1936).
396. Gowling v. United States, 64 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1933).
397. United States v. Parker, 19 F. Supp. 450, 457-59 (D.N.J. 1937), aff'd, 103 F.2d
857, 861 (3d Cir. 1939).
398. Carrillo v. Squier, 137 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1943); McNealy v. Johnston, 100 F.2d
280, 282 (9th Cir. 1938) ; Silverberg v. United States, 4 F.2d 908, 909 (5th Cir. 1925).
399. 48 Colun. L. Rev. 939, 942 n.22 (1948).
400. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
401. Hagner v. United States, 54 F.2d 446, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1931), aff'd, 285 U.S. 427
(1932).
402. 54 F.2d at 449.
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ciently charged a crime committed in the trial district. No objection was
taken except by motion in arrest of judgment. "In view of this con-
clusion, it becomes unnecessary to consider the further question whether
the trial court had jurisdiction to try the indictment, if construed as
charging the commission of an offense only"'' ' 13 in another district. Since
a continuous offense was involved, both districts could indict and try.
Hence, the case is rather weak on its facts. There was venue at the
place of the indictment and trial. A decision of the Court of Appeals
of the Second Circuit did not reject the doctrine of waiver mainly
because the facts indicated no waiver. The case involved two districts.
judge Learned Hand stated: "We do not say that the District Court for
the Northern District of New York had as little jurisdiction over a crime
committed in the Southern District, as though that were the territory
of another sovereign."4M A federal statute gave it general jurisdiction
over all "crimes and misdemeanors cognizable under the authority of the
United States." 0 5 He did not necessarily accept the theory that the
constitutional provision on the place of trial defines jurisdiction, for he
said "we do not suggest [that the provision] ... be treated as defining
jurisdiction [and] ... we therefore leave open any question of jurisdic-
tion. . .,,""' Thus the court did not reject a waiver involving actual
consent, but refused to infer consent from mere delay.
The Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit stated that the Consti-
tution deals "not with jurisdiction but with venue.'16 It found waiver
of trial by jury to be valid. This case, however, involved a continuous
offense committed in both districts. By pleading guilty and failing to
challenge the venue, the defendant waived the issue of venue and could
not attack it on habeas corpus. In a case arising in the Second Circuit,
judge Learned Hand found no facts showing waiver but pointed out
that the courts of appeals of the District of Columbia and the Tenth
Circuit had upheld waiver of venue." °
Lack of jurisdiction over the person is waived if not presented before
a plea to the indictment or information:1O While "the competency of any
403. Hagner . United States, 2M5 U.S. 427, 433-34 (1932). Both indictment and
trial occurred in the same district.
404. United States v. Strewl, 99 F.2d 474, 477 (2d Cir. 1933), cert. denicd, 3O US.
633 (1939).
405. See 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1953).
406. United States v. Strewl, 99 F.2d at 473.
407. Alahaffey v. Hudspeth, 123 F.2d 940, 942 (10th Cir. 1942).
403. United States v. Zeuli, 137 F.2d S45, 347 (2d Cir. 1943).
409. Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 3 (1927); Ford v. United Statcs, 273 US.
593, 606 (1927), affirming 10 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1926); Doeddl v. United Statcz, 221 US.
325, 332 (1911); Chapman v. Scott, 10 F.2d 156, 159 (D. Conn. 1925), aft'd, 10 F2d
690 (2d Cir. 1926).
19601
FORDIJAM LAW REVIEW
court to adjudicate the subject-matter may always be questioned, juris-
diction of the person, if not challenged upon appearance, is equivalent to
consent." ' The Supreme Court has stated: "A plea to the jurisdiction
must precede the plea of not guilty. Such a plea was not filed. The
effect of the failure to file it was to waive the question of the jurisdiction
of the persons of defendants." ''
2. No Waiver of Jurisdiction Over Subject Matter
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived.'12 The
issue may be raised at any time, for example, by habeas corpus.413
3. No Waiver of Failure to Charge Offense
If the indictment failed to charge an offense, the defendant could
raise the objection after trial by motion in arrest of judgment. 14 A
motion to exclude testimony is not the proper way to raise the issue."u
In 1895 the Supreme Court stated that "while it may be true that a
defendant by waiting until [after verdict] ... does not waive the objec-
tion that some substantial element of the crime is omitted, yet he does
waive all objections which run to the mere form in which the various
elements of the crime are stated, or to the fact that the indictment is in-
artificially drawn. ' 416  The defendant does not receive more time to
demur or move to quash by obtaining permission, when pleading not
guilty, to take advantage of all matters that can be availed of on a
demurrer or a motion to quash.417
K. Withdrawal of Plea
1. Plea of Not Guilty
A court may permit a defendant to withdraw his plea of not guilty
and then move to quash.41 8 One court permitted a withdrawal when
the defendants pleaded not guilty without the presence or advice of coun-
410. Chapman v. Scott, 10 F.2d 156, 159 (D. Conn. 1925).
411. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 606 (1927).
412. Chapman v. Scott, 10 F.2d 156, 159 (D. Conn. 1925).
413. In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 257 (1894).
414. Berry v. United States, 259 Fed. 203 (9th Cir. 1919); Cohn v. United States,
258 Fed. 355, 357 (2d Cir. 1919). Compare Dunbar v. United States, 156 U.S. 185, 191
(1895).
415. Gray v. United States, 9 F.2d 337, 339 (9th Cir. 1925).
416. Dunbar v. United States, 156 U.S. 185, 192 (1895).
417. Breese v. United States, 226 U.S. 1, 11 (1912).
418. United States v. O'Sullivan, 27 Fed. Cas. 367, 368 (No. 15974) (S.D.N.Y. 1851).
See also Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 404 (1894); O'Hara v. United States,
129 Fed. 551, 556 (6th Cir. 1904); United States v. Lewis, 192 Fed. 633, 637 (E.D. Mo.
1911); United States v. London, 176 Fed. 976, 978 (E.D. Okla. 1909).
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sel, but under the assurance of the court that their rights would not be
prejudiced. "The authority of the court, to control the order of plead-
ing at its discretion, cannot be doubted.""19 Likewise, the court may per-
mit a defendant to withdraw a plea of not guilty, and plead in abate-
mentY" The Supreme Court, moreover, finds no objection to a motion to
quash made after a plea of not guilty.421 It has been held that a plea of
misnomer must precede a motion to quash4 22 However, a subsequent de-
murrer will waive this plea. In one case the defendant was permitted to
withdraw his plea of not guilty and then re-enter it after his motion
to quash and demurrer were overruled 2 3 It is not error for a court
to refuse to allow the withdrawal of a plea of not guilty so that a motion
to quash the indictment can be filed." Refusal to withdraw is especially
justified when there is a second trial and the statute of limitations would
prevent a new indictment.42'
The overruling of a motion seeking permission to withdraw a plea of
not guilty in order to interpose a demurrer to the indictment is within
the discretion of the court and is not reviewable'120 In one case the
defendant was permitted to withdraw a plea of not guilty and to inter-
pose four pleas in bar."
2. Plea to jurisdiction
The court will permit withdrawal of a plea to the jurisdiction when
it is entered on an unconditional promise of the court that it can be
withdrawn at the discretion of the defendant's counsel " 3
L. Simultaneons Pleas
In 1818 a United States attorney objected to the defendant simul-
taneously entering on arraignment a plea of not guilty and a plea to the
jurisdiction."2 However, no decision was rendered since the defendant
419. United States v. O*Sullivan, 27 Fed. Cas. 367, 36S (No. 15974) (S.D.N.Y. 1351).
420. United States v. De Quilfeldt, 5 Fed. 276, 273 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1231). This as
done to permit the defendant to show coverture as a defense.
421. Pointer v. United States, 151 US. 395, 404 (IS94).
422. Lee v. United States, 156 Fed. 94-3, 950 (9th Cir. 1O7).
423. Alamaux v. United States, 264 Fed. 816, 319 (6th Cir. 1920).
424. Colbeck v. United States, 10 F.2d 401, 402 (7th Cir. 1925), cLg. denicd, 271 US.
662 (1926).
425. Waller v. United States, 179 Fed. 310 (3th Cir. 1910).
426. Andrews v. United States, 224 Fed. 413, 419 (9th Cir. 1915). The court may
refuse withdrawal of a plea of not guilty when the case is called for trial and the
defendant's counsel admits that the demurrer is without merit. Callahan %,. Unitcd States,
35 F.2d 633, 634 (10th Cir. 1929).
427. United States v. Rockefeller, 226 Fed. 328, 329 (S.D.N..Y. 1915).
423. United States v. Hare, 26 Fed. Cas. 14S, 149, 155 (No. 13304) (C.C.D. Md. 1313).
429. Id. at 155.
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was permitted to withdraw his pleas. In another case the defendant filed
a demurrer and a plea in abatement at arraignment.43 ° The court first
considered the demurrer and, on its overruling, the plea in abatement.
The Supreme Court has said that pleas of not guilty and former jeopardy
may be entered at the same time, since they are not inconsistent. The
plea of former jeopardy, however, will be first considered.43'
In one case the court stated:
[T]he plea of autrefois acquit or convict should not be tendered simultaneously
with the general issue. It is the rule in criminal law, as it was at common law on
the civil side, that defenses both dilatory and peremptory, if they did not go to the
merits of the controversy, should be pleaded first, in order that judgment (if against
defendant) might be respondeat ouster. This practice arose after the severity which
directed final judgment against defendant on overruling a plea in bar ...had been
modified.432
But since this was only a matter of detail, the court examined the
record as to the plea of jeopardy.
M. Time for Pleading
A plea in abatement may be too late even though made before trial.
It was held too late as to an objection to the summoning of a grand
jury where venires were issued November 18 and December 2. The
court opened December 3, the indictment was returned December 12,
and the plea was filed December 17. A plea in abatement made before
arraignment and three days after indictment, is timely.43" A plea ten-
dered after the overruling of a demurrer and at a term after the one at
which the defendant had pleaded not guilty comes too late.43 A plea
filed nineteen days after the finding of the indictment and on the day
of the trial is too late.43 6 The defendant objected because the grand
jury was completed when two bystanders were summoned. "An objection
of this kind should be made at the earliest day that the defendant has
an opportunity to make it."43 7 A plea in abatement made four years
after indictment, which alleges that the secretary of the jury unlaw-
fully abstracted some names from the box containing the names of pro-
spective grand jurors so that they could not be drawn for service, comes
too late.438 A plea filed more than two months after indictment and
430. United States v. Jones, 31 Fed. 725, 726 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1887).
431. Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271, 274 (1894).
432. United States v. J. L. Hopkins & Co., 228 Fed. 173, 175-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1912).
433. Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36, 44-45 (1897).
434. Crowley v. United States, 194 U.S. 461, 474 (1904).
435. Wilder v. United States, 143 Fed. 433, 438 (4th Cir. 1906).
436. Lowdon v. United States, 149 Fed. 673, 674 (5th Cir. 1906).
437. Id. at 675.
438. Hyde v. United States, 35 App. D.C. 451, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1910), aff'd, 225 U.S.
347, 373 (1912).
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nineteen days after service of process on the indictment is too late. The
court stated that one of the rules applicable to pleas in abatement "re-
quires the plea to be presented with the greatest promptness-general
rules which are applied.., to all those matters of abatement which, in
the technical sense, are dilatory, and which even if sustained do not
finally dispose of the subject matter of the indictment.... )24S3 A plea
in abatement made thirty-five days after arrest under the indictment
comes too late.440 A plea alleging illegal selection of the grand jurors,
filed nine months after the indictment, is too late.-" ' The court said:
"An objection of this kind should be made at the earliest day that the
defendant has an opportunity to make it.11' 2-  Usually, the plea should
be made at arraignment.44 3 A plea filed after answer and motion to
quash, based on grounds which the defendant might have discovered,
comes too late. When the defendant was indicted in October 1913,
pleaded not guilty, but was found guilty and appealed to the court of
appeals which reversed, a plea filed in 1916 comes too late.--- A plea
filed seven months after indictment and after two prior pleas had been
ruled on,; 5 or 108 days after the indictment and arraignment, is too
late.440 A plea in abatement for incompetency or disqualification of a
grand juror should be filed before a plea of not guilty or there is a waiver
of the defect.44 7 A plea filed three months after indictment is too late.11
A motion to quash must be timely made.4" Hence, a motion two
months after indictment, when defendant has been placed under bond
before indictment, is too late.41' A motion to quash because of the illegal
constitution of the grand jury is timely when filed before arraignment.
The indictment was on February 3, the motion, March 1541 Delay due
to judicial disqualification will excuse a late motion'1 2 A motion to
quash made after a delay of eleven-and-a-half years, based on the
ground that the grand jury did not accompany the foreman on the return
439. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 177 Fed. 774, 777 (W.D. Ky. 1910).
440. United States v. Louisville & N.R.R., 177 Fed. 7S0, 7S5 (W.D. Ky. 1910).
441. Aloffat v. United States, 232 Fed. 522, 52S-29 (Sth Cir. 1916).
442. Id. at 529.
443. United States v. Rintelen, 235 Fed. 7W7, 7S9 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
444. Younge v. United States, 242 Fed. 7R, 791 (4th Cir. 1917).
445. Matters v. United States, 244 Fed. 736, 737 (Sth Cir. 1917).
446. United States v. Perlman, 247 Fed. 158, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
447. Shaw v. United States, 1 F.2d 199, 201 (3th Cir. 1924).
44S. Powe v. United States, 2 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1924).
449. It should be made before pleading in bar. United States v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65, 70
(1883); Howard v. United States, 26 F.2d 551, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1928).
450. Wolfson v. United States, 101 Fed. 430, 432 (5th Cir. IcD).
451. United States v. Haskell, 169 Fed. 449, 494 (ElD. Oda. 1q09).
452. United States v. Lewis, 192 Fed. 633, 637 (ED. Mlo. 1911).
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of the indictment, comes too late.45 3 Where defendant was arrested in
March, indicted on June 2, and moved to quash on June 3, the court
deemed the motion to quash timely, though with some reluctance.4"4 A
motion to quash made on the day of the trial, stating that the indict-
ment fails to set forth an offense, comes too late.4 5 One case concluded
that a motion to quash "should be made at or before the beginning of
the trial. ' 450 After a defendant has pleaded not guilty and has moved
for a bill of particulars, the case being set for trial, he may not move
to quash on grounds known to him at the start.457 Where the grand
jury was impaneled on March 12, and the defendant made bond on
April 3 and was indicted on April 20, it was too late on May 14 to object
to an increase in the size of the grand jury.45 8 A motion to quash on
the morning of the trial, based on the ground of illegal evidence before
the grand jury, is too late.4 9 The court will overrule an unsupported
motion to quash because of incompetent evidence before the grand jury
made at the close of the Government's testimony.410  A motion to quash
an indictment on the ground that some of the evidence submitted to the
grand jury had been obtained by an unlawful search comes too late
when made after the jury had been impaneled and several witnesses
for the Government had been examined.40'
N. Trial by Court or by Jury
When there is a hearing on the issue raised by the objections and de-
fenses, who tries it, the court or jury? This is a matter of considerable
uncertainty for at least two reasons. In the first place, the decisions on
the problem are usually very brief and not well reasoned. In the second
place, it is usually not clear whether the court was laying down a rule
of constitutional law as to the right to trial by jury or merely a rule of
practice. The cases discussed may be of value under the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure when the issue of trial by jury is raised.
Determination of a plea to the jurisdiction was left to the jury when
its corrections depended on the alleged existence of certain facts not
admitted.0 2 In a subsequent case separate trial of the issue of territorial
453. Breese v. United States, 226 U.S. 1, 7, 11 (1912).
454. Christopoulo v. United States, 230 Fed. 788, 790 (4th Cir. 1916).
455. Benson v. United States, 240 Fed. 413 (5th Cir. 1917).
456. Cooper v. United States, 247 Fed. 45, 47 (4th Cir. 1917).
457. United States v. Gouled, 253 Fed. 242, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
458. Cook v. United States, 4 F.2d 517, 518 (5th Cir. 1925).
459. Colbeck v. United States, 10 F.2d 401, 402 (7th Cir. 1925).
460. Murdick v. United States, 15 F.2d 965, 967 (8th Cir. 1926).
461. Cody v. United States, 73 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1934).
462. Wright v. United States, 158 U.S. 232, 238 (1895). A special verdict was taken as
to a crime committed outside the jurisdiction of any state in United States v. Jackalow,
66 U.S. (1 Black) 484 (1861).
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jurisdiction was denied, the court ordering it "to be tried by the jury
along with the merits.'1103 The defendant had requested a separate trial.
Decision was rendered by the court on a plea in abatement interposed
on the ground of illegal drawing of the grand jury;10 and on the ground
that there was no competent evidence before the grand jury returning
the indictment."' In one case the method of determination of a plea
in abatement raising illegal proceedings of the grand jury was not finally
determined.4CG Yet, the court of appeals stated: "It seems to be con-
ceded that this trial should be before a jury.'1*7
In one case the trial court overruled a plea in abatement as a matter
of law. Later, there was a submission at the request of the United States
attorney, "presumably out of abundant caution," to the trial jury of the
question of fact involved in the identity of a grand juror with the per-
son naturalized. On appeal, this was upheld.A06 There was no need for
the issue to be submitted to a jury other than the trial jury. If a demand
had been submitted to the trial court for another jury, "doubtless" the
trial court would have granted such demand. Since it had not been, the
court of appeals would not review the matter. The evidence for the
Government was full and complete. The defendant offered no evidence
to the contrary. In another case the court denied a preliminary trial on
a plea in abatement averring misnomer, "and ordered that the plea be
tried with the merits."' The court stated: "The issues of fact as to
the meaning of the words 'Luigi' and 'Louis,' as well as the existence of
misnomers in the indictment, were left to the jury for decision. We
think the action was more favorable to the appellant than the record
warranted." 47  In a subsequent case a court of appeals held that on a
plea in abatement for misnomer the "question thus raised was tried by
a jury and if the finding was in favor of the defendant, the indictment
was abated."47'
Decision was rendered by the court on a plea in abatement raising
463. Price v. United States, 6S F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1934). See alro United States v.
Holmes, 1 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 412 (1820).
464. Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36, 41 (1S97); Morris v. United States, 123 F2d
912, 914 (5th Cir. 1942). In United States v. Upham, 43 Fed. 63 (C.C.S.D. .1a. 13O)),
the jury apparently passed on the plea.
465. United States v. Goldman, 23 F.2d 424 (D. Conn. 1923); United States v. Jonco,
16 F. Supp. 135 (SD.N. 1936).
466. Ev'aporated Milk Ass'n v. Roche, 130 F.2d 343, S46 (9th Cir. 1942), rev'd, 319
U.S. 21 (1943).
467. Evaporated IM Ass'n v. Roche, 130 F.2d 343, W (9th Cir. 1942).
46S. Jones v. United States, 179 Fed. 5S4, 592-93 (9th Cir. 1910).
469. Capriola v. United States, 61 F.2d 5, 6 (7th Cir. 1932), cerL denied, 237 U.S.
671 (1933).
470. 61 F.2d at 12.
471. United States v. Fawcett 115 F.2d 764, 767 (3d Cir. 1940).
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the defense of immunity,472 and "on admitted facts contained" in the
"sworn plea" of the defendant.17 A jury decided a self incrimination point
raised in a plea of abatement, 474 while the Supreme Court decided a plea
in abatement presenting the defense of the statute of limitations, treating
the plea as being in fact a plea in bar.475
Decision was rendered by the court on a motion to quash.47  The
court stated broadly that where, from the inspection of an indictment,
it becomes clear to the court that, if a jury should find the defendant
guilty under the evidence on which it is conceded the Government would
be compelled to rely, a new trial would necessarily be granted, then
the indictment should be quashed. This power is linked to the power to
direct a verdict for the defendant. Likewise, decision was rendered by
the court on a motion to quash the indictment because no women were
on the grand jury panel.477
Decision was rendered by the court upon a plea in bar presenting
expiration of the statute of limitations after a jury trial of the issue
had been waived.4 17  By agreement of the parties, the judge tried the
issues of fact and law involved in the plea.
The determination of a former jeopardy plea was made by directed
verdict at the time of the trial of the general issue and before a verdict
on the plea of not guilty.4 79 The court directed the jury to find in favor
of the Government. Of course, there could be no directed verdict of
guilt.48 0  Since there have been many directed verdicts in these pre-
liminary trials, it is doubtful whether there is any constitutional right
to such a trial by jury. The court's determination of the question of
law raised by a plea of former acquittal was held to be final.481 There
472. United States v. Thomas, 49 F. Supp. 547 (W.D. Ky. 1943).
473. United States v. Shaw, 33 F. Supp. 531, 532 (S.D. Cal. 1940).
474. Mulloney v. United States, 79 F.2d 566, 574 (1st Cir. 1935), affirming United
States v. Mulloney, 8 F. Supp. 674 (D. Mass. 1934), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 658 (1936).
475. United States v. Barber, 219 U.S. 72, 73, 78 (1910). It was also said in United
States v. Goldman, 277 U.S. 229, 236 (1928), that the plea in United States v. Barber,
supra, was in reality a plea in bar.
476. United States v. Kuhl, 85 Fed. 624, 625 (S.D. Iowa 1898).
477. United States v. Roemig, 52 F. Supp. 857, 858 (N.D. Iowa 1943).
478. Brouse v. United States, 68 F.2d 294 (1st Cir. 1933). The court ruled against
the defendant.
479. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 665 (1896); Thompson v. United States,
155 U.S. 271, 273 (1894).
480. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105 (1895). See Orfield, Motion For Acquittal
in Federal Criminal Procedure: Successor to Directed Verdict, 28 Temp. L. Q. 400, 406
(1955).
481. United States v. Peters, 87 Fed. 984, 986 (C.C.D. Wash. 1898), afl'd, 94 Fed. 127,
135 (9th Cir. 1899), cert. denied, 176 U.S. 684 (1900).
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were no questions of fact "to be disposed of by a jury.' 3 2 The defendant
waived his right, "if any he ever had," to other disposition of his plea,
since he consented to go to trial. In a subsequent case, decision on a
plea of former acquittal was made by the court, with no mention of
waiver of jury.4 3 The decision was against the defendant. Similarly,
determination was made by the court, after a waiver of jury trial, upon
a plea in bar averring former jeopardy.3
In one case the Supreme Court raised but did not decide the question
of whether the defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to
trial by jury where the trial court directed verdict against him upon his
plea of immunity."'5 Subsequently in this case, both the lower court °0
and the Supreme CourtS7 held that the determination by the jury on
a directed verdict was valid. Neither side asked that the case be sub-
mitted to a jury. In a subsequent case the jury found against the claim
of immunity under instructions of the court.-" A later case said the
determination of a plea of immunity was for the court.," As late as
1937, one court stated broadly: "Numerous cases are called to the at-
tention of the court in which issues raised by special plea in bar were
tried before a jury.... There can be no question of a defendant's right
in that respect upon a proper showing of sufficient issues. That the
defendants herein do not make."' The court concluded that if tenable
issues were raised by a plea in bar, they could be tried at the trial of
the general issue.
As to the determination of an averment of present insanity, one court
stated: "If present insanity does not appear until the trial has begun,
the court may submit the objection to the jury along with the principal
issue, requiring a special verdict as to the competency of the defendant
to understand the proceeding and intelligently defend himself. But, if
the jury find insanity to exist, a verdict upon the issue of not guilty
should be quashed."' 9' Another court stated: "The court may submit
432. Peters v. United States, 94 Fed. 127, 135 (9th Cir. 1S99).
483. United States v. J. L. Hopkins & Co., 22S Fed. 173, 176 (S.D N.Y. 1912).
484. United States v. Weiss, 293 Fed. 992, 994 (NMD. Ill. 1923).
435. Heike v. United States, 217 U.S. 423, 42S (1910).
4S6. United States v. Heike, 175 Fed. 352, S56, S60 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910).
4S7. Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 140 (1913).
483. Shervn v. United States, 26S U.S. 369, 370 (1925). See also Unitcd States v.
Greater N.Y. Live Poultry Chamber of Commerce, 34 F.2d 967 (S.DN.Y. 1929).
4S9. United States v. Goldman, 2S F.2d 424 (D. Conn. 1928). See also United States v.
Eisele, 52 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1943); United States v. Greater N.Y. Live Poultry Cham-
ber of Commerce, 33 F.2d 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
490. United States v. Noble, 19 F. Supp. 527, 530 (W.D.N.Y. 1937).
491. Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1S99). See alo 'United States
v. Fore, 33 F. Supp. 140, 141 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
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the issue of present insanity .. to a jury impaneled for that purpose,
or may determine the issue itself.1492 In another case the court stated:
"The defendant is not entitled to a jury trial of his mental condition."4 '
A subsequent case employed a jury.494
0. Pleading Over
Prior to the federal rules, if the defendant's pleading were overruled,
he was permitted to plead over. It was so held with respect to a plea
to the jurisdiction,495 plea in abatement, 490 motion to quash,497 and de-
murrer.498 There were similar holdings when a special plea of immunity
was overruled 4 9 9 and when four pleas in bar were overruled.""
P. Right to Counsel
There has been virtually no discussion in the cases of a defendant's
right to counsel with respect to his pleadings other than not guilty or
guilty. In one case the Supreme Court quoted Chitty 01 as saying:
It is perfectly clear that all persons serving upon the grand jury must be good
and lawful men.... And if a man who lies under any of these disqualifications be
returned, he may be challenged by the prisoner before the bill is presented; or, if it
be discovered after the finding, the defendant may plead it in avoidance, and
answer over to the felony; for which purpose he may be allowed the assistance of
counsel on producing in court the record of the outlawry, attainder, or conviction,
on which the incompetence of the juryman rests.5 0 2
In many cases defenses and objections were raised before arraignment.
For example, in one case the defendant filed a plea in abatement, a
492. Whitney v. Zerbst, 62 F.2d 970, 972 (10th Cir. 1933). See United States v. Boylen,
41 F. Supp. 724 (D. Ore. 1941).
493. United States v. Harriman, 4 F. Supp. 186, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
494. Owens v. United States, 85 F.2d 270, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
495. United States v. Lawrence, 26 Fed. Cas. 879, 884 (No. 15573) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1876);
United States v. Caldwell, 25 Fed. Cas. 237, 238 (No. 14707) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1871).
496. United States v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65, 67 (1883); United States v. Williams, 28 Fed.
Cas. 666, 670 (No. 16716) (C.C.D. Minn. 1871); United States v. Smith, 27 Fed. Cas.
1186, 1191 (No. 16341a) (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806).
497. United States v. Smith, 27 Fed. Cas. 1186, 1191 (No. 16341a) (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806).
498. Mulloney v. United States, 79 F.2d 566, 573 (1st Cir. 1935); Hillegass v. United
States, 183 Fed. 199, 201 (3d Cir. 1910); United States v. Plumer, 27 Fed. Cas. 561, 572
(No. 16056) (C.C.D. Mass. 1859); United States v. Watkins, 28 Fed. Cas. 419, 470, 474
(No. 16649) (C.C.D.D.C. 1829).
499. Heike v. United States, 217 U.S. 423, 427 (1910).
500. United States v. Rockefeller, 226 Fed. 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
501. I Chitty, Criminal Law 307 (2d ed. 1826).
502. United States v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65, 67 (1883). See also Orfield, Criminal Procedure
From Arrest to Appeal 267-68 n.6 (1947). At common law there was no right to retain
counsel for felonies, but only for treason and misdemeanors. Beancy, The Right to Counsel
in American Courts 8-12 (1953).
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demurrer, a plea to the jurisdiction, and then was arraigned. Finally,
he pleaded not guilty.1°3 In such a case, if the right to counsel accrued
only at arraignment, the defendant would have had to proceed without
counsel, unless he could retain counsel at his own expense. On the other
hand, when he pleaded not guilty, withdrew his plea, and filed various
objections and defenses,:" arguably he would have the right to counsel
since he had been arraigned. If the objection is taken at the arraign-
ment," there should likewise be a right to counsel.
It has been shown that the right to counsel at Government expense,
at arraignmentf,"6 and with respect to pleas '7 of not guilty, nolo con-
tendere, and guilty, was extremely limited. As a matter of logic, it must
have followed that the right to counsel as to defenses and objections
raised by the defendant must have been similarly limited. The utter
absence of judicial decisions indicating any right to counsel is highly
significant. But it is easy to exaggerate this deficiency in criminal pro-
cedure. A study made fifteen years ago of 34,240 federal criminal
cases, revealed that pleadings were filed by defendants in only 1,S57
cases. Of the 2,695 pleadings filed, only 403 were motions to quash. On
1,530 of these pleadings, the ruling was in favor of the Government, and
on 827, the ruling was in favor of the defendant?"I On the other hand,
it should be pointed out that the average defendant doubtless has a far
better understanding of what he is doing when he pleads not guilty,
nolo contendere, or guilty, than when he moves to dismiss.
III. RULE 12 AS INTERPRETED IN THE DECISIONS
A. Abolition of Common Law Objections and Defenses
Following the adoption of rule 12(a), a motion to quash7 3 and a
plea in abatementlo will be treated as a motion to dismiss. Although
motions to quash were abolished, one court of appeals made reference
503. Crowley v. United States, 194 U.S. 461, 46S (10,04).
504. See, e.g., United States v. Perlman, 247 Fed. 15, 159 (S.DN.Y. 1916).
505. In United States v. Rintelen, 235 Fed. 7M7, 739 (S.DN.Y. 1916), it vas caid that
a plea in abatement should usually be made at arraignment.
506. Orfield, Arraignment in Federal Criminal Procedure, 20 La. L. Rev. 1, 20, 23
(1959).
507. Orfield, Pleas in Federal Criminal Procedure, 35 Notre Dame Law. 1, 21, 39 (1959).
50S. Orfield, op. ciL supra note 502, at 283.
509. Universal Ailk Bottle Seri% v. United States, 1I3 F2d 959, f'2 (6th Cir. 1951);
United States v. Holmes, 16S F.2d SS3, S90 n.6 (3d Cir. 194S); United States v. Davis,
143 Supp. 473 (D.N.D. 1957); United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 279, 231 (N]D. Cal.
1952); United States v. Hearne, 6 F.R.D. 294 (E.D. Wis. 1946); United States v. McNeil,
91 A.2d 849, 350 (D.C. Mun. Ct. of App. 1952).
510. United States v. Holmes, 16S F.2d 333, S30 n.6 (3d Cr. 1943); United States v.
Janitz, 161 F.2d 19, 21 n.6 (3d Cir. 1947); United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 279, 281
(N.D. Cal. 1952).
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to the former doctrine that there would be no review on appeal of a
denial of a motion to quashY" A special plea in bar, such as the statute
of limitations, is now covered by the motion to dismiss. 12 A demurrer
will be treated as a motion to dismiss." 3 A number of cases have con-
tinued to use the old phraseology." 4 One court has stated that "the
substance of common law pleading in criminal prosecutions has not been
abolished. Pleas, demurrers and motions to quash the indictment, are
abolished . . . but the same defenses may be raised before trial by
motions as provided in the rules of criminal procedure."""
It should be noted that rule 12(a) does not speak only of defenses
which could have been raised by demurrer.510 The Court of Appeals of
the Second Circuit had improperly spoken of the rule as referring only
to demurrers. 117 Rule 12(a) seems to command only that all defenses
which are raised before trial shall be raised by motion to dismiss.", The
function of limiting the scope of defenses which may be raised before
trial is performed by rule 12(b)(1) and not by rule 12(a).
The jurisdiction of the court of appeals under section 3731 of Title
18,519 concerning appeals by the Government, is in line with rule 12, and
no increase in jurisdiction was intended. 2 ° This was also true of the
1942 statute; rule 12 did not increase the scope of appeal."'
511. United States v. Holmes, 168 F.2d 888, 890 (3d Cir. 1948). Nevertheless, the court
did review the denial and upheld it.
512. United States v. Zisblatt, 172 F.2d 740, 742 (2d Cir. 1949); United States v.
Haramic, 125 F. Supp. 128, 129 (W.D. Pa. 1959).
513. United States v. Jones, 207 F.2d 785, 787 (5th Cir. 1953); Universal Milk Bottle
Serv. v. United States, 188 F.2d 959, 962 (6th Cir. 1951); United States v. Haramic, 125
F. Supp. 128, 129 (W.D. Pa. 1954); United States v. Selph, 82 F. Supp. 56, 57 (S.D.
Cal. 1949).
514. United States v. Nunan, 236 F.2d 576, 592 (2d Cir. 1956); United States v.
Tornabene, 222 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1955); Harris v. United States, 190 F.2d 503, 505 (10th
Cir. 1951).
515. United States v. Williams, 203 F.2d 572, 573 (5th Cir. 1953). See also United
States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 453 (1960) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ; United States v.
Brodson, 234 F.2d 97, 100 (7th Cir. 1956).
516. United States v. J. R. Watkins Co., 16 F.R.D. 229, 232 (D. Minn. 1954).
517. United States v. Parrino, 203 F.2d 284, 287 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
841 (1954).
518. United States v. J. R. Watkins Co., 16 F.R.D. 229, 232 (D. Minn. 1954).
519. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1958).
520. United States v. Apex Distrib. Co., 270 F.2d 747, 751, 754 (9th Cir. 1959). Com-
pare United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 453 (1960) ; United States v. Heath, 260 F.2d
623, 627 (9th Cir. 1958); United States v. Nardolillo, 252 F.2d 755, 757 (Ist Cir. 1958);
United States v. Pack, 247 F.2d 168, 170 (3d Cir. 1957).
521. United States v. Janitz, 161 F.2d 19, 21 (3d 'Cir. 1947). Compare United States
v. Apex Distrib. Co., 270 F.2d 747, 752, 755 (9th Cir. 1959).
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B. Overlapping of Rules 12 and 6
It should be noted that there may be a certain overlapping of rule 12
with rule 6(b).*2 Under rule 6(b) a motion to dismiss lies for irregular-
ity in the summoning or array of grand jurors, or for objections to in-
dividual jurors. - A motion under rule 12 (b) has been made to raise the
issue of self incrimination of a witness before the grand jury. -"C A motion
to dismiss because of illegal evidence before the grand jury was treated
by one court as involving rule 12(b).12 Objection to the array or panel
of the grand jury has been treated as coming under both rules 12
and 6(b). -
C. Overlapping of R2des 12 and 14
One court of appeals appears to have linked a motion under rule 12(b)
with a motion under rule 14 on relief from prejudicial joinder of de-fendants. Z27
D. Overlapping of Rides 12 and 48
There is also a certain overlapping of rule 12 with rule 48(b) on dis-
missal for delay. A prosecution has been dismissed for delay under
both rules. -12S
E. Defenses and Objections Which May be Raised
On a motion to dismiss counts of an information, rule 12(b) restricts
the motion to an objection which is capable of determination without
522. See Soper v. United States, 220 F.2d 158, 159 (9th Cir. 1955); United States
,.L Gilboy, 160 F. Supp. 442 (MI.D. Pa. 1953); United States v. Long, 113 F. Supp. 057
(D.P.-. 1954); United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 279, 2S1 (NfD. Cal. 1952).
523. United States v. Agnew, 6 F.R.D. 566, 567 (E.D. Pa. 1947). See Orfield, The
Federal Grand jury, 22 F.R.D. 343, 419-23 (1959).
524. United States v. Miller, So F. Supp. 979, 931 (E-D. Pa. 1943). See alo United
States v. Gilboy. 160 F. Supp. 442, 460 (M.D. Pa. 195S).
525. United States v. Fujimoto, 102 F. Supp. SM0, 395 (D. Hawaii 1952). See alt,
United States v. Wheeler, 256 F.2d 745, 749 (3d Cir. 195S); United States v. Gilboy,
160 F. Supp. 442, 459 (M.D. Pa. 195S).
526. Miranda v. United States, 255 F.2d 9, 16 (1st Cir. 1953). See alzo Seales v.
United States, 260 F2d 21, 44 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 353 U.S. 917 (1950); Paliafico v.
United States, 237 F.2d 97, 110 (6th Cir. 1956), cerL denied, 352 U.S. 1025 (1957); United
States v. Kloc, 210 F.2d 217, 220 (2d Cir. 1954); York v. United State:, 167 F2d 347, PAS
(Sth Cir. 1943); Wright v. United States, 165 F.2d 405, 407 (9th Cir. 1943).
527. United States v. Soto, 256 F.2d 729, 735 (7th Cir. 1953). The court erroneoufly
referred to rule 12(g)(2) instead of rule 12(b)(2). The former is none.dstcnt. See, as
to misjoinder of offenses, United States v. Guterma, 179 F. Supp. 420 (E.D.%. 1959).
523. Petition of Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 13, 203 (D. Ald. 1955). See also United States v.
Apex Distrib. Co., 270 F2d 747, 755 (9th Cir. 1959); United States v. Heath, 2L0 F2d
623, 632 (9th Cir. 1953); United States v. Wheeler, 256 F.2d 745, 749 (3d Cir. 1935);
United States v. Barnes, 175 F. Supp. 60, 64 (S.D. Cal. 1959); United States v. Patrizo,
21 F.RJ. 363, 364 (S-D..Y. 195S).
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the trial of the general issues. 29 The court will not consider matters
which might be received as evidence upon trial. The court will not con-
sider the motives for including the counts, such as an alleged threat by
an assistant United States attorney that if the defendant did not plead
guilty to certain counts, then the present counts would be added.
Since the general issue may not be determined on the motion, the
allegations of an indictment or information must be taken as true on a
motion to dismiss for failure to state an offense. ° In construing an
indictment on demurrer, the courts cannot consider extraneous matter.
It is a "speaking demurrer" to contend that "from the face of the
indictment, plus facts of which the courts may take judicial notice,"
no offense is stated. 3' While rule 47 permits a motion to be supported
by affidavit, there was no intention to allow speaking motions nor sum-
mary judgments as in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."8 2 In one
case it was held that when the court, in deciding to dismiss, did not
consider matter in the appendices attached to the motion and denied
certain allegations, the question whether to grant the Government's
motion to strike the appendices had become moot. 533
Where on an indictment for perjury the "false statements charged
are not even probably material, the indictment may be dismissed with-
out putting defendant to the mere ceremony of trial." '34 Where in a
prosecution under the Sherman Act, 3" a motion to take testimony or
to ask questions was such that disposal of it before trial would require
double trial of a large part of the case, the motion should be denied.""
Whether a letter to a woman, referring to reports of her immoral con-
duct and stating that the writer would "deal with you and your cohorts,"
529. United States v. Hearne, 6 F.R.D. 294, 295 (E.D. Wis. 1946).
530. United States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847, 851, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ; United States
v. Jones, 207 F.2d 785, 787 (5th Cir. 1953); United States v. Chrysler Corp., 180 F.2d
557, 558 (9th Cir. 1950); Local 36, Int'l Fishermen v. United States, 177 F.2d 320, 326
(9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 947 (1950) ; United States v. Gilboy, 160 F. Supp.
442, 455 (M.D. Pa. 1958); United States v. Pennel, 144 F. Supp. 320, 322 (N.D. Cal. 1956);
United States v. Silverman, 129 F. Supp. 496, 501 (D. Conn. 1955) ; United States v. J. R.
Watkins Co., 16 F.R.D. 229, 234 (D. Minn. 1954); United States v. Universal Milk Bottle
Serv., 85 F. Supp. 622, 625 (S.D. Ohio 1949).
531. Local 36, Int'l Fishermen v. United States, 177 F.2d 320, 326 (9th Cir. 1949).
See also United States v. Barnes, 175 F. Supp. 60, 61 (S.D. Cal. 1959), where a speaking
motion was allowed.
532. United States v. J. R. Watkins Co., 16 F.R.D. 229, 234 (D. Minn. 1954).
533. United States v. Lattimore, 127 F. Supp. 405, 407 n.4 (D.D.C. 1955).
534. United States v. Laut, 17 F.R.D. 31, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
535. 28 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
536. United States v. Maryland State Licensed Beverage Ass'n, 138 F. Supp. 685, 700
(D. Md. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 240 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1957).
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constituted a threat was a question of fact, not to be determined on a
motion to dismiss.
The annotation of the Advisory Committee to rule 12(b) (1) and (2)
points out that there are some "objections and defenses, which the de-
fendant at his option may raise by motion before trial." This includes
"such matters as former jeopardy, former conviction, former acquittal,
statute of limitations, immunity, lack of jurisdiction, failure of indict-
ment or information to state an offense, etc." Cases on this point have
usually involved the statute of limitations.
The bar of the statute of limitations is a matter of defense.Y 3 It
cannot be raised by demurrer, or by a motion for judgment of acquittal
at the end of the Government's case.Y° In one case the defendant moved
to dismiss before trial, at the conclusion of the Government's case,
and at the close of all the evidence.' The trial court dismissed after
a verdict of guilty and the Government appealed. Where in an indict-
ment for conspiracy the defense was withdrawal by some defendants long
enough for the statute of limitations to operate, the defendants must
show this at the trial.5 41
The defense of the statute of limitations "should be presented to and
passed upon by the trial court."' - It may be raised by motion to dis-
miss before trial.5 3 It may not be raised for the first time on a motion
to vacate sentence under section 2255 of Title 2S.111
In a case involving a motion to vacate judgment of conviction, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a defendant may avail
himself of the statute of limitations on a plea of not guilty, and that
the trial court should not dismiss an indictment because it appears on
its face that the statute of limitations has run.51 In the next year, an
able opinion by Judge Nordbye held that under rule 12(b) (1) the de-
537. United States v. Pennell, 144 F. Supp. 317, 319 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
533. United States v. Franklin, 1S F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1951); Unitcd Statc3 v.
Johnson, 76 F. Supp. 542 (M.D. Pa. 1947).
539. United States v. Johnson, 76 F. Supp. 542, 544 (M.D. Pa. 1947).
540. United States v. Zisblatt Furniture Co., 73 F. Supp. 9, 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). ee
the case on appeal, 172 F.2d 740, 741 (2d Cir. 1949).
541. United States v. Metropolitan Leather & Findings . 3'n, 2 F. Supp. 449, 4-3
(S.D-N.Y. 1949.)
542. United States v. Franklin, ISS F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1951).
543. United States v. Gelb, 175 F. Supp. 267, 270 (S.D .NY.), afi'd mcmn, 269 F.2d
675 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 322 (1959); United States v. Brandt, 139 F. Supp.
367, 372 (N.D. Ohio 1955); United States v. Fujimoto, 102 F. Supp. S50, 897 (D. Ha ,-ai
1952).
544. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (195S). See United States v. Taylor, 207 F.2d 437, 433 (2d Cir.
1953). Conviction was on a plea of guilty. See also As-ins v. United States, 251 F2d !i)9,
913 (D.C. Cir. 1953); United States v. Gelb, 175 F. Supp. 267, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
545. United States v. Parrino, 203 F.2d 234, 235 (2d Cir. 1953) (L. Hand, J.).
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fendant may plead the running of the statute either before or at the
trial of the general issue.54 The Government objected to a motion before
trial because this would contradict the allegations of the indictment. The
decision of the Second Circuit involved different facts. There the de-
fendant had pleaded guilty and had moved to vacate the judgment. In
the instant case, the defendant made his motion before trial. Rule 12 (a)
does not speak only of offenses which formerly could have been raised
by demurrer. A district court in Pennsylvania took the same view.5' 7
It is in the discretion of the trial court whether the issue be determined
before or at trial. The court in the instant case ordered a hearing before
trial, and pointed to the hardships of compelling a trial if the statute of
limitations has run. In a case involving a continuing conspiracy under
the Smith Act 548 the court stated that "that is something to be dealt
with at the trial and not on a preliminary motion such as this." 4 " In a
perjury prosecution the court granted a motion to dismiss.,," In 1958
the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia stated that the defense
of the statute of limitations "must be raised at the trial or before trial
on motion." 51 Where the information charged on its face the commis-
sion of one offense which could well have been consummated within
the limitation period, a motion to dismiss would be denied.15 2
Motions to dismiss have been made on the ground of double jeopardy
and res judicata. 53 A ruling against a motion on the ground of res
judicata does not mean that questions relating to the doctrine of res
judicata may not arise during the course of the trial. 4
Failure of the indictment or information to charge an offense may be
raised by motion to dismiss. 5 But the motion may not be used to
challenge the truth of the allegations in the indictment."" The latter
raises issues of fact which should be tried by the jury. That is to say,
546. United States v. J. R. Watkins Co., 16 F.R.D. 229 (D. Minn. 1954).
547. United States v. Haramic, 125 F. Supp. 128, 129 (W.D. Pa. 1954).
548. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1958).
549. United States v. Silverman, 129 F. Supp. 496, 501 (D. Conn. 1955).
550. United States v. Laut, 17 F.R.D. 31, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
551. Askins v. United States, 251 F.2d 909, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
552. United States v. Dierker, 164 F. Supp. 304, 305 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
553. Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 578 (1948), reversing 161 F.2d 481 (3d
Cir. 1947); United States v. Perrone, 161 F. Supp. 252, 254, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
554. United States v. Perrone, 161 F. Supp. 252, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
555. United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374 (1953); Universal Milk Bottle Serv. v.
United States, 188 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1951); United States v. MacKenzie, 170 F. Supp.
797 (D. Me. 1959); United States v. Siegel, 152 F. Supp. 370, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), all'd,
263 F.2d 530 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1012 (1959); United States v. Miller, 17
F.R.D. 486 (D. Vt. 1955); United States v. Schneiderman, 102 F. Supp. 87, 97 (S.D. Cal.
1951).
556. Universal Milk Bottle Serv. v. United States, 188 F.2d 959, 962 (6th Cir. 1951).
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it raises the general issue. The pleas of not guilty and nolo conlcndcre,
in response to allegations of the indictment essential to prove the offense
charged, require a trial of the general issues. The motion cannot take
the place of such pleas. A motion to dismiss lies where the indictment
fails to charge an essential element of the crime such as the fact that
the defendant acted knowingly.Yr
F. Defenses and Objections Which Mist be Raised
A motion to dismiss on the ground of admission of incompetent or
hearsay testimony before the grand jury is inadequate unless it affirma-
tively appears in the motion that no competent evidence of the com-
mission of the offense charged was presented to the grand jury, or unless
all the evidence was unlawfully procured in violation of substantial
rights of the defendant, so as to subject the evidence to exclusion if
offered against him.Ys
Repugnancy is not necessarily a ground for a motion to dismiss, for
example, where the indictment is in the alternative with the intention
of proving one of the counts therein.r 9 However, a motion to dismiss
may be made on the ground that the indictment is too vague.'-1
A motion to dismiss because of use of aliases in the indictment in
referring to the defendant will be denied where there was no indication
that the aliases could not be proved at the trial.'; Prosecution or trial
in a district in which the offense was not committed may be attacked
by a motion to dismiss. 6
The crime of treason may be committed by an American citizen in a
foreign country; hence, a motion to dismiss does not lie.533 A crime
557. United States v. Deer, 131 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Wash. 1955); United Statez v.
Miller, 17 F.R.D. 4S6 (D. Vt. 1955).
55S. United States v. Frontier Asthma Co., 69 F. Supp. 994, 993 (W.D.Y. 1947).
559. United States v. Valenti, 74 F. Supp. 718, 720 (W.D. Pa. 1947).
560. United States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1954); United States
v. Lattimore, 127 F. Supp. 405 (D.D.C. 1955), afi'd by equally divided court, 232 F.2d
334 (D.C. Cir. 1955), 43 Geo. L. J. 111 (1954). See also United States v. Greater Bloue,,
Skirt & Neckwear Contractors' Ass'n, 177 F. Supp. 213, 213 (S.DN.Y. 1959).
It has been said that the correct remedy where the indictment is too broad or general is
not dismissal but a bill of particulars. Cefalu v. United States, 234 F.2d 522, 524 (10th
Cir. 1956); United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 105, 113-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
561. United States v. Valenti, 74 F. Supp. 71S, 720 (W.D. Pa. 1947).
562. Reynolds v. United States, 225 F.2d 123, 127 (5th Cir. 1955); United State3 v.
Patteson, 132 F. Supp. 67 (D. Kan. 1955), aft'd, 229 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1956); Unitcd
States v. Long, 113 F. Supp. S57, 859 (D.P.R. 1954); United States v. Mloody, 102 F.
Supp. 315, 318 (W.D. 'Mo. 1952) ; United States v. Borow, 101 F. Supp. 211 (DW.J. 1951).
563. United States v. Chandler, 72 F. Supp. 230, 233 (D. Mlass. 1947), aff'd, 171 F.2d
921 (1st Cir. 194S), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 913 (1949).
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committed in Lake St. Clair is within maritime jurisdiction; hence, a
motion to dismiss does not lie.564
A corporate defendant may move to dismiss on the ground that it has
been dissolved,505 and such a motion lies where the Government fails to
allow discovery under the rules of discovery.500
A novel ground for the motion to dismiss was employed in a net-worth
tax prosecution. A trial court granted dismissal because the defendant
was without funds to procure an expert accountant, his funds having
been tied up through jeopardy assessments.0 7  The court of appeals,
however, reversed.50 8
Motions attacking an indictment should be filed jointly and not piece-
meal, so that they may be set for hearing, argued, and disposed of with
the least delay.569
An attack on an indictment for insufficiency of evidence before the
grand jury must be made by motion to dismiss before trial."' Failure
to make such motion constitutes a waiver of the defense. Objections
that the United States attorney who appeared before the grand jury was
prejudiced against the defendant and that a weapon other than that
mentioned in the indictment was presented to the grand jury are waived
if not presented by motion to dismiss.5 7 '
The objection that the indictment was not returned in open court may
be made by motion to dismiss. If there is no such motion and the de-
fendant pleads guilty, there is a waiver of the objection.57 2
Duplicity,5 73 inconsistency, and repugnancy5 74  must be seasonably
564. Hoopengarner v. United States, 270 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1959).
565. Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 271 (1959) ; United States v.
San Diego Grocers Ass'n, 177 F. Supp. 352 (S.D. Cal. 1959); United States v. Maryland
State Licensed Beverage Ass'n, 138 F. Supp. 685, 706 (D. Md. 1956).
566. United States v. Heath, 260 F.2d 623, 625 (9th Cir. 1958), dismissing appeal from
147 F. Supp. 877 (D. Hawaii 1957); United States v. Nardolillo, 252 F.2d 755, 757 (1st
Cir. 1958). But see United States v. Apex Distrib. Co., 270 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1959).
567. United States v. Brodson, 136 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Wis. 1955), rev'd on other
grounds, 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1957), 25 Fordham L. Rev. 339 (1956), 69 Harv. L. Rev.
1499 (1956), 44 Ky. L. J. 476 (1956). See Orfield, Expert Witnesses in Federal Criminal
Procedure, 20 F.R.D. 317, 346-47 (1958).
568. United States v. Brodson, 234 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1956).
569. United States v. Long, 15 F.R.D. 25, 28 (D.P.R. 1953).
570. United States v. Labate, 270 F.2d 122, 123 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 900
(1959). The court stated that the "extent, if any, that Rule 12(b)(2) is modified by [Cos-
tello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 360 (1956)] is not before us." 270 F.2d at 124 n.2.
571. Soper v. United States, 220 F.2d 158, 159 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 828
(1955). The objection may not be first raised on appeal.
572. Hornbrook v. United States, 216 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1954).
573. Korholz v. United States, 269 F.2d 897, 901 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 829 (1960); Hanf v. United States, 235 F.2d 710, 714 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 880 (1956); United States v. Richie, 222 F.2d 436, 437 (3d Cir. 1955); Torres
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challenged by a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, they are waived. These
objections may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Where an
indictment contained four counts regarding the unlawful purchase or
disposition of narcotics and the narcotics in each count were received
at the same time and place, and handled in the same way by the de-
fendant, the sentences on each count running concurrently, the defendant
should have objected before or at the trial 7" If not, there was a waiver.Y0°
Where there have been irregularities in a federal removal proceeding,
the defendant may move to dismissY.7 Failure to do so is a waiver.
Failure of the United States Commissioner to follow the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure may be objected to by motion to dismiss, and a
failure to move is a waiver575 Technical error, if any, in arraignment
in the wrong district of the state is waived by the defendant's going to
trial with counsel and making no motion to dismiss?5° A failure to object
before trial to joinder of offenses constitutes a waiverY ° lisjoinder of
defendants cannot be objected to for the first time on appeal.551
In general, if the indictment is sufficient to advise the defendant of
the offense, enabling him to defend and protect himself against subse-
quent jeopardy, he waives if he does not move to dismiss. He may not
raise the issue on appealys ~ In general, it is sufficient if the indictment
contains "the essential elements of the offense charged." z  The Supreme
Martinez v. United States, 220 F.2d 740, 743 (Ist Cir. 1955); Witt v. United States, 1sG
F.2d 285, 2S6 (9th Cir. 1952); Beauchamp v. United States, 154 F.2d 413, 415 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 723 (1946); United States v. Raff, 161 F. Supp. 276, 231 (M.D. Pa.
1958) ; United States v. Gilboy, 160 F. Supp. 442, 457 (M.D. Pa. 195S); United States v.
Kidwell, 14 F.R.D. 399, 400 (W.D. Mlo. 1953); United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 279,
231 (NiJ). Cal. 1952).
574. Harris v. United States, 190 F.2d 503, 505 (10th Cir. 1951).
575. Anderson v. United States, 189 F.2d 202, 204 (6th Cir. 1951).
576. United States v. Private Brands, Inc., 250 F.2d 554, 557 (2d Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 957 (1958).
577. Hardy v. United States, 250 F.2d 580, 5SI (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 921
(1958).
578. United States v. Bistram, 153 F. Supp. 316, 813 (D.N.D. 1957), afi'd, 253 F.2d
610 (Sth Cir. 195S).
579. United States v. Bradford, 122 F. Supp. 915, 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
580. Smith v. United States, 180 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1950). But the court of appealb
found the joinder permissable under rule 8(a).
581. Lelles v. United States, 241 F.2d 21, 23 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 974 (1957).
5S2. Finn v. United States, 256 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 195S); United States v. Miller,
246 F.2d 4S6, 4SS (2d Cir. 1957); Hudson v. United States, 229 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1956);
United States v. Butch, 164 F. Supp. 678, 6S1 (E.D. Pa. 1953); United States v. Starhs,
6 F.R.D. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
583. United States v. Mller, 17 F.R.D. 4S6, 40S (D. VL 1955). See United States v.
Debrow, 346 U.S. 374 (1953); Bennett v. United States, 252 F.2d 97, 93 (10th Cir. 1953).
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Court has stated: "The sufficiency of the indictment is not a question
of whether it could have been more definite and certain." 8' Failure to
charge the necessary mental element in a crime, such as scienter, is
waived by failure to move to dismiss.85
The defendant may waive trial within the proper division of the dis-
trict.586 When the defendant fails to make a timely motion for transfer
to the proper division, there is a waiver.587 Request for a transfer from
one division to another may operate as a waiver of venue."88 Venue in
the division is a right conferred by statute and rule of court, and not a
constitutional right. Since venue in the district is waivable, it follows
that venue in the division is waivable.
According to some cases, venue for trial within the district may be
waived. A defendant claimed that his violation of the Selective Service
Act was committed solely in Oregon. He was tried and sentenced in the
Western District of New York. Judge Jerome Frank stated:
We assume, arguendo, the correctness of this characterization of the indictment. On
that basis, a timely objection pursuant to Article III, § 2 of the Constitution and to
the Sixth Amendment, should have halted the trial. But a defendant, thus warned,
by the face of the indictment, of the improper venue, waives the error when he
goes to trial without interposing an objection, as defendant did here. 80
The holding is a broad one as it seems to permit, where there is a waiver,
both indictment and trial in a district other than that of the offense.
The Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit held that although the in-
dictment found in the Southern District of California failed to state that
the crime was committed in the state or district, the defendant, by going
to trial on the merits without raising any question as to venue, waived
such defect."00 As a consequence, the defendant was tried in the Southern
District of California for a crime possibly committed in Brooklyn, New
584. United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 378 (1953). This case was followed in
United States v. Raff, 161 F. Supp. 276, 281 (M.D. Pa. 1958).
585. United States v. Williams, 202 F.2d 712, 713 (5th Cir. 1953). The petition for
rehearing was denied. 203 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1953).
586. United States v. Bistram, 153 F. Supp. 816, 818 (D.N.D. 1957), aff'd, 253 F.2d
610, 613 (8th Cir. 1958); United States v. Bryson, 16 F.R.D. 431, 435 (N.D. Cal. 1954);
United States v. Bink, 74 F. Supp. 603, 607, 614 (D. Ore. 1947).
587. Cagnina v. United States, 223 F.2d 149, 154 (5th Cir. 1955), citing Orfield, The
Constitutionality of Federal Criminal Rule 20, 34 Cornell L. Q. 129, 135 (1948).
588. United States v. Bryson, 16 F.R.D. 431, 434 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
589. United States v. Jones, 162 F.2d 72, 73 (2d Cir. 1947). Accord, United States v.
Greenberg, 268 F.2d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 1959); Poliafico v. United States, 237 F.2d 97, 113
(6th Cir. 1956) ; United States v. Brothman, 191 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1951) ; see United
States v. Bink, 74 F. Supp. 603, 607 n.2 (D. Ore. 1947).
590. Rodd v. United States, 165 F.2d 54, 56 (9th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 815
(1948). Compare Nemec v. United States, 191 F.2d 810, 811 (9th Cir. 1951), involving
a motion to vacate judgment.
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York. The defendant pleaded not guilty and was tried by the court
after a waiver of trial by jury. The Court of Appeals of the Sixth Cir-
cuit held that where a defendant, represented by counsel, did not raise
the issue of venue before the jury was impaneled and proceeded to trial
on a plea of not guilty, he waived the issue of venue. 0'; A district court
in California upheld waiver, citing cases from the Second, Third, Sixth,
Eighth, Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits.- 2 Shortly thereafter,
waiver was upheld in the Fifth Circuit.," The issue was raised in the
Seventh Circuit, but was left open; the court did not deny that there
could be waiver on proper facts.""
The District Court of Oregon rejected the doctrine of waiver between
districts for pleas of guilty under rule 20.115 The District Court of Maine
rejected the doctrine of waiver between districts as to a transfer of an
alleged noncontinuous offense under rule 21(b)."' The former court
suggested that it is universal practice in federal indictments to allege
the occurrence in the state and district. If there is no such recital, the
trial court should dismiss, and the appellate court should notice the
point.597
Several courts have held that there may be a proper waiver of venue
between districts for a plea of guilty under rule 20. 3 There may be
waiver as to transfer for prejudice under rule 21(a).53 There may be
waiver as to transfer of continuing crimes under rule 21(b).C"o
591. Shetterly v. United States, 205 F.2d S34 (6th Cir. 1953). But see United Statez v.
Lefkoff, 113 F. Supp. 551, 556 (E.D. Tenn. 1953), 63 Yale L. J. 426, 430 (1954).
592. United States v. Bryson, 16 F.R.D. 431, 434-35 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
593. Cagaina v. United States, 223 F.2d 149, 154 (5th Cir. 1955).
594. United States v. Browne, 225 F.2d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 1955).
595. United States v. Bink, 74 F. Supp. 603, 609-10 (D. Ore. 1947). The holding is
defended in 23 B. U. L. Rev. 230, 231 (1943); 36 Geo. L. J. 263, 265 (1943); 16 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 137, 190 (1943). It is criticized in Orfield, The Constitutionality of Federal Criminal
Rule 20, 34 Cornell L. Q. 129 (1943); 43 Colum. L. Rev. 939 (1943); 46 Mich. L. Rev.
964, 967 (1943). See also Comment, 96 U. Pa. L. Rev. 443 (1943); Comment, 53 fich.
L. Rev. 997, 993 (1955).
596. United States v. Holdsv-orth, 9 F.R.D. 198, 203 (D. Ale. 1949). On diizmal of
the appeal, the court of appeals did not follow this reasoning. Holdsworth v. United
States, 179 F.2d 933, 936-37 (1st Cir. 1950).
597. United States v. Bink, 74 F. Supp. 603, 603 (D. Ore. 1947).
593. Hornbrook v. United States, 216 F.2d 112, 113 (5th Cir. 1954). There may ha
an implied waiver as to the division. Earnest v. United States, 193 F.2d 561, 562 (6th Cir.
1952); United States v. Gallagher, 133 F.2d 342, 345 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 913 (1951); Levine v. United States, 132 F.2d 556, 553 (Sth Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 921 (1951); United States v. Bistram, 153 F. Supp. 316, 313 (D.N.). 1957);
United States v. Binion, 107 F. Supp. 630, 631 (D. Nev. 1952).
599. United States v. Parr, 17 F.R.D. 512, 513 (S.D. Tex. 1955).
600. Cagnina v. United States, 223 F.2d 149, 154 (5th Cir. 1955); Holdsworth v.
United States, 179 F.2d 933, 937 (1st Cir. 1950); United States v. Bryson, 16 F.R.I). 431,
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Several cases have held that the issue of venue can be raised during
the trial by a motion for acquittal under rule 29.101 One case found
that there had been a final and conclusive waiver." 2 In favor of allow-
ing a motion for acquittal, it has been said that the defendant cannot
know before trial whether the Government will fail to prove venue. He
can know this only when the Government has concluded its case.00a No
doctrine of waiver was applied to a defendant who committed a crime
"out of the jurisdiction of any particular state or district." ' 4 However,
the crime was treason, and the defendant obtained confidential records
not previously available by showing that the correct venue was else-
where.' o5
Where a defendant knew before trial that she had testified before a
grand jury, the objection that the indictment was procured by testimony
given involuntarily and through violation of constitutional rights must
be raised before trial by motion to dismiss. 00 If not, there is a waiver,
and a motion in arrest of judgment will not lie, nor will a motion to dis-
miss made at the end of the trial. The indictment has been dismissed
where the defendant, against whom criminal informations were pending,
was compelled to testify before a grand jury and was not warned of his
constitutional privilege against self incrimination.0 T
The words "lack of jurisdiction" in rule 12 (b) (2) refer to jurisdiction
of the subject matter.0 8 A defendant cannot waive such jurisdiction. But
434 (NJ). Cal. 1954). But see United States v. Lefkoff, 113 F. Supp. 551, 556 (E.D.
Tenn. 1953).
601. United States v. Browne, 225 F.2d 751, 755 (7th Cir. 1955); United States v.
Brothman, 191 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1951); United States v. Jones, 174 F.2d 746, 748
(7th Cir. 1949).
602. United States v. Bryson, 16 F.R.D. 431, 435 (N.D. Cal. 1954). See also United
States v. Greenberg, 268 F.2d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 1959); Poliafico v. United States, 237 F.2d
97, 113 (6th Cir. 1956).
603. United States v. Browne, 225 F.2d 751, 755 (7th Cir. 1955) (2-to-1 decision).
604. United States v. Provoo, 215 F,2d 531 (2d Cir. 1954). See Orfield, The Venue
of Federal Criminal Cases, 17 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 375, 396 (1956).
605. United States v. Provoo, 215 F.2d 531, 537 (2d Cir. 1954).
606. United States v. Garnes, 156 F. Supp. 467, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 258 F.2d
530 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 937 (1959). The defendant appeared as a wit-
ness before the grand jury, and was not at the time a criminal defendant. See also
United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1956),
10 Sw. L. J. 321, 34 Texas L. Rev. 641, 1956 Wash. U. L. Q. 373; United States v. Klein,
247 F.2d 908, 920 (2d Cir. 1957). See Note, 15 Fed. B. J. 194 (1955).
607. United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). The court
stated that there was inherent power to dismiss. Id. at 678. See Orfield, The Federal Grand
jury, 22 F.R.D. 343, 431-32 (1959).
608. Pon v. United States, 168 F.2d 373, 374 (1st Cir. 1948). See also Bistram v. United
States, 253 F.2d 610, 612 (8th Cir. 1958); United States v. Holdsworth, 9 F.R.D. 198, 201
(D. Me 1949).
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he may waive jurisdiction of the person, such as an illegal arrest ces A
court has jurisdiction even if the defendant was kidnapped from a
foreign country by federal officers, among others, in violation of federal
and international law.610 The defendant should have challenged the lack
of personal jurisdiction by a motion to dismiss. Personal jurisdiction
can be waived in criminal as well as civil cases. It would appear that
the committee annotation to the Second Preliminary Draft was not cor-
rect in stating that the provision that lack of jurisdiction shall always
be noted by the court
is not in entire accord with the present practice in providing that an objection
to lack of jurisdiction of the court may be presented at any time, since lac: of
jurisdiction of the court over the person is waived under the present practice if the
objection is not presented before any plea to the indictment or information. 11
Both before and after the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure juris-
diction of the person and venue could be waived.
A defendant could not, even by invitation, confer jurisdiction on the
court to impose a sentence greater than what the statute permitted.
Hence, a court of appeals can reverse.0 '2 Want of jurisdiction or failure
to charge an offense could be raised for the first time on appeal. 13
The defense of lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter may be filed
shortly before trial in the case of a proceeding wrongly transferred to
the transferee district. 14 The case was in the transferee court and the
decision was of the same court.
The defense of lack of jurisdiction over the offense may be raised by
a motion under section 2255 of Title 28.11 If the accused is not in cus-
tody, he may not make such motion.610
Failure to charge an offense can be raised under rule 12(b)(2) even
after the time for motion in arrest of judgment under rule 34 has ex-
609. Pon v. United States, 16S F.2d 373, 374 (lst Cir. 1943). In this caEa the arrczt
was found to be legal. See also Bistram v. United States, 253 F2d 610, 612 (Sth Cir. 1953).
610. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 5S3, 602-03 (2d Cir.), cert. den J, 344 US.
3S9 (1952).
611. Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Proccdurem, Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, Second Preliminary Draft 63-64 (1944).
612. Shelton v. United States, 165 F.2d 241, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
613. Anderson v. United States, 159 F.2d 202, 204 (6th Cir. 1951).
614. United States v. Holdsworth, 9 F.R.D. 193, 201 (D. Ie. 1949). The conccpt of
jurisdiction over the subject matter may possibly be clarificd by Kenny's statement
that "if the offense is one over vhich no English court at all has jursdiction (e.g, an
offense committed on board a foreign ship on the high scas), this defenze can clearly
be raised not only as a legal objection but even under 'not guilty'." Kenny, OutlinP5 of
Criminal Law 562 (Turner ed. 1953).
615. Keto v. United States, 1S9 F.2d 247, 251 (3th Cir. 1951). See 23 U.S.C. § 2255
(1953).
616. United States v. Bradford, 194 F.2d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1952)
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pired.6 17 The court may notice this defect at "any time during the pend-
ing of the proceeding." The proceeding is still pending when sentence
has not been pronounced. The defect may be noticed on appeal, though
not raised below.618 A motion to dismiss for failure to charge an offense
may be made on the opening day of the trial.619 The court may and
should dismiss on its own motion."' The court is not required to de-
termine the defendant's competency. There is no doctrine of waiver
as to failure to charge an offense.6"'
With respect to collateral attack by motion under section 2255 of
Title 28 for failure to charge an offense, it has been frequently stated
that only under exceptional circumstances is the sufficiency of an in-
dictment or information open to such attack. 2 2 If a federal offense is
charged, the motion does not lie. 23 If no offense is charged, the motion
does lie.624
Rule 12(b) (2) and rule 34 authorize a motion in arrest of judgment.
Both, however, are subject to rule 52 (a) on harmless error.6 25 In effect,
the five day limit provided in rule 34 for motion in arrest of judgment has
been extended by rule 12(b).626 A motion in arrest filed late has been
treated as a motion to vacate under section 2255 of Title 28.27
617. Finn v. United States, 256 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 1958) ; United States v. Yuncker,
147 F. Supp. 97, 99 (S.D. Ind. 1956); United States v. Holmes, 110 F. Supp. 233, 234
(S.D. Tex. 1953).
618. United States v. Calhoun, 257 F.2d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 1958); United States v.
Manuszak, 234 F.2d 421, 422 (3d Cir. 1956); United States v. Smith, 232 F.2d 570, 572
(3d Cir. 1956); Hotch v. United States, 208 F.2d 244, 250 (9th Cir. 1953); Johnson v.
United States, 206 F.2d 806, 808 (9th Cir. 1953).
619. United States v. Mercer, 133 F. Supp. 288, 291 (N.D. Cal. 1955). The motion
was made just after the jury had been impaneled.
620. United States v. Marino, 148 F. Supp. 75, 76 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
621. Finn v. United States, 256 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 1958).
622. Klein v. United States, 204 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1953); Barnes v. United States,
197 F.2d 271, 273 (8th Cir. 1952); Keto v. United States, 189 F.2d 247, 249 (8th Cir.
(1951); Aaron v. United States, 188 F.2d 446 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 954 (1951);
Buono v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 644, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); United States v. Jenkins,
106 F. Supp. 5, 6 (D. Neb. 1952).
623. Rowley v. United States, 191 F.2d 949, 951 (8th Cir. 1951); Banks v. United
States, 140 F. Supp. 837, 838 (S.D. Ind. 1956).
624. Marteney v. United States, 216 F.2d 760, 763 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 953 (1955). See Orfield, Arrest of Judgment in Federal Criminal Procedure, 42 Iowa
L. Rev. 8, 27 (1956).
625. Williams v. United States, 170 F.2d 319, 322 (5th Cir. 1949).
626. Finn v. United States, 256 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 1958); Marteney v. United
States, 216 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1954); Hatch v. United States, 208 F.2d 244, 250 (9th Cir.
1953); United States v. McDonough Co., 180 F. Supp. 511, 515 (S.D. Ohio 1959); United
States v. Holmes, 110 F. Supp. 233 (S.D. Tex. 1953). Compare Marion v. United States,
171 F.2d 185, 186 (9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 944 (1949). See Orfield, Arrest
of Judgment in Federal Criminal Procedure, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 8, 24-28 (1956).
627. Marteney v. United States, 216 F.2d 760, 762 (10th Cir. 1954). But the defendant
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G. Time of Makzg Motion
An attack on an indictment on grounds other than jurisdiction of the
court or that the indictment fails to state an offense must, unless oppor-
tunity to make it was lacking, be made before commencement of trial.r 2
In one case, a defendant was allowed to make a motion to dismiss two
indictments after a plea of not guilty as to each.cYO One case erroneously
referred to a statute now superseded requiring objection to be made
before or within ten days after arraignment. °: ° In one case a defendant
was allowed to make a motion to dismiss two indictments after a plea
of not guilty as to each.031 Failure to charge the mental element of a
crime, such as scienter, cannot be raised by motion in arrest of judg-
ment 632
The district court did not abuse its discretion with respect to the time
for filing a motion to dismiss where, on a plea of not guilty, it gave the
defendants ten days in which to move and then denied a second extension
of time. The defendants alleged no specific grounds for extension
of time.13 3 A defendant did not act timely when he pleaded guilty on
December 16, secured a delay to make certain pretrial motions until
January 14, appeared on January 14 asking for sixty more days, obtained
an extension to only February 18, filed certain motions on February 18,
and on March 15, for the first time, filed a motion attacking the grand
jury. 34 In one case the defendants at the time of their plea of not
guilty were given a month to move to dismiss.635
must be in custody. United States v. McDonough, 1S0 F. Supp. 511, 515 (S.D. Ohio 1959).
62S. Cratty v. United States, 163 F.2d 344, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1947). Here attach for the
first time on appeal was rejected. A motion to dismiss made at the sccond day of the
trial is not timely where the indictment was filed many months before the trial. United
States v. Dale, 223 F.2d 131, 184 (7th Cir. 1955). A motion at the opening of the trial
is too late. Hanf v. United States, 235 F.2d 710, 714 (Sth Cir. 1956). Sre al=- Sales
v. United States, 260 F.2d 21, 45 (4th Cir. 1953).
629. United States v. Dixon, 73 F. Supp. 6S3, 634 (E.D.N.Y. 1947). The method of
impaneling a grand jury shall be attacked before entry of plea unlezs the court p-rmits
it to be made within a reasonable time thereafter. Poliafico v. United Statco, 237 F2d
97, 110 (6th Cir. 1956); United States v. Spinley, 133 F. Supp. 241 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
630. Wright v. United States, 165 F.2d 405, 407 (Sth Cir. 1943). The note to rule
12(b) (3) indicates that the rule supersedes this statute.
631. United States v. Zisblatt Furniture Co., 73 F. Supp. 9, 13 (S.D-.NY. 1943).
Compare 172 F.2d 740, 741 (2d Cir. 1949).
632. United States v. Urffiams, 202 F.2d 712, 713 (5th Cir. 19353).
633. Cleaver v. United States, 23S F.2d 766, 769 (10th Cir. 1956).
634. Scales v. United States, 260 F.2d 21, 46 (4th Cir. 1953).
635. Elkins -. United States, 266 F.2d 5S3, 590 (9th Cir. 1959), rev'd on other grounds,
361 U.S. 810 (1960). The trial court denied motions made after the time permitted. Sea
also United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt & Neckwear Contractors' As.'n, 177 F. Supp.
213, 22S (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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A motion to dismiss should precede a subpoena duces tecum under
rule 17(c)." 6 At the end of the Government's evidence the court will
not permit the defendant to renew all his motions made before trial.aT
The Supreme Court has stated: "Even in federal felony cases where,
unlike state prosecutions, indictment by a grand jury is a matter of right,
this Court has strictly circumscribed the time within which motions ad-
dressed to the composition of the grand jury may be made.""'
H. Hearing on Motion
Under rule 12(b) (4) determination of a motion to dismiss may be
deferred until a trial of the general issue. In a treason prosecution the
legal sufficiency of an overt act shall not be determined until all the
evidence is presented, except when the evidence could not possibly add
anything to what appeared to be an untreasonable act. 3 Whether a
subpoena issued by a congressional committee directing the production
of certain documents is so broad as to violate the fourth amendment is
a mixed question of law and fact which should not be decided on a
motion to dismiss an indictment. 4 It can only be determined at the
trial and on the facts. In general, a motion to dismiss because of the
unconstitutionality of the act creating the substantive offense will be
denied unless the unconstitutionality of the act is apparent on its
face." A motion to dismiss was used to attack the constitutionality
of the Selective Service Act of 1948.642 One case held that a motion to
dismiss, on the ground that the statute making the act an offense was
unconstitutional, was not premature. It did not have to be reserved
until the trial of the case, after evidence had been introduced.6 4a Another
case permitted attack on constitutionality before trial, but objected to
the use of affidavits. 4
Rule 12(b)(4) provides that a motion to dismiss "shall be deter-
mined before trial," but that the hearing may "be deferred for deter-
mination at the trial of the general issue." Where the defendant did not
636. United States v. Long, 15 F.R.D. 25, 27 (D. P.R. 1953). Where the defendant is
granted a bill of particulars or discovery, the trial court sometimes extends the time to
move to dismiss. United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt & Neckwear Contractors' Ass'n,
177 F. Supp. 213, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
637. United States v. Klein, 139 F. Supp. 135, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
638. Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 99 (1955).
639. United States v. Chandler, 72 F. Supp. 230, 235 (D. Mass. 1947).
640. United States v. Bryan, 72 F. Supp. 58, 64 (D.D.C. 1947), rev'd, 174 F.2d 52.5
(D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd, 339 U.S. 323 (1950).
641. United States v. Bridges, 86 F. Supp. 922, 928 (N.D. Cal. 1949); United States
v. Foster, 80 F. Supp. 479, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
642. George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445, 447 (9th Cir. 1952).
643. United States v. Forrester, 105 F. Supp. 136, 137 (N.D. Ga. 1952).
644. United States v. Mungiole, 125 F. Supp. 32, 33 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
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request such deferment, and motions to dismiss were made and denied
at the close of the Government's case and the whole case, the court of
appeals may consider the defendant's contention that overruling his
motion was error.05
Insanity at the time of the offense "is tried to the jury as a part of
the trial under the indictment."040 Subsequent insanity involves an issue
collateral to the trial. When the defendant's present mental condition
is questioned before trial, the court should conduct the inquiry." 7
A district court has held that there was no requirement of trial by
jury as to issues of fact raised with respect to the authority of an assist-
ant United States attorney in connection with a grand jury, the powers
of a grand jury, the presence of an unauthorized person in the grand
jury room, and the absence of evidence to support the indictment.c"
The Constitution did not require a jury trial and the uniform practice
had been not to grant it. Where the issues raised by the motion to
dismiss are issues of law, the court will hear argument on such matters
as questions of law. Examples of issues of law are mentioned in the
first sentence of this paragraph. If general legal argument would not
dispose of the matters, there could be a trial of the controverted facts,
if justice imperatively required it.
A court of appeals has concluded that where there is no issue as to
the facts the judge, not the jury, should pass on the issue of res judicata.ra
It has been pointed out that under rule 47 the motion to dismiss may
be supported by affidavits.ZO The court will not, on motion of the Gov-
ernment, strike an affidavit which does not contain matter relevant to
the general issue raised by the pleadings.05' Affidavits should not be
used to test mixed questions of fact and of constitutional law.c - Affidavits
based on information and belief accompanying a motion to dismiss
645. United States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 663, 677 (2d Cir. 1955).
646. McIntosh v. Pe-scor, 175 F.2d 95, 93 (6th Cir. 1949).
647. United States v. MacLeod, S3 F. Supp. 372 (El). Pa. 1949).
64S. United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 279, 232 (N.D. Cal. 1952). The defendant-
waived a jury trial in open court.
G. Aaron Younquist pointed out, in Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 164 (Holtzoff
Ed. 146), that "there was danger in trying to point which of theze objections were triable
by jury and which were not. It is a very indefinite field, and it would hardly do to mis-
lead the courts and to mislead counsel by saying that such and such an objection may be
tried by the court without the jury, and then to have the Supreme Court later fay that
under the Constitution there was a right of trial by jury... .
649. United States v. Sealfon, 161 F.2d 431, 4S4 (3d Cir. 1947), rev'd on other gro)unds,
332 U.S. 575 (1948).
650. United States v. J. R. Watldns Co., 16 F.R.D. 229, 231, 233 (D, inn. 1954).
Affidavits were used in United States v. Patrisso, 21 F.R.D. 363, 365 (SD.N.Y. 195 3).
651. United States v. Quinn, 111 F. Supp. 370, 873 (ED.N.Y. 1953).
652. United States v. mungiole, 125 F. Supp. 32, 33 (ED. Pa. 1954).
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because of insufficiency of evidence before the grand jury are not suffi-
cient. 53 On a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy, the de-
fendant may supplement his motion by oral testimony. 5 4
Suppose a judge hears a motion to dismiss and denies it. May he or
another trial judge hear further argument? A district court judge has
said that conceding that a judge who determined a matter may entertain
a rehearing of it,
I know of no precedent which would allow one judge in a criminal case to rehear
a matter determined by another, except when the same legal question should arise, at
a subsequent stage of the proceedings, either on the admissibility of testimony, or
on a motion to acquit made at the conclusion of the Government's case, and
grounded on the insufficiency of the evidence.655
Yet, in this case the second judge heard further argument on the suffi-
ciency of the indictment, and considered this as being in the nature of
a "voluntary pre-trial" and not a motion for a rehearing. Like the first
judge, he found the indictment sufficient. Defenses asserted in a de-
fendant's motion to dismiss, denied by a district judge, are not open to
further consideration in the trial of the case before another judge of the
same court.650
I. Effect of Determination
In a case where illegally seized evidence was used before a United
States commissioner who bound over the defendants, the order binding
over was dismissed without prejudice to lawful prosecution of the de-
fendants, and the defendants were continued in the same bail for thirty
days pending the filing of an indictment or information.5 7 In a case
under the Smith Act, the court ordered bail of the defendants at liberty
continued. The defendants in custody were to be held ten days pending
the filing of a new indictment. 55 In another case under the Smith Act
the court ordered the bail of each defendant continued for a period of
twenty-one days pending the filing of a new indictment, subject to such
orders relative to enlargement as were then outstanding.05 9 In one case
the court ordered bail continued for thirty days pending the filing of a
new indictment or information.000
653. United States v. Frontier Asthma Co., 69 F. Supp. 994, 997 (W.D.N.Y. 1947).
654. Kramer v. United States, 166 F.2d 515, 519 (9th Cir. 1948).
655. United States v. Selph, 82 F. Supp. 56, 57 (S.D. Cal. 1949). See also United States
v. Patrisso, 21 F.R.D. 363, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), involving a motion to dismiss for delay
in prosecution.
656. United States v. Jaffe, 98 F. Supp. 191, 192 (D.D.C. 1951).
657. United States v. Cole, 6 F.R.D. 581, 584 (D. Conn. 1947).
658. United States v. Schneiderman, 102 F. Supp. 87, 97 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
659. United States v. Silverman, 129 F. Supp. 496, 514 (D. Conn. 1955).
660. United States v. MacKenzie, 170 F. Supp. 797, 800 (D. Me. 1959).
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With respect to the last sentence of rule 12(b) (5) a circuit judge has
pointed out: "That savings clause preserves the provisions of statutes
permitting reindictment if the original indictment is found defective or
dismissed for certain irregularities, and the statute of limitations has
Where an indictment is dismissed on a technical ground, such as
duplicity, a new indictment may be foundc0 2
Where defendant's motion for dismissal of an indictment is denied,
he cannot take an immediate appeal'C 3 Such an appeal therefore will
be dismissed by the court of appeals. The order denying dismissal is
not a "final decision" under section 1291 of Title 23.c°i The court of
appeals will not grant a stay in order for the defendant to apply to the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
J. Right to Counsel
As was true before the adoption of the rules, there has been little
discussion of the right to counsel. In a leading case, the Supreme Court
stated: "Prior to trial an accused is entitled to rely upon his counsel
to make an independent examination of the facts, circumstances, plead-
ings and laws involved and then to offer his informed opinion as to what
plea should be entered. ' 'ce5 However, this statement was made in con-
nection with a plea of guilty; the right to counsel in making a plea of
guilty was more directly involved. The Supreme Court also stated:
"Arraignment is too important a step in a criminal proceeding to give
such wholly inadequate representation to one charged with a crime.cco
There should be no "hollow compliance with the mandate of the Con-
stitution at a stage so important as arraignment." With respect to waiver
of counsel on a plea of guilty, the Supreme Court stated: "To be valid
such a waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the
charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allow-
able punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and cir-
cumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad
understanding of the whole matter." 07
661. United States v. Brodson, 234 F.2d 97, 102 (7th Cir. 1956).
662. United States v. Potishman, 230 F.2d 271, 274 (5th Cir.), cert. denicd, 351 U.S.
913 (1956).
663. Kyle v. United States, 211 F.2d 912, 914 (9th Cir. 1954).
664. Atlantic Fishermen's Union v. United States, 197 F.2d 519 (Ist Cir. 19S2). ze
2S U.S.C. § 1291 (1958).
665. Von Mloltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 703, 721 (194S). See Gann v. Gough, 79 F. Supp.
912, 916 (N.D. Ga. 1943), which is discussed by Baiter, Vsignment of Counsl in Federal
Courts to Defend Indigent Persons Accused of Crime, 24 Calif. B. J. 1140 117 (1943);
Beaney, The Right to Counsel in American Courts 61-63 (1955).
666. Id. at 723.
667. Id. at 724.
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The right of the defendant to counsel to raise defenses and objections
under rule 12 is somewhat connected with his right to counsel when he
makes a plea of guilty under rule 11. One court has held that a de-
fendant without counsel at arraignment and plea is constitutionally
entitled to considerable explanation and discussion of the charge against
him and the facts relating to a decision to plead guilty.'6 8 Another court
held that the trial court need not explain and set out for the accused
the possible defenses he might have to the charges against him, even if
counsel is waived. The waiver, however, must be competent, intelligent,
and intentional.069 The Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit has con-
cluded that the trial court should advise the defendant concerning the
notice of the charge, the range of possible punishment, defenses, and
circumstances in mitigation, as well as of the right to counsel. 0 A
similar view has been taken in the Second Circuit,"" and is probably
the view of the Fourth"72 and the District of Columbia Circuits.0 7 If
the defendant pleads guilty without counsel, the failure to appoint
counsel is not prejudicial, if counsel is appointed immediately thereafter
and full opportunity is given to withdraw the plea of guilty.7 4 The fed-
eral cases on this point followed a similar ruling of the Supreme Court
as to state court cases. 75 A recent case held that the failure of the trial
judge to inform the defendant of his right to counsel when he pleaded
guilty was cured when the defendant was represented by counsel at the
time of sentence and had the opportunity to move to withdraw his plea
but failed to do so. 676
Absence of counsel at arraignment when the defendant pleads not
guilty is not a basis for release.17 7 The Constitution does not guarantee
counsel in such a case.67M The Court of Appeals of the District of Colum-
bia has stated: "It has not been the custom in this jurisdiction to assign
counsel upon arraignment if the plea is not guilty, and we are not advised
668. Howard v. United States, 186 F.2d 778, 779 (6th Cir. 1951).
669. Michener v. United States, 181 F.2d 911, 919 (8th Cir. 1950).
670. Snell v. United States, 174 F.2d 580, 582 (10th Cir. 1949).
671. United States v. Lester, 247 F.2d 496, 499 (2d Cir. 1957).
672. Gundlach v. United States, 262 F.2d 72, 76 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
904 (1959).
673. Smith v. United States, 265 F.2d 99, 100 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
843 (1959). But see Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707, 710 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 847 (1958).
674. Council v. Clemmer, 177 F.2d 22, 23 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 880 (1949);
Hiatt v. Gann, 170 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 920 (1949).
675. Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82, 85 (1946).
676. Young v. United States, 228 F.2d 693, 694 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
913 (1956).
677. Ruben v. Welch, 159 F.2d 493 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 184 (1947).
678. Council v. Clemmer, 177 F.2d 22, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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that it has been the custom in other jurisdictions."0 O The law may be
summarized in the words of Professor Fellman: "It has been held that
an accused is entitled to assistance of a lawyer upon arraignment whether
he pleads guilty or not, but the weight of authority seems to be other-
wise.""es' He has also stated that the lower federal courts
disagree as to whether the right accrues at arraignment, though the better view, is
that one needs the advice of counsel on the crucial question of how to plead. Some
judges have taken the position that how one pleads doesn't matter so much because
counsel are always free to change the plea later. However, once a plea of guilty has
been entered, a very damaging admission has been made, and counsel may be un-
derstandably reluctant to try to undo the harm later by changing the plea. State
courts are practically unanimous in agreeing that the right to counsel accrues at
arraignment.6s1
Will inadequacy of counsel be presumed from a failure to move to
dismiss? In a state court case the Supreme Court held that it would
not where the matter was within counsel's discretion and there were
valid reasons for not moving. -2
IV. MoDEIN RFroRm PRoPosAs
The late G. Aaron Youngquist has pointed out that rule 12 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure "gave the committee more trouble
than any other rule in the book" and resulted in a "very drastic rule"
which "should very materially aid in clearing away the underbrush in
criminal prosecutions. '161 3 The rule seems to have worked very well in
practice. Rule 25 of the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws, approved in
1953, is modeled very closely on Federal Criminal Rule 12. Comment
on rule 12 has been uniformly favorable.P1 Similar procedure for the
states has been urged.15  New Jersey and Maryland have adopted
rules of court following the federal rule. Sections of the American Law
Institute Code are substantially similar.""0 The drafters of the Uniform
Rules pointed out that sections of the Institute Code made specific pro-
679. Ibid.
680. Fellman, The Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Courts, 30 INb. L. Re%.
559, 5S9 (1951).
6S1. Fellman, The Defendant's Rights 123 (1953).
6S2. Mlichel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 100 (1955).
683. Federal Rules of Procedure 162-63 (Holtzoff Ed. 1946).
6S4. Berge, Some Comments on the Proposed Federal Ruks of Criminal Procedure,
34 J. Crim. L. 222, 224 (1944); Cumming, The Third Great Adventure, 29 A.B AJ. 654,
655 (1944); Harno, The Proposed Rules of Federal Criminal Proccdure, 42 Mich. L. Rev.
623, 625 (1944).
635. Rossman, Study of Rules 10-17 of the Federal Rules, 25 Ore. L. Rev. 21, 29-31
(1946).
6S6. ALI. Code §§ 207-22.
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vision for specifying in the motion the facts upon which defenses are
based."8 7 They decided, however, not to follow the Institute Code, agree-
ing that there would be danger in an attempt to specify issues triable
by a jury.6 8 They also considered but rejected a provision equivalent
to federal rule 47, stating the grounds upon which it is made and the
relief or order sought. They rejected a provision that failure to plead
insanity should not preclude raising the issue later. The first sentence of
Uniform Rule 25 differs from the first sentence of federal rule 12, list-
ing nolo contendere in brackets. It also lists in brackets "not guilty
by reason of insanity as provided by statute." It also states in brackets:
"here insert any other procedures used in a particular State, as, e.g.,
where trial is on complaint and warrant on appeal from a magistrate."
The last sentence of rule 25, unlike the federal rule, fixes a maximum
time for holding in custody or continuing bail if the defendant's motion
to dismiss is granted. English pleading today remains very much as it has
been in the past.68
687. A.L.I. Code §§ 212-14.
688. They cited to this effect Dession, New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure II,
56 Yale L. J. 197, 213 (1947); Orfield, Criminal Procedure From Arrest to Appeal 289,
290 (1947).
689. Archbold, Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice 139-60 (32d ed. 1949); Kenny,
Outlines of Criminal Law 556-58, 560-65 (Turner ed. 1958); Orfield, Criminal Procedure
From Arrest to Appeal 266-72 (1947).
